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HORWICH ON THE VALUE OF TRUTH

100%
Lee D. B.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
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2020
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vol. 27
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issue 2
263 – 279
EN
On the normativity objection to Horwich’s minimalist theory of truth, his theory fails to capture the value of truth. In response to this objection, he argues that his minimalist theory of truth is compatible with the value of truth. On his view, the concept of truth is not constitutively normative, but the value of true beliefs can be explained instead by the belief-truth norm that we ought to want our beliefs to be true, and the value of true beliefs expressed in this norm is a moral value. I accept a deflationary theory of truth, according to which truth is too thin a concept to be constituted by any substantial norms. Thus I agree that the concept of truth is not constitutively normative. In this paper, however, I argue that the alleged value of true beliefs can be better explained in terms of epistemic normativity rather than moral normativity.
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NATURALISM AND SEMANTIC FACTS. ON PAUL HORWICH'S SEMANTIC DEFLATIONISM (Nataralizm a fakty semantyczne. Rozwazania nad semantycznym deflacjonizmem Paula Horwicha)

88%
Derra A.
Analiza i Egzystencja. Czasopismo Filozoficzne
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2008
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issue 7
89-108
EN
The article consist of three parts, in which the authoress analyses Paul Horwich's semantic deflationism as an example of naturalistic theory of language. In the first introductory part, she introduces the basic theses of the theory of truth and theory of meaning given by Horwich. In the second, she proposes terminological solutions concerning naturalism and reductionism. In the third substantial part, she presents some objections to the postulated reductionist consequences of Horwich's theory that can be found in the literature. She claims that his theory is in fact naturalistic, but not reductionist in a way described by Horwich's opponents. In the last part, she discusses the problem of normativity in the context of the presented theory, pointing out that some of Horwich's proposals are insufficient and need to be supplemented.
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