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1

To Prove the Evident: On the Inferential Role of Euclidean Diagrams

100%
Crippa D.
Teorie vědy (Theory of Science)
|
2009
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vol. 31
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issue 2
101-112
EN
Diagrams have been rightly acknowledged to license inferences in Euclid's geometric practice. However, if on one hand purely visual proofs are to be found nowhere in the Elements, on the other, fully fledged proofs of diagrammatically evident statements are offered, as in El. I. 20: 'In any triangle the sum of two sides is greater than the third'. In this paper the author explains, taking as a starting point Kenneth Manders' analysis of Euclidean diagram, how exact and co-exact claims enter proposition I. 20. Then, he ultimately argues that this proposition serves broader explanatory purposes, enhancing control on diagram appearance.
2

PREČO LEN (NUTNÉ) PRAVDY AKO PREDPOKLADY DEDUKTÍVNYCH ÚSUDKOV?

88%
Gahér F., Bielik L.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
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2013
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vol. 20
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issue suppl. 2
75 – 97
EN
The aim of the paper is to examine Tichý’s understanding of the term “assumption”. We show that Tichý distinguishes two approaches to inference: the one-dimensional view that treats inferences as a sequences of logical rules or axioms as well as hypotheses and their logical consequences; and the two-dimensional view specifying inference as a derivation of one entailment from (the set of) another entailment(s). It is claimed that Tichý is right in his critique of Meinong’s concept of assumption as ‘assertion without conviction’. Nevertheless, Tichý – in addition to his logical concept of assumption – uses, though unreflectively, also the epistemic concept of assumption. Henceforth, we claim that accepting Tichý’s rejection of the epistemic hypothetical assumptions we couldn’t use logic as an instrument for empirical knowledge enhancement. We believe, to the contrary, that the epistemic assumptions may become a basis for derivations and knowledge enhancement, even though they do not represent necessary truths.
3

VYUŽITIE POJMU ZHODA V HYPERINTENZIONÁLNEJ DEDUKCII

88%
Bielik L., Gahér F.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
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2013
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vol. 20
|
issue suppl. 2
98 – 111
EN
The paper deals with the usefulness of Pavel Tichý’s concept of match between two (or more) constructions for the deduction and inference considerations. Tichý’s preference of the two-dimensional view on inference instead of the one-dimensional view is criticized. The reasons for the implementation of the match concept are elucidated. The logical expressiveness of the match concept is demonstrated through its implementation to the Natural Deduction System explicated in the hyper-intensional framework of Transparent Intensional Logic.
4

UNDERSTANDING ENKRATIC REASONING

88%
Gjelsvik O.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
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2013
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vol. 20
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issue 4
464 – 483
EN
Beginning from John Broome’s approach to Enkrasia, the paper quickly moves to giving a condensed presentation of an approach to practical reasoning motivated by a Fregean approach to inference (in theoretical reasoning). The suggested account of practical reasoning avoids using rationality requirements to do explanatory work when accounting for correct reasoning, and thus avoids lots of problems. It is strictly conservative in its approach, and no new inference rules are required for moving from the theoretical to the practical case. It is suggested that we can stick to deductive reasoning when accounting for practical proper; the crucial premise from theoretical reasoning about practical matters cannot normally be established this way. The paper moves on to tackle counterarguments to the effect that there will simply be too little correct practical reasoning on the present (deductive) approach. The simple account of correct reasoning has too high a cost, it is argued. The paper meets this objection when it argues that much reasoning is enthymematic or incomplete reasoning. By making specific claims about how there may be practical premises to which we do not attend even when there are, in some sense, before the mind, the approach is defended.
5

Psychologia społeczna a neuronauki: Dominacja, separacja, czy satysfakcjonujący związek?

75%
Winkielman P.
Psychologia Społeczna
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2008
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vol. 3
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issue 1(6)
11-22
EN
Contemporary social psychology makes rich use of theories and methods from neuroscience. The new discipline of social neuroscience also enjoys much popularity. In this article, I show historical and intellectual reasons behind the interest of social psychologists in biological explanations, and consider the role of such explanations in our discipline. I suggest that the background of the current acceptance of biological approaches lies in the weakening of the computer metaphor that sharply separated the mind and the brain, and in an improved understanding of the necessity for the multilevel analysis of social behavior. I also emphasize the development of powerful new technologies, conceptual advances, and an improvement in inferences about psychological variables from biological data. Due to these advances, psychophysiological research helps us identify new phenomena and solve theoretical debates in social psychology. Throughout this article, I also show dangers that come from naïve interpretation of physiological data, and highlight the uniqueness of psychological level of analysis. In conclusion, I state that social psychology and neuroscience not only need, but might be necessary for each other.
6

INTUITIVE THOUGHT AND 'ORDINARY' COGNITIONS

75%
Kusa D.
Studia Psychologica
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2011
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vol. 53
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issue 2
111-122
EN
The study is aimed at analysing the position of intuitive thought as reflected in current polemics within the dual processes models. In the first section, theories concerned with functionality of heuristics are presented, where evolutionary and ecological lenses offer insights that uncover details of human cognitive functioning under uncertainty and time pressure. The shift from normative models towards alternative explanations of 'heuristic person' reasoning is discussed. In the second section, views of human cognitive uniqueness as manifested in inferential activity are presented, emphasizing the primacy of inferential cognitions in progression of human intelligence. Within cognitive linguistics and sociolinguistics, transmission and comprehension of relevant meanings is attributed to cognitive mechanisms that go beyond mere verbal functioning and underlie mutually efficient strategies in communication of humans as intelligent actors in various environments.
7
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AMBISEMY AS A CATEGORY OF FUNCTIONAL SEMANTICS

75%
Kiklewicz A.
Biuletyn Polskiego Towarzystwa Językoznawczego
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2008
|
vol. 64
63-76
EN
The article concentrates on the controversial questions of functional semantics, and namely the semantic distinctness of words in linguistic communication. The author distinguishes two levels of meaning variants: polysemy (semantic mutations) and diasemy (semantic modifications). Based on the example of possessive pronouns the author argues for the necessity of using the notion of semantic invariant in linguistics. The invariant category is realized in the language system as ambisemy, i. e. the reference to cognitive base of the linguistic subjects, which has nomothetic or empirical character during interpretation of compositional signs (especially formal indiscreet, semantically ambivalent). Two components are distinguished of the structure of meaning: endosemantic, which in case of the derived words is identical with their internal form, as well as exosemantic, which shows the sender's knowledge on the subject of standard relation between referents of word group components.
8

THE ROLE OF DISJUNCTION IN SOME ALLEGED NON-MONOTONIC INFERENCES

75%
Lopéz - Astorga M.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
|
2017
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vol. 24
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issue 1
2 – 9
EN
Lukowski has argued that, if it is the case that there are actual non-monotonic inferences, they are very hard to find. In this paper, a representative kind of inference that is often considered to be non-monotonic is addressed. Likewise, certain arguments provided by Lukowski to demonstrate that that type of inference is not really non-monotonic are reviewed too. Finally, the author proposes an explanation of why, despite the fact that the arguments given by him seem to be convincing, it is usually thought that those inferences are not monotonic. In this way, the author also tries to account for the role that disjunction has in this issue and argue in favour of the idea that we can continue to suppose that the human mind does not ignore the essential requirements of classical logic.
9

JE MILL NAOZAJ PREDCHODCA ZNÁMEHO VYSVETLENIA KONTRAFAKTUÁLOV?

75%
Gahér F.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
|
2019
|
vol. 74
|
issue 4
259 – 277
EN
In the discussion on counterfactuals Ramsey invoked Mill's opinion, when he defended the explanation that counterfactuals are elliptical deductive arguments. Similarly, Ramsey's followers did so. However, a more in-depth investigation reveals that Mill's view that conditionals (implications) express inferences is neither set within some theory of deduction, nor within propositional logic, which he could not adequately grasp due to his extreme inductivism. Mill's view of conditionals was simply inspired by Whately. Therefore, Ramsay's designation of Mill as the forerunner of the explanation of counterfactuals in his line is hasty and unjustified. On the other hand, while Whately, unlike Mill, adequately explains the role of deduction in categorical syllogism and partly also in propositional logic, we do not find in his work sufficient support for the explanation of counterfactuals as elliptical expressions of deductive arguments. That is simply because Whately in case of compound statements, including conditionals, unambiguously prefers content-based, nonlogic inference to logical inference.
10

Konstrukcja dowodu prima facie na tle niemieckiej instytucji der Anscheinsbeweis

63%
Kubień K.
Kwartalnik Prawa Prywatnego
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2011
|
vol. 20
|
issue 1
233-257
EN
In both Polish and German law there is a legal institution similar to the common law doctrine of 'res ipsa loquitur. In both Poland and Germany this legal institution is called prima facie proof, or respectively 'dowód prima facie' and 'der Anscheinsbeweis'. In Poland prima facie proof is used almost exclusively in inventory deficit and medical malpractice cases. In all mentioned jurisdictions prima facie proof has the function of easing the burden of proof. In Germany prima facie proof is commonly used. There are some minor exceptions, such as the proof of someone's intention. In Germany the doctrine of prima facie proof is well established and a predominant view of scholars, which is consistent with the rulings of the Federal High Court of Justice (BGH), can be identified. In Poland there are great discrepancies among the scholars. On the contrary, the Polish High Court (SN) demonstrates a clear understanding of the meaning of the doctrine. The view represented by the Polish High Court is clearly underrepresented among Polish scholars. The described phenomena give opportunity to compare both institutions of law in order to learn and draw conclusions for the future. In the first part of the article the Polish prima facie proof institution is analyzed. The different views of the doctrine are presented. The second part deals with the German construction of prima facie proof. The four legal concepts of the institution are presented: the burden of proof theory, the standard of evidence theory, the substantive law theory, the evaluation of evidence theory. Consequently the dominant theory in Germany is analyzed in detail. At the end some conclusions are made. The view of the Polish high court is very similar to the German concept presented by the standard of evidence theory. The essence of the concept is that prima facie proof when applied has the function of lowering the standard of evidence. Such a decrease of the standard of evidence by the court has been perceived inacceptable in Germany where regulation of the standard of evidence is reserved to laws enacted by the Parliament. Therefore in Germany the evaluation of evidence theory prevailed. In Poland the standard of evidence is also generally set up by laws. Nethertheless the Polish High Court clearly states that prima facie proof has the function of lowering the standard of evidence. This interesting phenomenom is judge-made law, which is otherwise generally considered prohibited in Poland. Prima facie proof has the important function of correcting the system of burden of proof in both Poland and Germany, which is particularly important because of the high standard of evidence applied in these countries. Therefore a further study of the phenomenom is necessary. It should be better described and analyzed, additional fields of application considered.
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