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David Lewis believes that possible worlds are spatiotemporal entities, maximal and causally isolated. They exist in the very same sense as 'our' world does. The article critically discusses his 'extreme modal realism', propounded mainly in his book 'On the Plurality of Worlds'. Having outlined the main features of this doctrine, the authoress raises several objections to it. 'Modal realism' is neither modal nor realistic. First, contrary to what Lewis declares, his theory does not analyze modality in terms of more basis entities in a theoretically defensible way. Secondly, it contains incredible existential claims whose ludicrousness is not justified by the presumed theoretical benefits it offers (in particular, by its 'economy'). Finally, it assumes that 'anything can co-exist with anything else'. This postulation, however, is controversial: it is implausible and it deprives the theory of possible worlds of its foremost motivation. Moreover it is at variance with ontological rationality. In sum, the doctrine in question, though designed with care and courage, sounds unconvincing.
EN
Divers (2014) argues that a Lewisian theory of modality which includes both counterpart theory and modal realism cannot account for the truth of certain intuitively true modal sentences involving cross-world comparatives. The main purpose of this paper is to defend the Lewisian theory against Divers’s challenge by developing a response strategy based on a degree-theoretic treatment of comparatives and by showing that this treatment is compatible with the theory.
EN
In the paper, the author distinguishes between the semantic and the 'direct' approach to event ontology. The first approach, employed by D. Davidson, starts with logical analysis of natural language. This analysis uncovers quantification over the domain of events. Thus, we have ontological commitment to events and, at the same time, also a suggestion of how to view their nature. The second approach, used by J. Kim and D. Lewis, deals with events 'directly', i.e. not by analyzing language first. Events are postulated because they are useful in other theories (of causation, explanation, etc.) and their nature is adjusted to the needs of these theories. In the paper, the author analyzes both approaches and outlines their problems and advantages. He concludes that we should conditionally prefer the latter approach on the methodological grounds. This preference is based on the assumption that submitting hypotheses to the tests seems to be a crucial part of metaphysical methodology. Since the 'direct' approach to event ontology allows for more testing, it should be preferred over the semantic approach.
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