The author of the article introduces Hayden White’s, Frank Ankersmit’s, and Jouni-Matti Kuukkanen’s constructive understanding of history. He contrasts their understandings of history with the traditional understanding, which supposes direct correspondence of historical work to the past. In his presentations of constructive thought, he points out their emphasis on legitimate possibilities of different methods of construction and ways of presentation, which result in different historical representations of historical events. Differences among historical representations of the past can also be related to the historian’s choice of different constructive methods and also the involvement of his/her preferred moral and political values. These constructive understandings of history, with the deeper analysis of process writing, incite the historian to deeper ethical self-awareness of his/her work.
The author of the article introduces Hayden White’s, Frank Ankersmit’s, and Jouni-Matti Kuukkanen’s constructivist understanding of history. He contrasts their understandings of history with the traditional understanding, which supposes direct correspondence of historical work to the past. In his presentations of constructivist thought, he points out their emphasis on legitimate possibilities of different methods of construction and ways of presentations, which result in different historical representations of historical events. Differences among historical representations of the past can also be related to the historian’s choice of different constructive methods and also the involvement of his/her preferred moral and political values. These constructivist understandings of history, with the deeper analysis of process writing, incite the historian to deeper ethical self-awareness of his/her work.
In the course of their discussion of historical explanation, historical narrative etc. philosophers of history repeatedly touched upon the metaphilosophical questions concerning the nature and the role of the philosophy of history. Especially during the last decades, some of the critics of the prescriptive approach advocated the need to focus on describing the actual historical works and the genuine historical practice. According to the advocates of the descriptive or bottom-up approach, philosophers of history should prescribe historians neither what they ought to do nor how their works ought to look like. Philosophers should rather follow the views of historians and describe their outcomes. Although this return to historical works and historical practice looks appealing, the author argues that one should not naively reduce philosophy of history to a mere description. It is important that philosophers of history follow the work of historians but they must anyway interpret what they find in historical discipline. Making use of examples from the writings of Paul Roth, he concludes that philosophy of history should try to fruitfully combine descriptive and prescriptive approaches.
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