This paper is a part of my research into the history of the concept of intuition and the category of insight in the writings of Canadian philosopher and theologian Bernard Lonergan (1904-1984). Philosophical discussions make use of many partly or totally different concepts of intuition, and the variety of those concepts is related to many aspects of intuition: the type of 'object' that intuition is; the way intuition grasps its object; its epistemic functions, etc. From the metatheoretical point of view the question is: historically, what type of 'object' (designatum) was denoted by the term intuition and its foreign language counterparts? In employing the term designatum of 'intuition' I am looking for more general categories for intuition. In classical terms, it is about finding the genus proximus for intuition. I distinguish and characterize three basic types of denotation of the term intuition: 1) (intuitive) knowing, as a cognitive act (for example insight), or as something that is not an act, or as a process; 2) (intuitive) knowledge, as propositional knowledge (propositions, beliefs) or as non-propositional knowledge (knowledge-how or knowledge by acquaintance), and 3) faculty (for example intellect) or ability (disposition) of mind to produce intuitive knowledge.
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