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ESPES
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2021
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vol. 10
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issue 2
72 – 87
EN
Through the concept of enjoyment in Levinas, this paper examines the phenomenological and ontological dimension of everyday aesthetics. Enjoyment, in Levinas, forms an essential element in the constitution of the subjectivity of the human being and is no longer to be seen as a moment of ‘inauthenticity’ or ‘alienation’. The experience of the objects of everyday experience is not related to that of objects of representation or of tools, but rather to that of a system of nourishment into which the subject is integrated, as in an ‘element’ or ‘atmosphere’. This constitutive closeness of enjoyment indicates the fundamental difference between what we understand as everyday aesthetics and other aesthetics characterised by contemplation or disinterest.
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Transcendentalizm Levinasa

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Filo-Sofija
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2006
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vol. 6
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issue 6
21-41
FR
En s’inspirant de l’approche de Natalie Depraz qui defini la position théorique de Husserl tardif comme «l’empirisme transcendental», je propose retrouver aussi dans la philosophie de Emmanuel Levinas une forme specifique du transcendentalisme, transcendentalisme de genese – différente de l’apriorisme transcendental de Kant. Je demontre que – en dépit de l’apparence – on peut interpreter certaines couches de la réalité ou certains phénoménes ou encore événements que Levinas soumet à l’analyse – telles que «il y a», «la mort», «le feminin», «la fecondité», «la jouissance» et «le travail – la demeure» – comme les conditions empirico-transcendentales de la genese du sujet mur et susceptible de nouer «l’intrigue éthique». Je montre ainsi combine Levinas doit aux méthodes classiques de la phénoménologie. Cependant je demontre aussi que ni la transcendence de l’Infini qui se devoile dans «l’épiphanie du visage», ni cette figure du sujet qui est décrite dans la dernière période de Levinas, notamment «le soi» – le sujet dechiré de l’interieur par la diachronie propre a lui, le sujet an – archique, indicible dans un langage prédicatif – ne peuvent plus remplir les functions transcendentales. En fin j’essai de demontrer que la perspective transcendentale chez Levinas trouve ses limitations et qu’elle est remplacée dans la dernière période par une sorte de dialectique apophatique.
EN
Phenomenology of Levinas is founded on the category of transcendence, whereas for phenomenology of Michel Henry immanence is the crucial notion. The analysis of main terms of both philosophers allows us to interpret these two concepts as similar ones. They try to find a fundament for subjectivity which for them is always embodied. However, for Levinas subject depends on the Other, on the transcendence, while according to Henry the subject is identified with radical immanence related to Life. They both use the same terms and describe the same phenomena: body and flesh, arché, passivity, self-affection, sensibility and vulnerability.
EN
The paper focuses on two 'faces' of Levinas' Judaism. First, the author mentions Levinas' significant biographic moments to suggest how rich and deep were the sources that influenced him from his early childhood: Latvian Judaism represented especially by the so called Musar movement, Russian secondary school, university education in France and Germany and importance of Alliance Israelite Universelle. Next, the authoress analyses 'traditional' and 'extra-traditional' aspects of Levinas' thought. She concludes that Levinas' Judaism conserves the traditional (actual and modern, nevertheless) reading of Bible as well as Talmud, while adopting the Greek methods of approaching philosophical texts. Theses multiple aspects of Levinas' Judaism do not simply stand in juxtaposition, but make an original synthesis.
EN
In this paper, Pascal's and Levinas' reflection about justice is juxtaposed. Both authors share the conviction that justice is not reducible to any established legal order. For the latter is always local and particular. Justice in an extra-local sense, so-called true justice, transcends the existing order and legally binding laws. According to Levinas, questioning or even destroying the subjectively unjust order in the name of 'metaphysical desire' can serve to limit, but not to eliminate injustice. Pascal is however inclined to claim that the notion of justice has no positive content, therefore it is right and really rational to 'delude people' by not rejecting the existing order but by inculcating the belief that the status quo is just. Yet at the same time, Pascal will talk about the very rare and uncertain, extra-rational intuition of justice given to chosen ones in the act of unearned grace of God.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2010
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vol. 65
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issue 7
652-663
EN
There are several terms in Levinas' philosophy, to which his reader better should not assign traditional meanings. The paper focuses on Levinas' usage of the terms 'ontology' and 'metaphysics', which reveal the philosopher's attempt to find their new interpretations. In his perspective, both terms become synonyms of the key concepts of his philosophy. In the context of Levinas' criticism of Western philosophical tradition, 'ontology' refers to totalization, i.e. a philosophy aiming at a unity, but at the same time denying the alterity of the other. 'Metaphysics', on the other hand, expresses transcendence leading to plurality and cherishing the otherness. Levinas finds its formal structure in Descartes' idea of the infinity in us and its tangible expression in the ethical attitude towards the other. Consequently, the term 'first philosophy' should be attributed to ethics, not as a normative and casuistic discipline, but as a relation to the other in his otherness, which the philosophy as the 'love for wisdom' transforms into the 'wisdom of love'.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2023
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vol. 78
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issue 4
296 – 305
EN
The aim of this paper is to examine Levinas’s and Derrida’s concept of metaphor. The paper compares their account on metaphor that shows well their position toward religion. Both authors agree that metaphor is connected to the realm of “beyond concept” but Levinas identifies the metaphor, in Carnets de Captivité, with monotheistic divinity. Derrida does not. The conclusion is that Derrida cannot be considered negative theologian nor religious thinker.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2014
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vol. 69
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issue 2
119 – 130
EN
Though the distant Other, the faceless stranger becomes ever closer and more accessible through various technological mediations and social networks, we seem to grow increasingly disconnected from any possibility of what Levinas calls ‘proximity’. ‘Proximity’ – the face-to-face encounter with the other person – signals a traumatising indictment of the gravitational pull of our egoism rooted in what Spinoza referred to as our conatus essendi. Rather than individualistic self-actualisation, Levinas sees brotherhood as the fundamental presupposition of our shared humanity and as the foundation of freedom and equality. While rather a-ethical than immoral, it is our very conatus that seems to open the door to indifference, prejudice and hate. On the other hand, the possibility of ethical action, of a humane society, is something that Levinas attempts to account for by the help of a responsibility more fundamental than our ontological blueprint.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2015
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vol. 70
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issue 9
770 – 777
EN
Our aim in this article is to offer an ethical and political approach to human body and life of a human being, deriving from the common reading and interpreting the famous Foucault’s writing on bio-politics as well as the shift of the relationship between ethics, life, sensual perception and corporeality made by Levinas in the 1960s and 1970s.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2017
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vol. 72
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issue 1
46 – 53
EN
The article explores the relationship between labour and work in Levinas, taking into consideration Arendt’s understanding of action as well as the Marxist conception of labour. The sections dealing with the concept of work in Levinas’ Totality and Infinity offer a roughly reproduction of the Marxist dichotomy creation/self-creation: on one hand there is the claim to the unity of labour and expression; on the other hand there is an alienated labour with this unity broken. Here the works are commodities and workers dishonoured and, what is more, exploited. Thus the reader is left with following questions: What is the true reason of breaking this fundamental bond of a person with herself/himself? How precisely this break is accomplished?
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2006
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vol. 61
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issue 8
221-231
EN
The paper remembers some features of the Husserlian conception of the phenomenon in order to show the ways of the inversion imposed to it by Levinas, namely in his book 'Totalité et infini' and in his article 'Intentionnalité et sensation'. In these texts it is still possible to maintain a fundamental description of the phenomenon as 'experience/vécu/Erlebnis' even with 'intentionality' and 'sensation' as its components. The rejection of the concept of 'representation' as the very fundament of appearance by Levinas does not make obsolete any use of those concepts which locate an important dimension of the phenomenality to the interiority of the experience, in the subjectivity. Even if the subjectivity in Levinas seems to admit no homogeneous unity and seems to be constituted by the different kinds of the relations to an exteriority the phenomena implicated in these relations remain inner sensual experiences.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2017
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vol. 72
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issue 10
769 – 778
EN
What is the nature of the interpellation that enables us to recognize ourselves as subjects of an experience? How do we become subjects and what is the relationship between subjectivity and otherness? The paper discusses the genesis of the subjectivity from a phenomenological and a social standpoint, confronting Levinas’ phenomenological perspective on subjective responsibility with Althusser’s and Butler’s account of the interpellation by the law. If ethical and normative interpellation is often seen as overlapping, this paper discusses their differences as a critical resource for the phenomenological theory of subjectivity.
EN
The article undertakes a critical reflection on the notion of proximity, which is one of the basic categories of Levinas’s philosophy of the Other. This notion is present in the work of Levinas at all stages of its development. In a way, it is a meta-category that takes on various functions, but is always used to emphasize the impossibility of achieving a permanent closeness with another. Proximity first occurs as a significant moment in the very genesis of the subject in the movement of hypostasis, then it becomes the hedonic closeness of the subject to himself in the act of delight (jouissance), but in the next step it takes the form of home proximity, which paradoxically leads to the separation of the subject. But this formation process of the egotistical subject is a preparatory phase needed to achieve ethical maturity through the encounter with the face of the Other. As it turns out, this encounter also has the structure of achieving both proximity and distance. Proximity is a necessary stage of transcending, and it reaches the very height of paradox: the face is physically close, and at the same time unattainable metaphysically. The Other, represented by another human being, is within the reach of your hand as a concrete person, but is, at the same time, infinitely distant and unknown as an absolute. The aporias of proximity are not, however, an element of Levinas’s method, such as the use of hyperbole or contradiction. He eliminates proximity as impossible, though its descriptions testify to the fact that he had knowledge of radical closeness and used the notion of proximity in the sense of a fulfilled community with another. In my interpretation, Levinas’s thinking is burdened by the trauma of loss of his loved ones, who cannot be brought back and therefore become the hidden object of metaphysical desire.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2014
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vol. 69
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issue 7
581 – 590
EN
It is just there, where he stands clearly against Heidegger that Levinas profoundly approaches that what makes a human being human. Here he is an ever more radical defender of the irreducibility of subjectivity in the era proclaiming the death of subject. Such subjectivity meets the ethical requirement already in the form of sensual, bodily sensitivity or vulnerability, which, instead making human a servant or intermediator of the domination of appearing, being and history, liberates him from that domination. The paper focuses namely on this bodily-affective subjectivity as the core of the humaneness, which resists phenomenology as well as history of being.
EN
In his final interview published under the title 'Apprendre a vivre enfin' Derrida returns to the recurrent theme of his work namely responsibility, but this time also with regard to the death. Drawing critically on the works of Heidegger and Levinas, Derrida explores, in his later work 'Gift of Death', 'history of responsibility' from the Plato's interpretation of the Socrates death to the Kierkegaard's meditations on infinite responsibility in the face of God. Refusing the traits of platonism in Heidegger, which has to do with taking death upon oneself, Derrida still sees his point in that it is in the irreplacability of one's death that the call of responsibility appears. Taking into account Levinas' critique of Heidegger stance, Derrida reformulates singularity as an assymetrical relationship of a responsible 'I' to the Other. However, arguing together with Patocka, Derrida underlines that this kind of responsibility has only become possible in the Christian religion which changes the understanding of death and the call of conscience in the terms of a personal relationship to the Other, i. e. Good, and which brings a new experience of death. In the conclusion the essay offers a short introduction to Derrida's understanding of religion as a promise and of what-is-to-come yet could mean.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2006
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vol. 61
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issue 8
642-658
EN
Basically it is not possible to fully understand to the Levinas' ethical axioms without the comprehension of his time scheme. This is to be defended here as it is important to show the time awareness apparent in its relationship to the infinity which is essentially preconditioned by the death. The term time does not necessarily include the 'conatus essendi', however, especially the ontological excess 'extra sui' is present. The death and the nihility are not the last possible instances of the question of the being; on the contrary, they are the essential conditions for the constitution of the time. It is not possible for the time to be realized without the approach of the Other's future, within the hypostatic isolation of the subject. It is on the background of the neutrality that the subjectivity arises. The time is not the question of subjectivity. The presence of the existing essentially relates to the duration. The nihility is a destructive moment of the duration and it lies in the detachedness of the present moments. In this sense the sociability - the space of time - is actually 'contra tempus'.
Kwartalnik Filozoficzny
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2014
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vol. 42
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issue 2
103-116
EN
The article has to do with the issue of war and violence in the thought of Emmanuel Levinas. According to him war is not only a traumatic historical event, but also a peculiar ontological state resulting from the peculiar way of thinking of Europeans. He considers how war is connected with the notions of whole, identity, and objectivity, why history is at fault, and why the only solution is eschatology, which challenges individuals and calls them to responsibility. The relationship between war and morality is at the center of the thought of Levinas. He sensitizes the reader to the fact that war is always a latent possibility, a constant hidden threat, always unexpected. War, as well as violence and force broadly understood, always change the world order, and with it accepted principles, rules, and values. It is an event that seeks to eliminate otherness, that tends to a uniform whole by leveling differences. Pluralism must give way to the totalizing aspirations of war.
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