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Central European Papers
|
2013
|
vol. 1
|
issue 2
51-63
EN
Hungarian society and the government never approved of the loss of the northern region populated by Hungarians and Slovaks, just as they never accepted the loss of other territories of the former Kingdom of Hungary. They endeavoured to regain those territories during the interbellum years. The annexation of Slovakia was in the focus of Hungarian revisionary thought, cherished by both political and military circles. Hungarian politicians especially resented the loss of Upper Hungary, second only to the loss of Transylvania, because this region had played an essential role in the economy of the Kingdom of Hungary. Hungarian propaganda implied that since Czechoslovakia had no historical traditions as a state, it would be the easiest target to break up in order to regain the lost territories. In their view, Czechoslovakia was an artificial construction which could thank the great powers for its existence, and therefore could be defeated relatively easily in an appropriate moment. After the Anschluss in 1938, the Hungarian diplomacy tried to negotiate a potential incorporation of Slovakia to Hungary based on autonomy with Slovak political representatives. Polish foreign policy representatives acted as mediators in these talks. On the other hand, Josef Tiso and his political mates wanted to achieve that the Polish, German and perhaps the Hungarian leadership support the recognition of the Slovaks as political nation, possibly their autonomy or directly their independence. Also Slovak politicians held secret negotiations with the Hungarians. From the Slovak party, the negotiations with the Hungarians could be regarded simply as tactics, but they rejected it indeed, thus these talks ended without success.
Central European Papers
|
2013
|
vol. 1
|
issue 1
27-40
EN
Hungarian society and the government never approved of the loss of the northern region populated by Hungarians and Slovaks, just as they never accepted the loss of other territories of the former Kingdom of Hungary. They endeavoured to regain those territories during the interbellum years. The annexation of Slovakia was in the focus of Hungarian revisionary thought, cherished by both political and military circles. Hungarian politicians especially resented the loss of Upper Hungary, second only to the loss of Transylvania, because this region had played an essential role in the economy of the Kingdom of Hungary. Hungarian propaganda implied that since Czechoslovakia had no historical traditions as a state, it would be the easiest target to break up in order to regain the lost territories. In their view, Czechoslovakia was an artificial construction which could thank the great powers for its existence, and therefore could be defeated relatively easily in an appropriate moment. After the Anschluss in 1938, the Hungarian diplomacy tried to negotiate a potential incorporation of Slovakia to Hungary based on autonomy with Slovak political representatives. Polish foreign policy representatives acted as mediators in these talks. On the other hand, Josef Tiso and his political mates wanted to achieve that the Polish, German and perhaps the Hungarian leadership support the recognition of the Slovaks as political nation, possibly their autonomy or directly their independence. Also Slovak politicians held secret negotiations with the Hungarians. From the Slovak party, the negotiations with the Hungarians could be regarded simply as tactics, but they rejected it indeed, thus these talks ended without success.
EN
Budapest government established between 1918–1922 their own irredentist organizations and supported movements, which tried to undermine the idea of Czecho-Slovak statehood. Between the two word wars the idea of acquiring Upper Hungary became the objective number one regarding Hungarian revision, engaging the atention of both the political and military circles. Hungarian leadership made every effort all along to cross the rapprochment of the Czech and Slovak nations. Especially the groups of emigrants, who had voluntarily or involuntarily left the territory of the emerging Czechoslovak Republic, became substantially engaged in this direction. For Budapest was the best person highly educated and ambitious priest František Jehlička. In my study, I tried to give an objektive illustration about Jehlička life between (1918–1938) who played a significant but very controversial role in this action. Jehlička was not one of the new faces in Slovak politics. In 1906, he was already elected as member of the Hungarian parlament for the constituency of Pezinok. He belonged to the Slovak Peoples Party and many of his ideological associates saw him as the young hope of Slovak politics. He was accused of betraying the national interest for the sake of a university career. Jehlička again began to engage in politics in the autumn of 1918. By the side of Andrej Hlinka, he began to build up the Slovak Peoples Party. Jehlička was openly criticized the situaton in Czechoslovakia after 1919. He decided to return to the pro-Hungarian platform and openly support them. He left Czechoslovakia, and he became emigrant in Hungary, Poland and Austria.
CS
Budapešťská vláda mezi lety 1918–1922 vytvořila vlastní iredentistickou organizaci podporující hnutí, které se pokoušelo podkopat ideu česko-slovenské státnosti. Mezi dvěma světovými válkami se myšlenka na získání Horních Uher stala předmětem číslo jedna maďarského revizionismu, poutající pozornost politických i vojenských kruhů. Maďarské vedení vyvinulo veškerou možnou snahu, aby narušilo sbližování českého a slovenského národa. Zvláště skupiny emigrantů, kteří ať už dobrovolně nebo nedobrovolně opouštěli území nově se formující Československé republiky, se staly značně angažované na vedení. Pro Budapešť byla nejvýznamnější osoba vzdělaného a ambiciózního kněze Františka Jehličky. V této studii se pokouším poskytnou objektivní popis Jehličkova života mezi lety 1918–1938, kdy v této akci hrál významnou, ale kontroverzní roli. Jehlička nebyl novou tváří na slovenské politické scéně. V roce 1906 byl již zvolen jako člen Maďarského parlamentu ve volebním obvodě Pezinok. Patřil ke Slovenské lidové straně a mnoho z jeho ideologických podporovatelů v něm spatřovalo mladou naději slovenské politiky. Byl obžalován ze zrady národních zájmů kvůli své univerzitní kariéře. Znovu se stal Jehlička politicky činným na podzim 1918. Za stranu Andreje Hlinky začal budovat Slovenskou lidovou stranu. Jehlička otevřeně kritizoval situaci v Československu po roce 1919. Rozhodl se vrátit do promaďarsky orientované platformy a otevřeně ji podpořil. Emigroval postupně do Maďarska, Polska a Rakouska.
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