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EN
Kant's essay: 'A Project of Eternal Peace' contains a critical review of conditions that must be met in order to establish peaceful relations between nations. The project was inspired by political events of the time. In the Polish philosophical tradition it is often claimed that the essay contains Kant's comments on the legality of the partition of Poland. The author attempts to verify this claim. Using extant documents he describes Kant's attitude to Poland and Poles. He also presents various arguments that were used by students of Kant in Poland who sought to show that Kant's position was based on principles that make partition of any autonomous state incompatible with a project of permanent peace.
EN
Metaphysics has unergone a major reform in the second half of the 18th century thanks to the efforts of Johann Heinrich Lambert and Immanuel Kant. The turning point was the publication in 1764 of the 'Neues Organon' by Lambert in the printing offices of Johann Heinrich Wendler in Leipzig and the publication in 1781 of the first edition of the 'Critique of Pure Reason' by Immanuel Kant in the printing offices of Johann Heinrich Hartknoch in Riga. The span of nearly seventeen years between these two books is very significant. Kant used the time to analyse premises for the reform of metaphysics, the premises which he himself had extracted from Lambert's system. Then he devised a concept of metaphysics that was later developed into a theory presented in the first edition of the 'Critique of Pure Reason'. These 'almost seventeen years' in Kant's work have been marked by such works as 'Träume eines Geistersehers, erläutert durch Träume der Metaphysik', 'De mundi sensibilis atque intelligibilis forma et principiis', and the 'Critique of Pure Reason'. In the same period, and especially in the years 1765 through 1770, Kant conducted a lively correspondence with Lambert, and their letters can be used to sustain two main hypotheses of this paper. First, it can be demonstrated that Kant's attempt to undertake a reform of metaphysics in the pre-critical version was inspired by Lambert. Secondly, the 'Critique of Pure Reason' is the first successful attempt to venture beyond the compass of the dogmatic presuppositions imposed on metaphysics by Descartes, Leibniz and Wolff, and to found metaphysics on new, transcendental premisses.
EN
The author highlights different senses of the Categorical Imperative in ethics, law and politics. These three different interpretations produce moral conflicts among subjects who try to apply the imperative. For instance the legal imperative imposes on the political subject the obligation to observe all laws, and in consequence justifies participation in criminal acts that perpetrated without breaking any binding laws. This clashes with the demands of the ethical imperative. It is also argued that moral justification of all forms of political power by the political imperative generates dubious political imperative of submission to all authorities. It is so because political subjects do not possess the power, according to Kant, to propose politically and morally binding interpretations of the original contract.
EN
The paper compares certain views of Kant's with positions taken by Putnam, Prauss, Frege and Peirce on the origin and status of the contents of representations. The author focuses on the shift that is detectable in the 'Critique of Pure Reason', where Kant seems ready to abandon the 'representation' position for the 'use' position, and the 'internalist' position for the sake of the 'externalist' position to emphasise the process-like character of concepts and contents. This shift is tantamount to 'expelling contents out of mind'. Contents is understood as a system of rules formulated conditionally, pertaining to conceptual determinants and dependent on our knowledge. The semantic test of adequacy of use is the world. Thus, instead of speaking about 'contents' of concepts, it is preferable to speak of rules of using concepts. The author proposes to replace 'representations' with 'instances of direct insight', which will facilitate understanding of the alleged question of externalisation of contents of representations. In author's proposal the signifying sign cannot be separated from the signified object and its history in our knowledge. Both are aspects of the same process, and direct insight is a non-conceptual phenomenon. But on the other hand, even the most scrupulous observation of the rules of correct usage of concepts will not guarantee that a representation will reach an external object for which it is intended or that the object will possess the stable identity that we wish to assign to its representation.
EN
Until the eighteenth century most European normative positions in moral philosophy presupposed strong motivational internalism. According to this assumption a belief about the good leads to action in accordance with it because the belief brings about a desire to act in this way or it is identical with this desire. Strong internalism is susceptible to fundamental difficulties. It cannot explain incontinence (the so-called weak will) or justify obligations for those who have not assented to (correct) beliefs about the good. An analysis of the 'Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals' and the 'Critique of Practical Reason' shows that Kant departed from strong internalism in favour of its weak version. Having drawn a clear line between facts and desires (the sphere of the empirical) on the one hand, and beliefs about the good (the sphere of the rational) on the other, Kant holds that a belief about the good does not necessarily lead to an appropriate action but may require a special motive. For this reason Kant distinguishes between facticity and normativity, and with a view to this purpose he analyses the concept of duty. This concept allows him to grasp the particular phenomenon of necessitation that is associated with beliefs about the good without presupposing that these beliefs will lead to actions that accord with them. In developing his conception of acting from duty Kant explains the possibility of both acting on beliefs about the good and of diverting from them. This 'discovery' of normativity has important consequences for moral theory and practice. Among other things, it requires a distinction between moral and other goods by identifying moral good with unconditional good.
EN
The author undertakes to reconstruct Kantian analysis of instrumental rationality in the 'Foundations of Metaphysics of Morals'. He argues that Kant's arguments are crucial for the understanding of wanting, and especially for identification of epistemic conditions of wanting. He also points out that Kant's writings contain two different concepts of the subject. Each presupposes a different conception of rationality.
EN
The author undertakes as interpretation of the 'Critique of Pure Reason' in which transcendental idealism and empirical realism are equated with one another. He proceeds by first asking if such an equation is possible, and then inquires how its acceptance would change the standard interpretation of Kant's thought and whether it will be helpful in presenting his ideas in their true colors. The author claims that such reading of Kant may be more interesting if it is seen in the light of phenomenology. He is not only concerned to emphasize similarity between some conceptions of transcendental idalism (empirical realism) of Kant and Husserl, but shows how the proposed reading of Kant helps to detect Kantian inspiration in much of contemporary philosophy.
EN
It is usually assumed that what Kant called the Copernican Revolution in philosophy marks his most important achievement and constitites the essence of his transcendental turn. The author shows, however, that not only had Kant several predecessors in his highlighting the role of the cognising subject but also that the new epistemic perspective that endows the subject with the power to gain objectively valid knowledge was already present in Kant's precritical writings, which means that the idea did not belong specifically to his transcendental philosophy. These observations lead the author to believe that the more important achievement than the Copernican Revolution was the proposal of the synthetic unity of apperception. It was more important, as the subject in Kant's philosophy is an entity that produces a uniform picture of the world while remaing itself completely invisible and unaccountable for its contribution. The elusive manner of its operation and the consistent, uniform and interpersonally compatible effect of its work are more characteristic of Kant's transcendental philosophy than the claim that the active role of the subject guarantees epistemic validity of its findings.
EN
The main objective of the paper is to examine relations between three Kantian ideas: freedom, law and constraint, as they have been presented in the 'Foundations of Metaphysics of Morals'. The author argues that the close relationship between the three ideas testifies to a deeply social nature of Kant's philosophy. The possibility of mutual and universal constraint is crucial to the understanding of external freedom, whereas the possibility of self-constraint is fundamental to the understanding of inner freedom. Mutual constraint manifests itself as the negative side of the mutual acknowledgement of everyone's freedom. Coordination of freedoms is a liberal, but not a libertarian, concept; one's aim must not be a moral perfection of the others, but their happiness, in so far as it does not interfere with the moral law .
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SKEPTICISM AND ONTOLOGICAL PROOF

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EN
The paper defends the thesis that the only possible answer to the global skepticism is the so called ontological proof: only God's truthfulness and His bonitas can guarantee the rejection of such skeptical hypothesis as the one of R. Decscartes' stating that we are deceived by some evil demon or H. Putnam's claim that we are brains in vats. The author proposes an interpretation of the ontological proof in the spirit of I. Kant's considerations from his 'Der einzig mögliche Beweisgrund zu einer Demonstration des Daseins Gottes' (1762) where Kant uses the concepts of necessity and possibility in order to proof God's existence. Existence is a perfection and hence it must be one of the attributes that form the idea of God. Also truthfulness and bonitas must be treated as belonging to the idea of a perfect being. The truth condition for the sentence 'Perfect necessary being exists' is the real existence of a perfect necessary being but at same the time the truth condition for this sentence is its condition of possibility. This sentence could not be possible, if the object it refers to had not existed, e.g. if the perfect necessary being had not existed. Because this sentence is something real it must be also possible and from this follows that the perfect necessary being exists. Analogically, every attempt to suppose that it is possible that perfect necessary being does not exist presupposes real existence of perfect necessary being because nothing could be possible, if something were not necessary. 'Perfect necessary being exists' is the only sentence where the truth condition and condition of possibility coincide in this way. God's truthfulness and His bonitas guarantee that we are not deceived by some evil demon or that we are not brains in vat.
EN
Traces of Kant's main ideas can be found in hand written notes that he used to prepare before delivering his lectures. It is clear from these pages how Kant reached the conclusion that reason acting on its own could not establish epistemologically valid results and that cognitively valid findings must be confirmed by experience. A non-verifiable proposition does not refer to anything, Kant believed. Having made these observations the author focuses on discrepancies between some of Kant's essential premises., e.g. the discrepancy between status and functions of the intellect and senses, or between a priori truths and transcendentalism. Following Kant the author argues that without direct insight pure reason is empty and cannot serve as a fundamental cognising faculty. Less clear is the status, unity and functions of self-consciousness (the self or the subject). The unity of the subject emerges as a result of the application of categories (synthesis) and is not a raw datum. This makes several contentions of Kant doubtful. The author believes that Kant drew his inspiration for the development of the tables of categories from the Emile by Rousseau. In conclusion the author says that the main achievement of Kant is to be found in the showing that the self, truth and objective validity of cognising are intimately connected and inseparable.
EN
Moral philosophy of Kant assigns to religion no justificatory but only some kind of ancillary function. Religion is subordinate to ethics and supports it as in this world virtue and justice are not rewarded with happiness. Religion tells us that such concurrence will happen in after life. This basic idea that can bring ethics and religion together has gradually emerged in the history of what Kant calls the universal church. In Europe the history of religion began with Judaism. However, Jewish faith was shared by people who formed a civil association dedicated to a common law rather than a religious congregation. Judaism did not proclaim unequivocally that human soul is eternal and did not hold that man can participate in the supreme good as a result of the divinely created harmony between nature and moral obligation. These ideas emerged only later, in Christian churches, insofar as they strove to create on earth God's invisible Kingom. Kant hoped that a pure religious morality would prevail when it has been recognised that religious life consists in the faith in the trinity of God-persons interpreted according to the old Protestant creed as the summoning, redemption and elligibility.
EN
Arguably Kant's most important achievements have been (i) his critical method, (ii) his answer to the questions: What can I know?, (iii) What ought I to do?, (iv) What can I hope for?, (v) How can I find undisturbed happiness? These are also the problems on which the author has focused. In the first place he emphasises the distinction introduced by Kant between thought and perception, which in itself was a consequence of Kant's belief that our knowledge arises from two different sources, and thought without perception is empty, while perception without mental contents is blind. This is an occasion for the author to highlight the active role of the intellect in cognition and to show that human knowledge is limited to the cognition of phenomena rather than things in themselves. The author explains subsequently what is the origin and role of the categories, concepts and ideas in Kant's system of transcendental idealism. Along with the problems of theoretical philosophy he also deals with some issues of practical philosophy (autonomy, rationality, the formal ethics of obligation), and religion. He also shows why when carrying out the project of transcendental idealism Kant was obliged to recognise the a priori character of fundamental rules and laws. Finally the question of Kant's moral postulates is discussed. Man should treat another man always as an end in itself, and never only as a means, political society should be based on just laws and should be governed with fairness by its rulers, happiness is to be found in what is sublime and beautiful. The author points out in this context how Kant's philosophy has influenced Catholic philosophical thought of the 20th century (Mueller, Krings, Baumgartner).
EN
The point of departure in the paper is the problem of Heidegger's anti-logic claims. The author undertakes a short analysis of position taken by Heidegger in the context of the problem of relation between logic and experience. When Heidegger uncovers originality of temporality, he shows the pre-conceptual origins of possible human experience and begins to undermind the dominance of logic. The resulting 'onto-logy'' the author tries to compare with Kant's transcendental philosophy as interpreted by Heidegger. Methodical function of ontology stressed in the paper makes it possible to understand Heidegger's hermeneutic phenomenology as a discipline that is concerned with the formal meaning of 'phenomenon'.
EN
This is an attempt to analyse a psychoanalitic reading of the 'Critique of Practical Reason', proposed by Jacques Lacan and his followers. In the well known article 'Kant through Sade' Lacan has pointed to a symmetry between the Categorical Imperative and the 'imperative of delight' of Marquise de Sade. Lacan argues that moral law presupposes a bifurcation of the subject that splits it into the subject of uttering (the imperative and the other that stands behind it) and the subject of utterace, or the symbolic identity. A similar division of the subject is found in de Sade, where the will of the submitting party is subjects to the will of the other ordering it to 'indulge in delight'. In Kant's philosophy laws is an impersonal injunction that comes from nowhere. Lacan interprets this aspect of Kant's philosophy as an attempt to make the other invisible or barely adumbrated as a sadistic executioner. The Categorical Imperative is like a cruel maxim imposed by the other, and its functioning resembles the operation of the superego. Finally the author proposes to get further insights into Kant's philosophy by following Slavoj Zizka and reading Kant not only through de Sade's: 'Frenchmen, make one more effort, if you want to become republicans', but also by relying on Kafka's novels and films by Passolini.
EN
The problem of moral motivation, or speaking more generally, the question, why we should follow demands of 'pure reason' rather than inclinations 'contingent nature', is of an essential importance to those who seem not to be satisfied with Kant,s approach to practical philosophy. But their position, most elequently expressed in the philosophy found in English language publications, is rather simplistic and it tends to separate the question of conflicting claims of reason and nature from the rest of Kant's philosophy. Thus despite the fact that Kant's ethics has enjoyed a renewed interest in analytic philosophy recently, it is typically subordinated to other ethical positions, such as utilitarianism, expressivism, a theory of virtues (Aristotelian or Humean), or various anti-theoretic forms of particularism. Proponents of these theories go in the footsteps of Foot, Williams, McDowell or Blackburn and reject all kinds of moral theories that resemble Kant's ethics too closely. It seems consequently necessary to venture beyond the proper field of Kant's scholarship when one wants to reach wider public. Which in turn means that it is advisable to raise a more general question: What issues should be included in every perspicuous and reliable moral theory? The author starts to discuss this problem in a neutral language (part one) in order to be able to defend Kant against most common objections (part two) to his ethics, then he reconstructs Kant's theory of motivation (part three) by pointing to some salient features of that theory which unfortunately has been either neglected or overlooked.
EN
The papar reconstructs in general outline philosophical transcendentalism which was first formulated in the critical writings of Kant, then further developed in his theory of knowledge, and finally made conceptually more precise in the works of Fichte. These two philosophers, Kant and Fichte, are not discussed here as concrete thinkers or authors but as participants and representatives of sense making events and processes which have developed and unfolded in their texts and treatises. Two different though related questions are submitted to close scrutiny. First, what has happened with the Kantian idea of transcendentalism, how has it modified the previous configuration of questions, problems and concepts connected with the philosophical theory of human knowledge? And secondly, why did Fichte's 'Wissenschaftslehre', and not some previously written philosophical work, manage to lay bare theoretical consequences of that event, and why this work rather than any other has showed the way for the future course of the ensuing process of thought.
EN
Practical reasoning must provide other persons with reasons for action. It must, consequently, refrain from all presuppositions that are not available to them. This observation offers an insight into what Kant meant by the concept of legislation that is made by moral subjects. In Kant's philosophy autonomy should not be interpreted as self-expression exercised by persons who make law. Instead it is a practice of adopting maxims or 'laws' that are in no way derivative or dependent on one's preferences. Practical reason imposes on practical maxims a certain modal demand which is to be found at the foundation of his criticism of heteronomy in ethics and which supports his arguments for various formulations of the categorical imperative to warrant its adequacy with respect to rationality, autonomy and obligation.
EN
The point of departure in the paper is the problem of identification of the foundations of knowledge, its beginning and status in modern philosophy (Descartes, Leibniz, Wolff, Hume, Fichte, Chisholm, Shoemaker). The author undertakes an analysis of the position taken by Kant in the context of the problem of transcendental deduction of categories and its fundamental principle - the transcendental unity of apperception. He focuses on the connection between transcendental apperception with pre-predicative existence of pure consciousness and intellectual insight. Kant held that consciousness is a result of the self-referring operation of auto-reflection. This means that self-consciousness is not some kind of knowledge, nor is it any sort of mental content through which it would be possible to identify the subject.
EN
The Ch.W. Hufeland's concept of the organism as the seat of vital force, presented in his best known work entitled 'Die Kunst das menschliche Leben zu verlängern' (1797) is discussed in detail. In accordance with the conditions in which the vital force operates (or: in which the property of animateness occurs), it can assume the following three forms: (a) Organic force, which integrates the building blocks of the body and maintains the cohesion between them. (b) Plastic force, which subjects to transformations, taking place over time, a whole that emerges in an organic way, thus ultimately endowing it with a specific form. (c) The force-faculty of responding to stimuli (Reizfähigkeit), which could be termed excitability in the broadest sense. The single vital force acts simultaneously in all its three varieties, i.e. at the same time it annuls chemical laws, it controls the morphogenetic process, and it also responds specifically to internal and external stimuli. It is worth adding that, from time to time, Hufeland felt sceptical with regard to that unknown cause-force: he doubted whether it would ever be possible to know it, but more frequently he took that lack of knowledge to be a temporary, transitional state. Indeed, he described this force in conditional terms as 'hitherto unknown' or 'as yet not known'. Hufeland sent his treatise to Kant, for whom the treatise became an inspiration for a new, very peculiar dissertation, incorporated as a third part into a larger work that he published: 'Der Streit der Fakultäten', and entitled it 'Der Streit der philosophischen Fakultät mit der medicinischen'. Luckily, letters between Hufeland and Kant relating to the publication of that dissertation have been preserved.They provide some information on the last years of the philosopher's life. These letters, together with two fragments from the first edition of Kant's dissertation are presented in Polish translation for the first time in the current paper.
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