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1

Niebieskie złoto i trójnogi tygrys

100%
Suchoń W.
Kwartalnik Filozoficzny
|
2013
|
vol. 41
|
issue 2
49 - 59
EN
The article refers directly to the widely read and well-known book Naming and Necessity by Saul Kripke, presenting reflections on the thesis found in Kripke to the effect that the power of necessity attributed to analytic sentences of the same structure can be varied. An attempt is made to explain on what grounds one may adopt such a paradoxical belief and to what extent can we agree with Kripke's thesis.
2

QUINE AND QUANTIFIED MODAL LOGIC: AGAINST THE RECEIVED VIEW

100%
Tuboly Á. T.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
|
2015
|
vol. 22
|
issue 4
545 – 518
EN
The textbook - like history of analytic philosophy is a history of myths, received views and dogmas. Though mainly the last few years have witnessed a huge amount of historical work that aimed to reconsider our narratives of the history of analytic philosophy there is still a lot to do. The present study is meant to present such a micro story which is still quite untouched by historians. According to the received view Kripke has defeated all the arguments of Quine against quantified modal logic and thus it became a respectful tool for philosophers. If we accept the historical interpretation of the network between Quine, Kripke and modal logic, which is to be presented here, we have to conclude that Quine’s real philosophical animadversions against the modalities are still on the table: though Kripke has provided some important (formal-logical) answers, Quine’s animadversions are still viable and worthy of further consideration.
3

PUTNAM’S VIEW ON REFERENCE CHANGE IS DIFFERENT FROM THAT OF KRIPKE’S

88%
Moreno L. F.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
|
2016
|
vol. 23
|
issue 3
367 – 383
EN
A usual objection put forward against the causal theory of reference is that it cannot explain the reference changes that terms may undergo. The main aim of this paper is to examine the position on reference change of one of the classic supporters of the causal theory, Hilary Putnam. It is usually claimed that Putnam’s causal theory of reference of natural kind terms is closely related to Kripke’s theory and can be conceived as a development of the same. The motivation of this paper is to allege that there is at least one important difference between both theories, consisting of their explanation of reference changes or at least in the way in which those theories make reference changes possible. After dealing with the problem of reference change within the framework of Kripke’s theory and reconstructing Kripke’s proposal to account for it, we will allege that there are components of Putnam’s theory which make reference changes possible, although they are different from those present in Kripke’s theory.
4

WHY YOU CAN’T ACTUALLY IMAGINE THE IMPOSSIBLE (BUT THINK THAT YOU CAN)

88%
Malik L.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
|
2015
|
vol. 22
|
issue 4
499 – 517
EN
There are philosophers who think that it is possible to imagine the meta-physically impossible. On the one hand, there are philosophers that think that only knowledge limits what one can imagine. Prior to knowledge of certain facts the imagination is unbounded. On the other hand, there are philosophers who think that the imagination is unconstrained whatever. The author shall argue that (a) it is not actually possible to imagine what is metaphysically impossible, though (b) it appears to be possible. He takes this to be a defence of the Kripkean view. He aims to develop an understanding of the imagination that can accommodate this view.
5

AN ARGUMENT FOR AUTHORIAL CREATION

75%
Zvolenszky Z.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
|
2015
|
vol. 22
|
issue 4
461 – 487
EN
Artefactualism about fictional characters, positing Harry Potter as an abstract artefact created by J. K. Rowling, has been criticized on the grounds that the idea of creating such objects is mysterious and problematic. In the light of such qualms, it is worth homing in on an argument in favour of artefactualism, showing that it is the best way to include the likes of Harry Potter in our ontology precisely because it incorporates authorial creation. To that end, he author will be exploring Kripke’s fleeting remarks in the Addenda to his “Naming and Necessity” lectures about expressions like ‘unicorn’ and ‘Harry Potter’. Elsewhere, Kripke motivates artefactualism by suggesting that incorporating authorial creation (as artefactualism does) is a move that is intuitive and natural; but beyond this, he doesn’t provide any arguments in favour of such a move. The author ś purpose in this paper is to construct such an argument based on considerations about Kripke’s general view about proper names, in particular, his seminal causal-historical chain account of reference determination, and its consequences for fictional names as well as nonfictional names without bearers such as ‘Vulcan’.
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