The aim of this paper is the exploration of Heidegger's interpretation of the phenomenon of technology against the background of his new vision of reality. It can be said that in this context sin which was formerly moral and religious became in our age, as it were, technological. Because man has distanced himself from the Nature, he finds himself at the same time alienated and guilty, contemplating, like a child brazen in the brainlessness of what he has done and waiting in anguish the imminent punishment of a mother who does not forgive. Cum multis aliis, it is not only ugliness with which Heidegger reproaches technoscience but aggressiveness as well.
In the last two decades, the question of religion has become a central concern of many philosophers belonging to the Continental philosophical tradition. As the interest in religion has grown within Continental philosophy, so also has the question of Martin Heidegger’s relationship with religion. This paper poses the question of what religion meant to Martin Heidegger in the development of phenomenology as ontology; how he preconceived the notion of religion and why he eventually denied any authenticity to religion. In engaging with this question, the paper will also attempt to disclose some delimitations of Heidegger’s approach to religion.
It is a commonplace assumption that there are realities and types of experience words are just not able to handle. I find the recourse to ineffability to be an evasive tactic and argue that there is inherently nothing beyond words and that this fact has ethical implications. I offer three theoretical considerations in support of my claim. The first two deal with the infinite nature of language itself, as understood first in Chomsky and then Derrida. The third deals with the linguistically structured nature of human experience. Expanding on Heidegger, I then draw some ethical implications from language’s inexhaustibility.
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