Search results

1

The shape of the international order: the case study of AUKUS

100%

Uz Zaman R., Yasmin L.

Stosunki Międzynarodowe - International Relations

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2021

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vol. 57

180-191

EN

This article argues that in the 21st century, international order has not only become unstable but also shortterm in nature and issue-based, which has led to the emergence of a number of alliances whose functionality can be questioned. A number of alliances are being formed and are in existence but without any clear goals and objectives. This hypothesis is applied to understand the nature of the recently formed AUKUS-Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States’ alliance in the Indo-Pacific region. The paper, taking the framework of international order, argues that AUKUS would be one such alliance that has started with a lot of promises but its fundamental proposition to counter the rise of China in the Indo-Pacific region-although it does not mention the name of the country-is impractical. Given the economic rise of China as well as the example of the Five Eyes (FVEY) of intelligence sharing mechanism of the Anglophone countries formed during the early years of the Cold War, the AUKUS may survive the test of time but it also may exist as an example of the patterns of the current international order-that is another alliance without a clear path. This article also takes into account of the reaction of the Southeast Asian nations and criticisms against AUKUS in Australia. It points out how Australia’s security should be viewed more comprehensively.

2

The Role of Anglo-Saxon Countries in Maintaining the American-led Order in the Indo-Pacific Region

100%

Jureńczyk Ł., Kuź A.

Polish Political Science Yearbook

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2024

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issue 1(53)

87-105

EN

The analysis is based on theoretical assumptions characteristic of the multi-order world by Trine Flockhart concept. The main factor influencing the situation in the Indo-Pacific region is the conflict between two international orders, Chinese-led and American-led, which is economic but may take a military form in the future. The practical limitations of the article result from the complex process of analyzing and forecasting political phenomena in statu nascendi. The analysis contributes to the scientific discussion on the future of international relations in the Indo-Pacific region. The American-led order in the Indo-Pacific region is based on the institutionalized forms of cooperation involving Anglo-Saxon states based on identity factors determining their effectiveness. The US strategy for the Indo-Pacific is mainly based on the network of partnerships with the region’s countries and countries from other parts of the world supporting the American-led order in the region, especially the Anglo-Saxon countries. In addition to identity factors, the positive long-term experience of military cooperation between the Anglo-Saxon countries is significant. The escalation of the global conflict between the US and China will be conducive to further tightening this cooperation.

3

Joe Biden’s Strategy in the Asia-Pacific Region: Change or Continuity. A Comparative Analysis

86%

Grabowski M.

Polish Political Science Yearbook

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2021

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issue 4 (50)

95-105

EN

The election of Joseph Biden for the office of the President of the United States has brought expectations of fundamental change in American foreign policy, including policy toward the Asia-Pacific/Indo-Pacific region. As observed in the last few months, the reality has been more complex as definite changes in the US Indo-Pacific policy are not as visible as expected. It is especially in respect of the US policy toward China being more a continuation than a change from Donald Trump’s approach. Changes are rhetorical rather than actual policies. The situation is different in the case of alliances, as Joe Biden offers much more commitment to allies like Japan or South Korea. Also, multilateral dimensions (both regional and global) witness some – however still limited – change. The main goal is to make a comparative analysis of Joe Biden’s policy toward Asia, referring to the administrations of Barack Obama and Donald Trump. Hence the strategies of pivot/re-balance toward the Asia of Obama, and the free and open Indo-Pacific strategy of Trump, will be examined. The analysis refers to the complex interdependence theory and the power transition theory. Methodologically, it is based on document analysis with comparative analysis.

4

“Remarks on CANZUK”: Theoretical and methodological perspective of research on the post-Brexit Anglosphere

86%

Szczepański J.

Polish Journal of Political Science

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2020

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vol. 6

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issue 3

7-22

EN

BREXIT, the withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the EU structures has become a turning point in the process of formation of (as it seemed) permanent upranational blocs of economic cooperation. It was the first time that the European Union as a sui generis first in the world supranational organisation was so explicitly questioned as a value in itself. The redefinition of values that took place in the United Kingdom may be connected with a turn towards the part of the “Anglosphere” known as CANZUK. The research hypothesis for the studies announced in this article is that this ideological turnaround will lead to gradual regional integration. The article presents the theoretical and methodological framework for conducting the planned studies, outlines the currently available sources, and maps out the directions for detailed analyses within the singled out research areas. The planned research fits into the area of political and law studies. As regards the first field, analysed will be efforts aimed at consolidating cooperation, and in the future – postulated integration. The research will be carried out from the perspective of Karl Deutsch’s communication theory. The theory emphasises substantiveness of nation states and the need for social integration before political integration, which is also the fundamental assumption underlying the postulates of both the supporters of Brexit, as well as the persons and entities postulating the construction of the CANZUK bloc. With the use of this theoretical perspective it will be possible to complement the research with analyses in the area of contemporary political thought indicating the axiological foundations for the construction of a community in the Anglosphere. In the latter area, analysed will be certain acts of public international law, such as e.g. Trans-Tasman Travel Arrangement. That act may be treated as a model solution as regards constructing an alternative mechanism for the freedom of movement of persons.

5

Znaczenie relacji z Australią i Nową Zelandią w ramach pobrexitowego zaangażowania Zjednoczonego Królestwa w regionie Indo-Pacyfiku

86%

Eska-Mikołajewska J.

Krakowskie Studia Małopolskie

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2023

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vol. 1(37)

138-156

EN

In the geopolitical situation in which Great Britain found itself after its withdrawal from the European Union in 2020, it was necessary to develop a new foreign and security policy strategy. The flagship concept of ‘Global Britain’ assumes the reorientation of the United Kingdom outside Europe and greater involvement in the security architecture of the Indo-Pacific region. The article examines to what extent the intention to strengthen relations with as likeminded partners in the Indo-Pacific region coincides with the assumptions of Australian and New Zealand policies. It has been shown that the former British dominions, which are part of the so-called Anglosphere, have been given a vital role in securing the UK’s position as a world leader. From the perspectives of the national interest of both countries, rebuilding ties with the former empire is considered an important strategic element, although giving it a priority in the current geopolitical realities is not possible. Australia and New Zealand put special emphasis on developing cooperation with the Indo-Pacific countries.

6

USA-Asia Relations in the Time of Trump’s Administration

72%

Kuźnar A., Menkes J.

Roczniki Administracji i Prawa

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2017

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vol. 17/2

15-31

EN

We analyse the possibilities and consequences of changing the US foreign policy in terms of cooperation with Asian allies since Trump became the US President. The goal of the paper is to answer the question of what the political strategy of President Trump is and whether he will manage to implement it, and what the reaction of the allies will be in response to it. Institutional and functional considerations are settled in the economic reality, analyzing the economic indicators of the USA and selected countries of the Pacific region and China (the latter declairing the will to take over the USA’s place in the region and in the world). The hypothesis that the way of conducting US foreign policy will not affect the density of the real US relations with their allies in the transpacific space is positively verified. What will change in the short and medium term will be the increase in US foreign policy costs. In a broader sense, the American alliance with the countries of East and South-East Asia will survive the turbulence in the US policy. Regardless of China‘s willingness to take the place of the US in international relations, it does not constitute a competitive partner, able to replace the USA.

XX

Analizujemy możliwości i konsekwencje zmiany polityki zagranicznej USA dla współpracy z azjatyckimi sojusznikami po objęciu przez Trumpa urzędu Prezydenta USA. Celem jest odpowiedź na pytanie, jaka jest strategia polityczna Prezydenta Trumpa i czy ją zrealizuje oraz jak na tą strategię zareagują sojusznicy. Rozważania o charakterze instytucjonalno-funkcjonalnym osadzamy w rzeczywistości gospodarczej, analizując wskaźniki gospodarcze USA i wybranych państw regionu Pacyfiku oraz Chin (deklarujących wolę zastąpienia USA w regionie i w świecie). Pozytywnie weryfikujemy hipotezę, że sposób prowadzenia polityki zagranicznej przez USA nie wpłynie na gęstość realnych związków USA z ich aliantami w przestrzeni transpacyficznej. Tym, co się zmieni w krótkim i średnim okresie będzie wzrost kosztów prowadzenia polityki zagranicznej przez USA. W podmiotowo szerszym wymiarze sojusz amerykański z państwami Azji Wsch. i Pd.-Wsch przetrwa turbulencje w polityce USA. Niezależnie od gotowości Chin zajęcia miejsca USA w tych relacjach, nie są on partnerem konkurencyjnym, zdolnym zastąpić USA.

7

India's "Strategic Autonomy" and strengthening its ties with the US

72%

Aryal S. K., Pulami M. J.

Przegląd Geopolityczny

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2023

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vol. 44

116-128

PL

Wkrótce po uzyskaniu niepodległości India przystała do Ruchu Państw Niezaangażowanych, który pozwalał na uniknięcie konieczności opowiadania się po stronie żadnego z istniejących wówczas dwóch bloków polityczno-militarnych, którym przewodziły USA i ZSRR. India pod rządami Jawaharlala Nehru, kierując się w polityce zagranicznej zasadami wynikającymi z tradycji indyjskiej cywilizacji, nie były nawet zdolne przewidzieć i zapobiec agresji Chin w 1962 roku. Idealistyczne podejście Nehru przyjęte przez Partię Kongresową nie zapewniło trwałości władzy i w 2014 roku wybory wygrała konserwatywno-nacjonalistyczna Indyjska Partia Ludowa (Bharatiya Janata Party), dla której suwerenność i interes państwowy Indii stanowią naczelne imperatywy polityczne. Celem niniejszego artykułu jest wyjaśnienie, w jaki sposób rząd BJP osiąga równowagę między tradycyjną kulturą strategiczną Indii opartą na niezaangażowaniu, a rosnącymi więzami obronnymi z USA w regionie Indo-Pacyfiku. Dlatego niezbędne było przedstawienie ewolucji indyjskiej polityki od radykalnego niezaangażowania, mającego swoje oparcie w tradycyjnej wartości jaką stanowi powstrzymywanie się od przemocy (ahinsa) do tzw. strategicznej autonomii.

EN

Immediately after independence, India joined the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), which allowed it to avoid having to take sides with either of the then-existing two political-military blocs led by the US and the USSR. India under Jawaharlal Nehru, guided in foreign policy by principles derived from the traditions of Indian civilization, was not even able to anticipate and prevent China's aggression in 1962. Nehru's idealistic approach adopted by the Congress Party failed to ensure the permanence of power, and in 2014 the conservative-nationalist Indian People's Party (Bharatiya Janata Party) won the election, taking India's sovereignty and national interest as its supreme political imperative. The purpose of this article is to explain how the BJP government is striking a balance between India's traditional NAM-based strategic culture and growing defense ties with the US in the Indo-Pacific region. Therefore, it was necessary to present the evolution of Indian politics from radical non-alignment, grounded in the traditional value of non-violence (ahinsa), to so-called strategic autonomy.

8

Strategic Ambiguity in US-Taiwan Relations During the Donald Trump Administration

72%

Grzegorzewski F.

Polish Political Science Yearbook

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2022

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issue 1(51)

59-74

EN

Strategic ambiguity, or the deliberate policy of uncertainty as to whether the United States would use force to defend Taiwan against an invasion by the People's Republic of China, has been the centrepiece of US policy towards the Taiwan issue for decades. This paper discusses the factors driving the redefinition of strategic ambiguity and its recalibration throughout Donald Trump's presidency (2017–2021). The fundamental driver of this change was to balance the rising power of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). The paper applied offensive realism as a theoretical framework for its analysis. Under President Donald Trump, Washington modified its policy of strategic ambiguity, explicitly framing relations with Taiwan within a broader Indo-Pacific strategy. While the US retained key elements of strategic ambiguity, including the 'One China' policy, it added new features to deploy it offensively against Beijing's growing regional hegemony. The increased dynamism and unpredictability of relations with Taiwan were matched by a welcoming attitude towards strengthening Taiwanese identity and highlighting the systemic differences between communist China and democratic Taiwan. America stepped up arms sales and encouraged Taiwan to build its self-defence capabilities. Washington engaged in countering Chinese attempts to isolate Taiwan internationally and included it in restructuring global supply chains. Although the United States has not formally revised the boundaries of the 'One China' policy, the modification of strategic ambiguity increased Taiwan's prominence in US-China power competition and pushed back the prospect of peaceful unification.

9

AUKUS - czy „małe NATO” Indo-Pacyfiku ograniczy chińską ekspansję morską?

72%

Ciastoń R.

Nowa Polityka Wschodnia

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2022

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issue 1(32)

96-107

RU

15 сентября 2021 года США, Великобритания и Австралия подписали трехстороннее оборонное соглашение (АУКУС). Первые две страны должны помочь Австралии построить атомные подводные лодки. Понятно, что цель соглашения - еще больше ограничить влияние КНР в регионе. Соглашение немедленно подверглось критике со стороны Китая. Голоса критики или озабоченности также исходили с других сторон, например, из некоторых стран АСЕАН, европейских союзников США или Индии. Предлагаемая статья будет попыткой ответить на вопрос: в какой степени создание АУКУС усилит региональные позиции Соединенных Штатов в морском измерении и будет способствовать ограничению экспансии Китая?

EN

On September 15, 2021, the United States of America, United Kingdom and Australia signed the trilateral defense agreement (AUKUS). The first two countries are to help Australia build attack nuclear submarines (SSN). It is clear that the purpose of the agrement is to further restrict the influence of the PRC in the region. The agreement was immediately criticized by People’s Republic of China. Voices of criticism or concern also came from other directions, such as from some ASEAN countries, European allies of the USA or India. The following article is an attempt to answer the question: to what extent will the establishment of AUKUS strengthen the regional position of the United States in the maritime dimension and contribute to limiting the expansion of China.

10

The European Union Strategy for Partnership in the Indo-Pacific Region

72%

Bharti M. S.

Athenaeum. Polskie Studia Politologiczne

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2023

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vol. 80

191-210

PL

Celem artykułu jest zbadanie polityki geoekonomicznej Unii Europejskiej (UE) dotyczącej współpracy w regionie Indo-Pacyfiku. W ostatnim czasie Indo-Pacyfik zaczął przyciągać uwagę światowych potęg gospodarczych, w związku z czym UE uruchomiła w tym regionie politykę współpracy. W niniejszym artykule przeanalizowano kompleksową strategię UE dotyczącą rozszerzenia jej obecności na Oceanie Indyjskim i Morzu Południowochińskim. UE dąży do zawarcia partnerstw gospodarczych i w zakresie bezpieczeństwa między krajami Indo-Pacyfiku. Spośród państw członkowskich UE bardzo entuzjastycznie nastawiony do współpracy strategicznej w regionie Indo-Pacyfiku jest rząd francuski. Polityka Unii Europejskiej funkcjonuje w tych obszarach zarówno jako instrument soft power, jak i hard power. W badaniu podkreślono, że działanie UE pociąga za sobą budowę struktury sieci strategicznych w celu zintensyfikowania zdolności w zakresie projekcji siły. Unia wykorzystuje podejścia ugruntowane w soft i hard power, aby osiągnąć cele transatlantyckie. Dla osiągnięcia celów badania i poznania jego wyników korzystne okazuje się zastosowanie w studium przypadku metody porównawczej. Reasumując, UE musi ustanowić znacznie ściślejsze stosunki między krajami Pacyfiku, aby przeciwstawić się chińskiej agresji i ekspansji w dyplomacji morskiej.

EN

The aim of the paper is to study the European Union’s geoeconomics policy for cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region. In recent times, the Indo-Pacific has been gaining attention of the global economic powers. On this issue, the EU has launched a cooperation policy in the IndoPacific. This study examines the EU’s comprehensive strategy for the expansion of its presence in the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea. The EU wants economic and security partnerships among the Indo-Pacific countries. Among the EU member states, the French government is much enthusiastic about strategic cooperation in the Indo-Pacific. The European Union’s policy has been operating in the regions as an instrument of soft and hard power. The research highlighted that the EU implies the construction of structural strategic networks to intensify the high capacities in the projection of power. The EU uses the key approaches of hard and soft power to achieve transatlantic goals. The comparative case study method is useful to know the objectives and results of the research. In conclusion, the EU needs to establish a much stronger relationship among the pacific countries to counter the Chinese aggression and expansion in maritime diplomacy.

11

The rise and fall of China’s ‘Peaceful Rise’: Implications for US-China geopolitical competition in the Indo-Pacific

72%

Kwun-Sun Lau R.

Stosunki Międzynarodowe - International Relations

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2021

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vol. 57

159-179

EN

Strategic competition and rivalry between the United States and China has become a paradigm of international relations in the past decade. Central to this growing strategic distrust between Washington and Beijing is the tug of war between the US-led Indo-Pacific strategy and China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). However, the role of China’s ‘peaceful rise/peaceful development’ strategy and assertive nationalism characteristic of Chinese foreign policymaking in creating an atmosphere of tension and misunderstanding between Beijing and Washington have been largely overlooked. This paper, therefore, seeks to understand the relationship between the rise and fall of China’s ‘peaceful rise/peaceful development’ concept, the emerging prominence of assertive nationalism in China’s foreign policy making and a deteriorating US-China relations with deepening strategic mistrust between the two major powers through a comparative-historical analysis of China’s BRI and the US-led Indo-Pacific strategy. Rather than demonstrating China’s commitment to its ‘peaceful rise/peaceful development’ to the world, this paper argues that Beijing’s offensive to defend China’s national interests in a confrontational manner is an indication that an increasingly confident Chinese leadership no longer feels the need for reassuring the world that China's ‘rise’ is peaceful and non-threatening in nature. This could embolden Beijing to defy (if not explicitly challenge) the ‘rules-based international order’ upheld/defended by Washington, thereby spelling the end of China’s ‘peaceful rise/peaceful development’ strategy.

12

Quad–Australia. Nowe otwarcie

44%

Zdziech D.

Krakowskie Studia Międzynarodowe

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2018

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issue 4

221-239

EN

Ten years after the collapse of the first version of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QSD), the new „Quad” is growing, with the participation of the same counties: Australia, India, Japan and the United States. Why after the fall of the idea did they return to this platform again? The answer seems to be obvious, not only for those who wanted to maintain the „Quad” but also for those who did not treat it as a priority. The growing strength and assertiveness of China convinced these four states to launch the new „Quad”. For Australia, the key factor for the effectiveness of the new Quadrilateral Security Dialogue will be to deepen mutual cooperation with special emphasis on India, as well as to convince ASEAN countries to the idea of the Indo-Pacific. Only in this way „Quad” would guarantee security in the region, as much as to create an alternative to the China’s Belt and Road project. It is Australian chance to balance the power, through bringing order to the region, on principles that are favorable for itself.

PL

Dziesięć lat po upadku pierwszej wersji Czterostronnego Dialogu Bezpieczeństwa, rozwija się nowy „Quad” z udziałem tych samych państw: Australii, Japonii, Stanów Zjednoczonych oraz Indii. Dlaczego powrócono do tej idei raz jeszcze? Odpowiedź wydaje się oczywista nie tylko dla tych, którzy chcieli utrzymania dialogu, ale także dla wszystkich, którzy nie traktowali go priorytetowo. Rosnąca siła i asertywność Chin przekonała „czwórkę” do ponownego otwarcia „Quad”. Dla Australii kluczem do skuteczności nowego Czterostronnego Dialogu nBezpieczeństwa będzie pogłębienie wzajemnej współpracy, ze szczególnym naciskiem na Indie oraz przekonanie państw ASEAN do wizji Indo-Pacyfiku. Tylko w ten sposób „Quad” może stać się gwarantem bezpieczeństwa w regionie, jak również tworzyć alternatywę dla chińskiego projektu Pasa i Szlaku. To szansa Australii na korzystne zrównoważenie sił przez doprowadzenie do porządku w regionie, na korzystnych dla siebie warunkach.

Refine search results

The shape of the international order: the case study of AUKUS

The Role of Anglo-Saxon Countries in Maintaining the American-led Order in the Indo-Pacific Region

Joe Biden’s Strategy in the Asia-Pacific Region: Change or Continuity. A Comparative Analysis

“Remarks on CANZUK”: Theoretical and methodological perspective of research on the post-Brexit Anglosphere

Znaczenie relacji z Australią i Nową Zelandią w ramach pobrexitowego zaangażowania Zjednoczonego Królestwa w regionie Indo-Pacyfiku

USA-Asia Relations in the Time of Trump’s Administration

India's "Strategic Autonomy" and strengthening its ties with the US

Strategic Ambiguity in US-Taiwan Relations During the Donald Trump Administration

AUKUS - czy „małe NATO” Indo-Pacyfiku ograniczy chińską ekspansję morską?

The European Union Strategy for Partnership in the Indo-Pacific Region

The rise and fall of China’s ‘Peaceful Rise’: Implications for US-China geopolitical competition in the Indo-Pacific

Quad–Australia. Nowe otwarcie