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Interpretowanie literatury: obrona intencjonalizmu i pluralizmu

100%
Bjelčevič A.
Świat i Słowo
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2013
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vol. 11
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issue 1(20)
27-37
EN
I defend two positions concerning interpretation of literature: hypothetical in-tentionalism and critical pluralism. I will address four questions: What is the concept of interpretation? Do we interpret literature differently than non-literature? What are the aims of interpretation? Are there many acceptable interpretations of a given work (the question of pluralism)? My answers are: The concept of interpretation refers in particular to the interpretation of tropes and figures (metaphors, ironies, allegories, etc..). Literary tropes and figures can be interpreted the same way as non-literary. The question “What is the author trying to say with his literary work” is a legitimate question (although sometimes difficult) and seeking the answer to this question is a proper aim of interpretation. When interpreting a literary work readers can make several acceptable (and unacceptable) hypotheses about authorial intention; and the key to the meaning of a literary work is given by the best hypothesis from the position of an informed and competent reader. In addition to that an interpretation may have other legitimate aims (what meanings a text could have for non intended/non implied audience; making a text the best possible artwork etc.). Plurality of interpretations is therefore possible due to different acceptable hypotheses about author’s intentions and different intepretative aims.
2

HARMAN ON MENTAL PAINT AND THE TRANSPARENCY OF EXPERIENCE

61%
Demircioglu E.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
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2020
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vol. 27
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issue 1
56 – 81
EN
Harman famously argues that a particular class of anti-functionalist arguments from the intrinsic properties of mental states or events (in particular, visual experiences) can be defused by distinguishing “properties of the object of experience from properties of the experience of an object” and by realizing that the latter are not introspectively accessible (or are transparent). More specifically, Harman argues that we are or can be introspectively aware only of the properties of the object of an experience but not the properties of the experience of an object and hence that the fact that functionalism leaves out the properties of the experience of an object does not show that it leaves out anything mentally relevant. In this paper, I argue that Harman’s attempt to defuse the anti-functionalist arguments in question is unsuccessful. After making a distinction between the thesis of experiencing-act transparency and the thesis of mental-paint transparency, (and casting some doubt on the former,) I mainly target the latter and argue that it is false. The thesis of mental-paint transparency is false, I claim, not because mental paint involves some introspectively accessible properties that are different from the properties of the objects of experiences but because what I call the identity thesis is true, viz. that mental paint is the same as (an array of) properties of the object of experience. The identification of mental paint with properties of the object of experience entails that the anti-functionalist arguments Harman criticizes cannot be rightly accused of committing the fallacy of confusing the two.
3
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Defending ‘the Artist’s Theory’: Wollheim’s Lost Idea Regained?

51%
McFee G.
Estetika: The Central European Journal of Aesthetics
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2010
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vol. 47
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issue 1
3-26
EN
The paper considers an argument of Richard Wollheim's, originally presented in a 1976 symposium with Goodman and Wiggins, which disappeared when the symposium contribution was 'reprinted' in the supplementary essays to the expanded edition of Art and Its Objects (Wollheim, 1980). It lays out the argument's original context, locating its objectives by means of a comparison with Goodman's autographic/allographic distinction, with its attendant discussion of the 'history of production', and presents Wollheim's defence of 'the artist's theory'. This defence coheres in interesting ways with Wollheim's aesthetics emphasis on the importance of the artist's intention (suitably understood) as part of a specification of what the work itself is. This conception reinforces the importance Wollheim grants both to the fulfilled intentions of the artist and to a suitably positioned, suitably informed, and suitably sensitive spectator. Both should be modelled as operating under the aegis of the artist's theory, a notion this 'missing' argument serves to emphasize.
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