Full-text resources of CEJSH and other databases are now available in the new Library of Science.
Visit https://bibliotekanauki.pl

Results found: 5

first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last

Search results

Search:
in the keywords:  Józef Maria Bocheński
help Sort By:

help Limit search:
first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last
Rocznik Tomistyczny
|
2020
|
vol. 1
|
issue 9
335-354
EN
The Cracow Circle aimed at adapting the contemporary achievements of logic to the fields of Catholic philosophy and theology. The Circle was formed by J.M. Bocheński, J. Salamucha, J.F. Drewnowski, and B. Sobociński. The Circle was active in the 1930s. A special event in its history was the 3rd Polish Philosophical Congress in Cracow in 1936. During that Congress a special meeting for representatives of Christian philosophy was organized in order to discuss the relationship between Catholic thought and contemporary logic. Father Bocheński returned to the ideas of the Circle in his article, Die fünf Wege, where he analyzed the quinque viae. A revised and extended version of that work became part of his book, Gottes Dasein und Wesen. Logische Studien zur Summa Theolgiae I, qq. 2-11. In that book, Father Bocheński discusses the subsequent questions from the Summa Theologiae and analyzes Kant’s critical commentary against the cosmological argument The first chapter of that volume is titled Program of Studies on God. The text structures the research studies presented in the book, but additionally, it points to other research goals. The aim of the present paper is to present Father Bocheński’s program of studies on God, showing those postulates of the program that were realized by their author and their relationship with the scientific goals of the Cracow Circle.
Rocznik Tomistyczny
|
2020
|
vol. 1
|
issue 9
355-369
EN
The aim of this paper is to show the conception of philosophical superstition understood as something which is without any doubt false but considered as undoubtedly true. The conception is presented in The Short Philosophical Dictionary of Superstitions of fr. Józef Maria Innocenty Bocheński OP. Philosophical superstition differs from superstition in general, understood as beliefs and practices grounded in conviction that there exist cause-effect relationships, which are impossible to be empirically proven but are thought to have supernatural origin. Bocheński draws from philosophical realism, including classical conception of truth, and claims that philosophical superstition is a cognitive distortion characterized by two: obviousness that a claim is false and universal conviction that this false claim is true. In this paper we present not only premises necessary to qualify some ideas as philosophical superstition but also fundaments that initiate the proces of their creation. According to Bocheński, we find remedy for superstitions in growing social significance of philosophers, whose main task would be to search and identify superstitions. For that reason, in this work we speak of topic of the social role of philosophy. Bocheński claims that not every philosophy is equally destined to fulfill this task for many philosophical ideas contributed to create superstitions. The author of the Dictionary made St. Tho-mas a specific guide on the path of searching and identifying superstitions. The additional aim of the paper is to show a historical context of perception of Bocheński’s book on philosophical super-stitions and describe his influence in various environments. We focus on numerous editions (in Polish and foreign languages) and on main revisions.
Logos i Ethos
|
2021
|
vol. 56
|
issue 1
51-73
EN
A phenomenon of authority is one of the most important in social life but the concept of authority is at the same time one of the most difficult in theoretical perspective. Against the background of extensive literature about this problem an essay by J. M. Bocheński entitled What is authority? written in 1974 constitutes a masterpiece. In his analysis Bocheński puts forward as many as 88 theses in metaphysics of a man characterizing the authority. The main thesis says that “every authority is both epistemic and deontic one.” Although this thesis is doubtful, the reasoning of Bocheński is very clear and it opens the door for construction of theory of authority.Author of this paper claims that authorities in general may be divided into personal and institutional ones. Personal authorities in turn split into fraternal and sectarian. Fraternal personal authority is a “mutual love between unequal persons.” This very basic category had been already distinguished by Aristotle. This type of authority is always of epistemic-deontic character. Such pattern of behaviors is also present in India and China, but it has been underestimated by Bocheński.In the contemporary Western world we experience the “collapse of authorities.” In other words, the “false authorities dominate.” This means that we lack fraternal ones, namely the masters. In their place we have a plethora of sectarian authorities and idol-fan type of relations. Fall of authorities constitutes a result of technological advancement that ultimately altered the condition of human existence, thus complicating our recognition of congenial companions.
PL
Zjawisko autorytetu należy do zjawisk najważniejszych w życiu społecznym, a jego pojęcie do najtrudniejszych w teoretycznym ujęciu. Na tle obszernej literatury przedmiotu wyróżnia się niezrównana rozprawa ojca Jana Marii Bocheńskiego Co to jest autorytet? z roku 1974. Autor daje w niej 88 tez z metafizyki człowieka, charakteryzujących autorytet.Teza główna głosi, że „każdy autorytet jest autorytetem epistemicznym albo deontycznym”. Teza ta jest wątpliwa, lecz wywody Bocheńskiego niezwykle jasne – stwarzające w ogóle możliwość budowania teorii autorytetu. Autor niniejszego artykułu twierdzi, że zasadniczy podział autorytetów dzieli je na osobowe i instytucjonalne, te pierwsze zaś rozpadają się na bratnie i sekciarskie. Bratni autorytet osobowy to „miłość wzajemna do osoby, między nierównymi” – kategoria podstawowa, wyróżniona przez Arystotelesa. Jest on zawsze epistemiczno-deontyczny. Jako wzorzec zachowań silnie jest obecny także w Chinach czy Indiach. Bocheński go nie docenił.We współczesnym świecie Zachodu ma miejsce „upadek autorytetów” czy, inaczej mówiąc, „dominują autorytety fałszywe”. Oznacza to, że brakuje autorytetów bratnich, czyli mistrzów, a plenią się autorytety sekciarskie oraz związki typu idol-fan (kwitną „bożyszcza”). Upadek autorytetu jest skutkiem rozwoju technologii, która zasadniczo odmieniła warunki ludzkiego życia, utrudniając rozpoznawanie bratnich dusz.
4
71%
PL
The Cracow Circle was a group of four Polish philosophers and logicians (Salamucha, Bocheński, Drewnowski, Sobociński) connected with Lvov-Warsaw School. They tried to apply the modern logic to a Christian thought. This application first needed explication what the mathematical logic really is-not a science connected with the Aristotelian abstraction of the second degree but formal science unnecessary in a strict reasoning and defining. Then they showed how important was always exactness in Christian thought and wrote some papers in which the modern logic was used in different issues (maybe the most famous was Salamucha’s analysis of Thomas’ proof ex motu of the existence of God). Cracow Circle was also strongly interested in relations between science and religion, they tried to show and explore new ways to develop Christian, especially catholic, views of the world, philosophy and theology. Very interesting was Drewnowski’s philosophical program and its applications in various problems in philosophy, theology, sociology etc.
PL
Celem artykułu jest analiza Józefa M. Bocheńskiego zabobonów występujących w logice w odniesieniu do żywo współcześnie dyskutowanej w filozofii logiki problematyki pluralizmu logicznego. Koncentruję się na jednym zabobonie, nazwanym hasłowo „relatywizm w logice”, który pojawił się w związku z powstaniem nieklasycznych rachunków logicznych. Rozważam problem, czy pluralizm w logice, rozumiany jako współistnienie wielu (nieskończenie wielu) systemów logicznych, przekreśla jedność logiki i sprzeciwia się jej normatywnemu charakterowi oraz czy z tego faktu można wyprowadzić wniosek o relatywizmie w logice.
EN
The aim of the article is to analyse Joseph M. Bochenski’s superstitions in logic with reference to issues of pluralism in logic, which is widely discussed in the contemporary philo­sophy of logic. I concentrate on a superstition known as “relativity in logic”. It emerged con­temporarily with the construction of non-classical logical calculi. I make an attempt at con­sidering logical pluralism in the sense of co-existence of infinitely numerous logical systems as ruling out the unity of logic and negating its normative nature. I also try to determine if it is possible to deduct relativity in logic from the fact of logical systems pluralism.
first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last
JavaScript is turned off in your web browser. Turn it on to take full advantage of this site, then refresh the page.