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Tertium non datur? Der Streit zwischen Idealismus und Dogmatismus in Fichtes Versuch einer neuen Darstellung der Wissenschaftslehre

100%
Machoń H.
Forum Philosophicum
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2008
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vol. 13
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issue 2
283-294
DE
Der Beitrag präsentiert wesentliche Bestandteile von Fichtes Wissenschaftslehre mit einigen kritischen Bemerkungen. Als repräsentatives Beispiel seiner philosophischen Position, die zugleich die Grundlage seines wissenschaftlichen Systems bildet, stellt Fichte den Streit zwischen zwei möglichen philosophischen Systeme dar: dem Idealismus und dem Dogmatismus. In Auseinandersetzung mit dem Dogmatismus findet er die Begründung für die idealistische Position durch die Analyse von Begriffen und Phänomenen wie Erfahrung, Bewusstsein, Erkenntnis und schließlich Freiheit. Die Freiheit, verstanden als eine bewusste Entscheidung, nötigt den Philosophen zur Wahl einer konkreten Form von Philosophie, weil sie davon abhängt, was für ein Mensch man ist.
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A New Realistic Spirit: The Analytical and the Existential Approaches to Ontology

88%
Watzka H.
Forum Philosophicum
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2011
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vol. 16
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issue 1
7-28
EN
I shall distinguish between two periods of analytic ontology, one semi-idealistic, the other post-idealistic. The former fostered the very idea of a conceptual scheme within which questions of ontology could be formulated and answered in the first place; the latter rejected this idea in favour of the view that ontological inquiry neither presupposes a framework, nor provides the framework for science or everyday speech. Since then, ontology is what it always have been, the systematic study of the most fundamental categories of being, not of thought. Unfortunately, such a category theory becomes aporetic in its search for a solution of the problem of the “temporary intrinsic” (D. Lewis). Experience cannot tell us, whether entities persist by “perduring” or by “enduring.” One can take an alternative route and seek to broaden the conceptual basis of ontology by focussing on “Being” (Sein) in contrast to entities, or being (Seiendes). The controversy on perdurantism and endurantism emerges as a dispute over two conflicting ways of being in time, not of Being itself.
3
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The Notion of Conceptualized Experience in John Mcdowell's Mind and World

88%
Szałek P. K.
Forum Philosophicum
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2007
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vol. 12
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issue 1
87-103
EN
In this paper I would like to asses critically McDowell's argument to the effect that all experience is conceptualized and explain the role that this thesis plays within his general philosophical project. It has been argued that McDowell's conception of experience leads to idealism. I will demonstrate why this charge could be made and whether it is a charge which McDowell can adequately respond to. The paper will clarify McDowell's conception of conceptualized experience, and evaluate its efficacy for his philosophical aim. In order to accomplish these goals, the paper will contain the following two components: (1) a reconstruction of McDowell's position, and (2) its critical analysis. To reconstruct the position of McDowell, I will try (i) to establish his motives (i.e. avoiding the collapse into the Myth of the Given or coherentism), and (ii) the sources of inspiration for his thought and its and context (the Kantian categories of receptivity and spontaneity; the thought of D. Davidson, W. Sellars, G. Evans and Ch. Peacocke); (iii) and to explain his arguments (i.e. the general idea of the unboundedness of the conceptual, and the arguments against existence of non-conceptual content) and his defence against the charge of idealism. In order to critically analyse his position, I will try to evaluate it in terms of whether his defence against the objections to his proposal, in particular the charge of idealism, is successful.
4
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Pragmatic Objectivity

75%
Marsonet M.
Academicus. International Scientific Journal
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2014
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issue 09
43-54
EN
Nicholas Rescher writes that “objectivity is not something we infer from the data; it is something we must presuppose. It is something that we postulate or presume from the very outset of our dealings with people’s claims about the world’s facts”. Such definition is just the opposite of objectivity conceived of in classical terms, but it cannot be equated with an idealistic viewpoint according to which objectivity is something that our mind simply creates in the process of reflection. It is, rather, a sort of cross-product of the encounter between our mind-shaped capacities, and a surrounding reality made up of things that are real in the usual meaning of the term. Science itself gives us some crucial insights in this direction, since it shows that we see, say, tables and trees in a certain way which, however, does not match the image that scientific instruments are able to attain. Does this mean that our commonsense view of the world is totally wrong and that nature deceives us? This is not the case. The difference between the commonsense and the scientific image of the world is explainable by the fact that we are evolutionary creatures. Nature has simply endowed human beings with tools and capacities that enable them to survive in an environment which - at least in remote eras - was largely hostile. Our way of seeing tables and trees is what is requested for carrying on a successful fight for the survival of the species: nothing more - and nothing less - is needed for achieving this fundamental goal. Turning once again to the problem of ontological objectivity, the picture has now gained both strength and clarity. If we recall that human endeavors, although occurring in a largely autonomous social and linguistic world, are nevertheless limited by the constraints that natural reality forces upon us, we begin to understand that the social-linguistic world itself is not a boat freely floating without directions. If the boat is there, it means that an explanation of its presence is likely to be obtained if only we are patient enough to look for it. Some kind of hand must be on the wheel, giving the boat indications on Contrary to other pragmatist-flavored positions popular nowadays, this approach maintains that universality has a fundamental and unavoidable function in our rational endeavors. This is due to the fact that “presupposition” and “hypothetical reasoning” are key ingredients of our very capacity to rationalize the world in which we live. Indeed, there can be no rationality without universality.
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Pozytywizm, racjonalizm i... romantyzm Marii Skłodowskiej-Curie

75%
Petelenz B.
Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce
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2015
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issue 59
101-124
PL
The International Year of Chemistry (2011), intertwined with commemoration of the Nobel Prize in Chemistry awarded in 1911 to Marie Skłodowska-Curie, made me to ask about the philosophical background of this outstanding woman. The first factor which I could see was the positivism, launched by August Comte in France and developed a few decades later by his Polish followers. Another factor which seemed to me important was the interplay between the emotional (romantic) and intellectual (positivistic) attitudes among the Poles in the 19th century. In her research, Marie Skłodowska-Curie used the positivistic, rationalistic method. This has led her (jointly with her husband Pierre Curie) to elucidation of the radiation phenomena discovered by Henri Becquerel in 1896. The research initiated by the Curies (rewarded by the half of the Nobel Prize in Physics 1903) caused a subversion of the 19th century’s views on the structure of Matter. The way to such spectacular results must have been paved not only by the positivistic intellectual discipline but also by a dose of romantic enchantment. In the applicative terms, Marie Skłodowska-Curie became a pioneer of the evidence-based medicine. In moral terms, she represented a rare example of the practical altruism, inspired indirectly by Christianity, and directly by the Comte’s “religion of Humanity”.
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