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Philosophical Controversies on Rationality of Science

100%
Motycka A.
Zagadnienia Naukoznawstwa
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2008
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vol. 44
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issue 3-4
459-464
EN
Science is not only rational but non-rational (beyond-rational) too. In the paper the authoress is arguing this thesis.
2

Nie warto, panie Witkowski, czyli dlaczego trudno walczyć z pseudonauka) Source: Psychologia Spoleczna

88%
Klebaniuk J.
Psychologia Społeczna
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2008
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vol. 3
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issue 4(9)
340-344
EN
In this commentary I argue that the Author of the provocation showed moral courage, however he did not escape the sin of over-generalization in evaluating reactions of the academic community to the provocation. The observed lack of unambiguous support to the Author’s effort may be explained in a number of ways. First, psychotherapy tends to be perceived as not scientific, due to its tradition, the way it is practiced, and the prevalent optimistic bias as to its effects. Second, forces of a free market create demand for the pseudoscientific practices that promise improvement of life quality. Third, the deep irrationality as revealed in a general acceptance of beliefs that contradict scientific knowledge may lead to higher tolerance of pseudoscientific concepts.
3

S ODSTUPOM ČASU: AKRASIA A INTERTEMPORÁLNE STRATÉGIE

88%
Rozemberg A.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2020
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vol. 75
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issue 10
861 – 872
EN
Intertemporal decision making research in the fields of psychology and behavioural economy (Mischel et al. 1972, Kahneman & Tversky 1979, Loewenstein & Prelec 1992, O’Donoghue & Rabin 1999) shows that people are less concerned about distant future benefits than about outcomes that arrives sooner. Although the economy of “sooner rather than later”, i. e. focus on short-term utility, may have good evolutionary explanation mainly in the past, it can be also, if connected with other factors, one of the main factors of contemporary environmental crisis, as well as unwillingness to do something. The aim of this paper is to examine the phenomenon of time preference in relation to the philosophical concept of akrasia or weakness of will, and show to what degree rational argumentation and cognitive strategies of delayed gratification can be useful in this direction. According to the pessimistic scenario the time distant and abstract nature of the global risks must not evoke sufficient reactions in the form of behavioural changes (motivate people to the long-term strategies). If so, then either a kind of paternalist intervention or direct personal experience of permanent crisis is needed.
4

BÍDA RACIONÁLNÍ IRACIONALITY: PŘÍPAD KONSPIRAČNÍCH TEORIÍ

88%
Tvrdý F.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2022
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vol. 77
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issue 10
743 – 755
EN
Discussions in contemporary epistemology are burdened with confusions about the terms “rational”, “rationality” and their antonyms. In economy, for an agent to be rational simply means to satisfy the Bayesian probability axioms, but the situation in philosophy is much more complicated. Two kinds of rationality are usually distinguished. Epistemic rationality is an ability to achieve justified and true beliefs, whereas instrumental rationality is a capacity to act in accordance with one’s own interests. This division cleared the way to contemplation about rational irrationality, which is the case when an acceptance of epistemically unwarranted beliefs may increase instrumental profit for an individual. In my article, I will criticize this approach. The proponents of rational irrationality 1) misunderstand the primacy of epistemic rationality over instrumental one; 2) underestimate social nature of normative terms; and 3) misinterpret the evolution of human cognition. I will illustrate my conclusions with an example from applied epistemology – conspiracy theories. It is misleading and disparaging to use the term “rational” in relation to sets of unjustified beliefs that are based on conspiratorial ideation. If philosophers cannot make their ideas on rationality clear, it might be better to leave out rationality completely from the epistemological discourse.
5

SPRAVODLIVOSŤ AKO VZŤAHOVÝ POJEM

75%
Barány E.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2011
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vol. 66
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issue 9
845 – 855
EN
Among the ideas implicitly present and generally accepted in legal theory we can find claims, such as: 1. Justice concerns about distribution of goods and burdens. 2. It is connected with the relationship between law and morality. 3. Justice has an existential dimension and is rooted partially in irrational attitudes and intuitions. The first two prepositions make it possible to characterize justice as conformity with that part of morality which concerns the distribution and exchange of goods and burdens. Justice connects law as an intentionally rational phenomenon with irrationality and particular existential experience. Thus, proposed understanding of justice connects the law or other social phenomena (e.g. institution, etc.) with a specific part of morality, irrationality and particular existential experience.
6

SWIMMING UPSTREAM - PROBLEMS FOR SMITH'S ACCOUNT OF THE NATURE OF REASONS

75%
Hoej J. B.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
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2008
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vol. 15
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issue 3
283-294
EN
In an account of what we might call fundamental practical normativity, it is helpful, the author thinks, to distinguish between the normativity of reasons and that of rationality. But when we do so the question of the relation between these two realms arises: are these two independent kinds of normativity? Can we account for the normativity of rationality in terms of the normativity of reasons? Or is it the other way around; is rationality explanatorily prior to reasons? This paper discusses a positive answer to the last of these questions. In a number of articles, as well as in his first book, Michael Smith has argued that the nature of reasons can be accounted for in terms of ideal rationality. The author argues that Smith is unsuccessful in his analysis of normative reasons in terms of full rationality, and that the failure of his analysis leaves his closely related argument for normative judgement internalism unconvincing.
7

O NEÚPRIMNOSTI A SEBAKLAMANÍ

75%
Smreková D.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2011
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vol. 66
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issue 9
856 – 867
EN
The key issue of the contemporary discourse on self-deception is the necessity to explain the inner structure of consciousness or the state of mind which enable us to tell lies to ourselves or to be fooled by one’s own tricks. Two different approaches to the problem are analyzed: Sartre’s concept of bad faith as well as Davidson’s concept of self-deception. What these divergent conceptions have in common is their intentional approach. However, Sartre’s conception deriving from his ontological considerations (conceiving the consciousness in its unity) is seen as substantially different from Davidsonian rationalizing the phenomenon in question by claiming the division of mind. For Sartre a person of a bad faith is one disguising his or her freedom, i.e. the non-coincidence, which defines her or his being.
8

STUDIES ON RATIONALITY (Vizsgalodasok a racionalitasrol)

75%
Havasi V.
Tarsadalomkutatas (Social Science Research)
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2009
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vol. 27
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issue 3
347-364
EN
Nowadays there is a reunion of social and human sciences, a so-called transdisciplinarity can be observed. An example of this process is the research on rationality, which is the object of psychology, sociology and economics as well. These sciences use the findings of the others. According to mainstream economics the rational actor is fully informed, capable of calculating and preference ordering. His preference order is transitive, reflexive and total, his decisions are consistent. The theory of bounded rationality offers solutions to the problems arising from the lack or plethora of information, from the deficiency of calculative capability and the time required for a decision. It is debated whether the acts governed by emotions or norms are rational ones or not. New theories in the field of decisions under uncertainty try to give an explanation to the harms to the axioms of preference ordering.
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