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EN
In this study, we investigated the hypothesis that correct responders are at a metacognitive advantage compared to intuitively incorrect responders because they are aware that there exists an appealing but incorrect response that many would fall for. A total of 169 participants solved three CRT tasks, followed by questions about the perceived difficulty of the tasks and the most probable incorrect response that others gave. The results mainly confirmed the hypothesis: the more correct responses (or the less intuitive responses) participants gave, the more they were correct about the most prevalent incorrect responses of others. Furthermore, the more correct responses (or the less intuitive responses) participants had, the more difficult they found the tasks to be, perhaps due to the awareness of the incorrect but appealing response that would trick many others into giving a wrong response. Interestingly, the number of nonsensical responses (those neither correct nor intuitive) was positively related both to awareness of appealing incorrect responses and to the perceived difficulty of the task. This indicates that even those participants who seemingly gave nonsensical responses to CRT tasks might have a metacognitive advantage over intuitively incorrect responders. We discuss how our results fit into contemporary dual-process theories.
EN
In his first work entitled “Thoughts Concerning the True Measure of Vital Forces” Kant made an attempt to solve one of the most famous disputes of 17th-century philosophy. Though Kant’s solution is incorrect, it shows the way the philosopher usually solved philosophical problems. In his later works, written during the critical period, Kant came back to the problems he dealt with in his first essay, but the most important continuation of it can be found in the unpublished notes being part of so-called Opus postumum.
EN
Color revolutions is a term which was widely used to describe related movements that developed in several societies in the CIS (former USSR) and Balkan states during the early 2000s. The term has also been applied to a number of revolutions elsewhere, including the Middle East. Participants in the color revolutions have mostly used nonviolent resistance, also called civil resistance. Such methods as demonstrations, strikes and interventions have been intended protest against governments seen as corrupt and authoritarian, and to advocate democracy; and they have also created strong pressure for change. These movements generally adopted a specific color or flower as their symbol. The color revolutions are notable for the important role of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and particularly student activists in organising creative non-violent resistance. Such movements have had a measure of success, for example: The Rose Revolution in Georgia (2003), The Orange Revolution in Ukraine (2004), The Tulip Revolution in Kyrgyzstan, also sometimes called the “Pink Revolution” (2005), Blue Revolution in Kuwait (2005), Green Revolution in Iran (2009), Jasmine Revolution in Tunisia (2010–2011).
EN
Intuition is usually seen as fast, automatic, high processing capacity, yet only few studies focused directly on the connection with the amount of information search. In this paper we present two studies examining two different domains (financial and recruiting) and employing different manipulations (time stress and instruction). The main aim of both studies was to examine whether preference for intuition (as cognitive style) would lead to less information search with respect to expert and non-expert population, with experience as moderator affecting intuitive people more in terms of searching for less information. Generally, our results indicate that situational manipulations, such as inducing time stress or giving instruction to think intuitively, affect information search more than preferred cognitive style and that it is necessary to examine intuition in context-specific tasks as the experience plays a crucial role in the searching information when making decisions.Intuition is usually seen as fast, automatic, high processing capacity, yet only few studies focused directly on the connection with the amount of information search. In this paper we present two studies examining two different domains (financial and recruiting) and employing different manipulations (time stress and instruction). The main aim of both studies was to examine whether preference for intuition (as cognitive style) would lead to less information search with respect to expert and non-expert population, with experience as moderator affecting intuitive people more in terms of searching for less information. Generally, our results indicate that situational manipulations, such as inducing time stress or giving instruction to think intuitively, affect information search more than preferred cognitive style and that it is necessary to examine intuition in context-specific tasks as the experience plays a crucial role in the searching information when making decisions.
EN
Managers' thinking is based on a mental model developed over years. Elements of this model are derived from the experience, observation and rules referring to the market phenomena. There are also numerous areas of ignorance and uncertainty. Even the important features of the distant future are only hypothetical. In order to get rid of the uncertainty managers use intuitive thinking. It contains the creative root in itself. Intuition is able to fill up some areas of the ignorance and gives managers the impression of the full knowledge about surrounding world. Finally an intuition becomes a test of the quality of managers and the evidence of their intellectual efficiency.
EN
Within the system created by Husserl and Ingarden the issue of intuitive acts of consciousness is a fundamental methodological condition that allows the foundation of phenomenology as a science. This paper presents some of the necessary relations between empirical and eidetic intuition that emerge from Husserl’s and Ingarden’s understanding phenomenology. At first I formulate the thesis that an act of empirical intuition is a condition of possibility for eidetic intuition, and vice versa, eidetic intuition is a condition of fulfilling empirical intuition. I demonstrate the first dependence by analyzing some intuitive moments referring to Ingarden’s description of the cognition of what he calls pure qualities, that exhausts the range of materially a priori phenomena, and further to Husserl’s understanding of pure essences, which exhausts the issue of cognition of formally a priori phenomena. In both cases empirical intuition appears to be necessary for the fulfillment of eidetic intuition. Next, I turn the reverse implication, that simple empirical intuition also relies on eidetic intuition. I describe Ingarden’s notion of a constitutive nature, considered as a condition of what I call noematic consistency in noetic fluency. Considering two possible ways of understanding the constitutive nature (either as only intended or as fully given) I notice that in each particular object presented in an unrepeatable view that is a part of an empirical intuition there are certain universal moments, such as its constitutive qualities, which are strictly unchangeable and can be perceived in no other way than within the act of eidetic intuition. Finally, I formulate the quite controversial thesis that empirical and eidetic intuitions are nothing more than two moments of one act of consciousness, rather than two separate acts.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2015
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vol. 70
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issue 7
531 – 545
EN
The article aims at answering two questions: 1) Is scepticism still a problem worth the attention of philosophers? 2) Is sceptical attitude true? It also sheds light on current local discussion of scepticism and offers some critical commentaries on it. Ad 1): The difference between scepticism and sceptic argument is underlined as well as the necessity to focus on explicitly articulated sceptic arguments. Ad 2): There are several scepticisms that are to be differentiated if we want to judge their truth values. In general, the interesting forms of scepticism are not true (this judgment depends on conceiving interesting sceptical arguments as paradoxes). Finally, some of the short-comings of otherwise valuable writings on sceptical arguments in current discussion are indicated, due to which the solutions they offer cannot be satisfactory.
EN
In the analytic tradition, the appeal to intuition has been a common philosophical practice that supposedly provides us with epistemic standards. The authoress argues that the high epistemological standards of traditional analytic philosophy cannot be pursued by this method. Perhaps within a naturalistic, reliable frame intuitions can be evoked more coherently. Philosophers can use intuition as scientists do, in hypothesis- construction or data- collection. This is an ironic conclusion: Traditional analytic epistemologists rely on the appeal to intuition, but cannot justify it. Naturalists, on the other hand, are not those who need such a method; yet they can better accommodate it within their view.
EN
Intuition belongs to the most prominent concepts of philosophical methodology. In my paper I put forward some crucial ideas related to the notion of intuition. Firstly, I sketch a general picture of intuition in philosophy. Secondly, the main debates about intuition in analytical philosophy are presented and discussed. Finally, it is argued that the aforementioned debates are not clear about the epistemic and explanatory status of intuition. My own view is that intuition may be a very useful power for initiating philosophical cognition, but at the same time it does not look promising when it is interpreted as a cognitive power for justification of philosophical knowledge.
World Literature Studies
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2016
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vol. 8
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issue 1
98 – 111
EN
The stress that English Romanticism laid upon a poet’s imaginative capacity as a source of poetic inspiration finds its clearest expression in the writings of its philosopher Samuel Taylor Coleridge (1772–1834). Unlike many of his English contemporaries, he developed a philosophy of poetic inspiration that conceptualized the notion of imagination within the context of a Christian theology that was informed by both Neoplatonism and German idealism. As a student and later lecturer of English literature, the Muslim poet Muhammad Iqbal (1877–1938) had been exposed to both English Romanticism and German idealism. Though he recognized the importance of imagination as a source of artistic creativity, Iqbal emphasized intuition as a higher form of poetic inspiration. By adopting as well as adapting certain aspects of English Romanticism and then merging it together with Islamic theology in his poetry, Iqbal argues for the importance of a special type of intuition, the “intuition of existence”, as a form of poetic inspiration. This paper, hence, is a comparative study of English Romanticism’s emphasis on imagination and Iqbal’s notion of intuition, in order to discuss the important roles that both Christian and Islamic theologies played in both poets’ poetic philosophies respectively.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2016
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vol. 71
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issue 9
733 – 745
EN
The goal of this paper is to provide answers for two key questions concerning epistemic intuitions in the context of sceptical arguments: (1) What is the nature of these intuitions? (2) Do they provide evidence or justification for the premises of these arguments? In contemporary literature on scepticism, the precise propositional contents of our „sceptical“ intuitions are rarely identified. The author considers several possible ways of identifying them and concludes that our intuitive answers to various sceptical thought experiments are the best means of capturing the propositional content of our intuitions. This conclusion is based on the argument from philosophical usage of the terms „intuition“, „intuitive“ and the like. Moreover, the author proposes a theory of the origin of sceptical intuitions. He argues that these intuitions are products of our language competence. Further, he shows that if this theory was true, it would not lend support to the idea that sceptical intuitions provide evidence or justification for the premises of sceptical arguments.
EN
This paper is a part of my research into the history of the concept of intuition and the category of insight in the writings of Canadian philosopher and theologian Bernard Lonergan (1904-1984). Philosophical discussions make use of many partly or totally different concepts of intuition, and the variety of those concepts is related to many aspects of intuition: the type of 'object' that intuition is; the way intuition grasps its object; its epistemic functions, etc. From the metatheoretical point of view the question is: historically, what type of 'object' (designatum) was denoted by the term intuition and its foreign language counterparts? In employing the term designatum of 'intuition' I am looking for more general categories for intuition. In classical terms, it is about finding the genus proximus for intuition. I distinguish and characterize three basic types of denotation of the term intuition: 1) (intuitive) knowing, as a cognitive act (for example insight), or as something that is not an act, or as a process; 2) (intuitive) knowledge, as propositional knowledge (propositions, beliefs) or as non-propositional knowledge (knowledge-how or knowledge by acquaintance), and 3) faculty (for example intellect) or ability (disposition) of mind to produce intuitive knowledge.
Studia Psychologica
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2017
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vol. 59
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issue 4
233 – 242
EN
This study investigates the relationship between rational and experiential thinking styles, perceived stress and life satisfaction in university students. The research sample included 259 students (56.8% females, Mage = 21.57) of psychology and informatics. Lower stress and higher life satisfaction are predominantly related to the thinking style preferred by the given gender – the rational style in males and the experiential style in females. More positive results in stress and life satisfaction were observed in the groups scoring higher in both styles compared to those scoring lower in both thinking styles. The relationships between thinking style preferred by the given gender and life satisfaction are mediated by the perceived stress. The present results indicate the possibility of increasing life satisfaction through changing information processing modes.
EN
The contemporary Platonists in the philosophy of mathematics argue that mathematical objects exist. One of the arguments by which they support this standpoint is the so-called Enhanced Indispensability Argument (EIA). This paper aims at pointing out the difficulties inherent to the EIA. The first is contained in the vague formulation of the Argument, which is the reason why not even an approximate scope of the set objects whose existence is stated by the Argument can be established. The second problem is reflected in the vagueness of the very term indispensability, which is essential to the Argument. The paper will remind of a recent definition of the concept of indispensability of a mathematical object, reveal its deficiency and propose an improvement of this definition. Following this, we will deal with one of the consequences of the arbitrary employment of the concept of indispensability of a mathematical theory. We will propose a definition of this concept as well, in accordance with the common intuition about it. Eventually, on the basis of these two definitions, the paper will describe the relation between these two concepts, in the attempt to clarify the conceptual apparatus of the EIA.
EN
The paper compares the way in which Plotinus and Jacques Maritain understand the relationship between philosophy and contemplation. Both distinguish between discursive, conceptual reasoning and intuitive contemplation, and do not discount the importance of the first. However, they see in intuitive contemplation a very significant dimension of philosophy. Both distinguish two types of contemplation in terms of their relationship to essence and existence. While Plotinus did not possess a full conceptual understanding of essence and existence, some scholars suggest that he was somehow aware of the difference. The first type of contemplation is an intuitive knowledge of essence; the second is an intuitive state of “unknowing” which somehow grasps existence as such. The authors see the importance of this second type of contemplation differently: for Maritain it is a significant, but unnatural, experience of God via the esse of the soul, while for Plotinus it is the supreme human experience and the goal of philosophy.
Studia Psychologica
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2011
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vol. 53
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issue 2
111-122
EN
The study is aimed at analysing the position of intuitive thought as reflected in current polemics within the dual processes models. In the first section, theories concerned with functionality of heuristics are presented, where evolutionary and ecological lenses offer insights that uncover details of human cognitive functioning under uncertainty and time pressure. The shift from normative models towards alternative explanations of 'heuristic person' reasoning is discussed. In the second section, views of human cognitive uniqueness as manifested in inferential activity are presented, emphasizing the primacy of inferential cognitions in progression of human intelligence. Within cognitive linguistics and sociolinguistics, transmission and comprehension of relevant meanings is attributed to cognitive mechanisms that go beyond mere verbal functioning and underlie mutually efficient strategies in communication of humans as intelligent actors in various environments.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2017
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vol. 72
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issue 1
1 – 14
EN
The paper contributes to the methodological discussion of what evidence the philosophers of language (e.g. Devitt, Machery, Stich, etc.) use in support or disconfirmation of semantic theories. Three classical theories of empirical confirmation are discussed. We suggest that in the methodological literature on semantics one of them – namely H-D conception – prevails. Further, we provide a basic framework for testing modal semantic statements. Finally, we discuss the role of intuitions, language corpuses and other linguistic data in the methodological considerations.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2016
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vol. 71
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issue 9
746 – 758
EN
In mathematics we witness a certain tension between intuitive and non-intuitive elements or between intuitive and rigorous approach. Some philosophizing mathematicians remind us of the intuitive as a necessary background of all productive mathematical work, while others prefer to steer clear of anything „merely intuitive“ since they view it as something leading us to mistakes and paradoxes. The aim of this paper is to point out the variety of the intuitive in mathematical praxis and appeal for its more adequate appreciation both in the didactics and philosophy of mathematics. As a sort of a preliminary semantical map we make use of Reuben Hersh’s list of the distinctive usage of term „intuitive“ in contemporary mathematical discourse.
EN
Empirical examinations about cross-cultural variability of intuitions, the well-known publication of Stich and his colleagues criticizing thought-experiments and intuitions in philosophical debates, is still a challenge that faces analytical philosophers, as any systematic investigation of the methodology of philosophy must give answers to these basic questions: What is an intuition? What role should intuitions play in philosophy? The author presents and examines the sceptical argument of experimental philosophers, and claims that experimental philosophers misunderstand the role of evidence in philosophy. His argument will utilize Goldman’s view, according to which intuitions give reliable (though not infallible) evidence about a person’s Concepts, and this knowledge is valuable for further philosophical research as well. The author will argue that the sceptical conclusions of experimental philosophers are harmless against this conception of philosophy, because even from a naturalist perspective certain kind of intuitive judgments about our concepts can be warranted, and this grants the specific epistemic status of intuitions. Of course, the reliability of introspection can be challenged. However, denying self-knowledge about his internal mental states is disputable – as he will show – both from a philosophical and a scientific point of view.
Studia Psychologica
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2011
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vol. 53
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issue 2
215-220
EN
Coming across conclusions finding intuition teachable, and a notable deal of evidence determining intuitive way of thinking as typical for the East, we study Zen literature in order to bridge the message of its techniques with the vocabulary of modern psychology. Learning how to recognize - not necessarily understand - and employ the proper sets of stimuli coming from the unconsciousness can be seen as a function of mastering what Zen literature refers to as a) unconscious concentration, b) clarity of mind and thought and c) spontaneity in action. We discuss each of these virtues on its own, yielding conclusions that boost more questions for the future direction of research in area of intuition.
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