Full-text resources of CEJSH and other databases are now available in the new Library of Science.
Visit https://bibliotekanauki.pl

Refine search results

Journals help
Authors help
Years help

Results found: 42

first rewind previous Page / 3 next fast forward last

Search results

Search:
in the keywords:  LIBERALISM
help Sort By:

help Limit search:
first rewind previous Page / 3 next fast forward last
EN
The state is the means by which the most primeval human problems are solved. It is, an entirety, capable of confronting an opponent in a fierce fight for survival. It is an authoritative, total and sovereign entity, having at its disposal the power to set out measures, to encompass the whole of public life and to make final decisions; it is in such words that this institution was described by Carl Schmitt, who added: should any of these features be missing, the state will cease to exist. Its existence depends on this power, which is necessary to identify the enemy adequately, to defeat it and to make peace. The state is also an answer to those human passions too destructive to be freely unleashed; conceit, envy and aggression. Machiavelli, Hobbes, de Maistre or Hegel, regarded as political thinkers 'par excellence', had no doubts whatsoever in this respect. Because of their anthropological pessimism, they were all followers of Plato. They knew that the realm of politics is a cave where one should not expect to meet wise men and saints. A hero of politics is enthralled by the play of shadows and echoes and devotes to it his all time and passion. Moved by an exuberant ambition and tempted by the hope of immortal glory, he pursues mirages. The liberals seem not to understand these nooks and crannies of the human psyche and not even to notice them. They reduce the mystery of our multifarious needs to one: lust. The entire wealth of feelings is reduced to the fear of poverty, greed and the want of luxury. They claim that all our choices are accompanied by economic motivation. The central character of liberal philosophy is Adam Smith's 'homo oeconomicus'. 'The Wealth of Nations' is, to them, a priceless source of knowledge regarding everyone's conduct. The economic way of thinking and the methods of eliminating tensions derived from the capitalist economy should, to them, provide a template for the solving of conflicts in other areas as well, including politics. What becomes important is the scope of power, which raises the highest distrust. It is the largest threat to the value which has been recognised as the most precious; human freedom.
EN
What does 'the neutrality of the state' mean and is it possible? There are two colliding concepts in political thought regarding the extent of the state's intervention in the life of an individual. The first of them is minimalist and the second is that of the common good. It is in this context that it is worthwhile analysing what neutrality means. The dispute between the advocates of the state's neutrality and its enemies is not only of a theoretical nature. The lack of agreement in this matter often leads to political conflicts, which antagonise not only politicians but also society in its entirety, as in the case of abortion or euthanasia. Neutrality is one of the main features of a contemporary, liberal state. In the liberal approach, the standpoint may be also put forth that compromise and toleration are the most important of liberal and democratic values. The essence of this is the separation of the sphere of the state from that of morality, which results in the creation of a space for discussion, polemics and dispute. Involvement on the part of the state raises controversy, most of all in the moral sphere related to one's philosophy of life. When we talk of the neutrality of the state, the issue which comes to the fore is that of religious toleration and an issue akin to this, the issue of relations between the state and the church. The contemporary understanding of this matter is more narrow. Neutrality of the state is associated with the latter's remaining distant from any philosophy of life, and not necessarily only that which is rooted in religion. The issue of religious toleration has, however, contributed to a large degree to the debates on the neutrality of the state which are being carried out at present and the very idea of the neutrality of the state is like a generalisation of the role of the concept of neutrality with regard to religion.
EN
The purpose of this text is the comparison of the interpretations of Carl Schmitt’s thought in Poland and worldwide. Polish literature on Schmitt is very modest: two large monographs and some scientific articles. It focuses on the problem of the theory of the state and politics. At the same time, the world literature is very abundant. Schmitt is a thinker concerned with many topics. He wrote about many problems. For a long time there has been a tendency to look for the interpretive key to use in order to find a central theme of his reflections and then read the rest of his works through this perspective. Researchers identify these central themes as: a critique of liberalism, political theology, favorability towards Nazism, political opportunism. This text shows four major worldwide interpretations and their reflection in the Polish-language literature.
Annales Scientia Politica
|
2020
|
vol. 9
|
issue 2
5 – 15
EN
The article opposes the rejection of autonomy in favour of coercive paternalism. Based on the thought of especially John Stuart Mill, Immanuel Kant, and Joel Feinberg, it suggests that autonomy as an ideal, a moral capacity, and a foundational principle in liberal democracies must not be surrendered for a doctrine of benevolent coercion. The arguments are equally concerned with the justifications for coercion, the value of autonomy and moral agency, and the dangers of paternalism (e.g. infantilization). The article concludes that Mill’s soft paternalism based on the harm principle could serve as a reasonable middle-ground allowing for the most severe types of self-harming behaviour to be avoided without surrendering autonomy altogether.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
|
2008
|
vol. 63
|
issue 2
174-185
EN
Since W. Kaufmann's attempt more than half a century ago (Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist, (N)1950) to rehabilitate Nietzsche as a progressive thinker there has been a lively debate about the relation between Nietzsche's philosophical and political positions. According to some, Nietzsche's 'reactionary politics' follows naturally from his doctrines of Will to Power and the Overman. (Bruce Detwiler argues for this position in: 'Nietzsche and the Politics of Aristocratic Radicalism' (D), 1990.) Others maintain that, properly interpreted, Nietzsche's philosophical views imply a progressive political position which Nietzsche could not arrive at because he was captive of a number of misguided assumptions. (Mark Warren in 'Nietzsche and Political Thought' (W), 1988; and William E. Connolly in 'Political Theory and Modernity' (C), 1988, take this position.) The author going to defend a version of W. Kaufmann's thesis that Nietzsche's teachings on the Overman and the Will to Power ought not to be interpreted in (traditional) political terms. However, in contrast to Kaufmann, the author argues that in his middle period Nietzsche does put forth a fairly coherent political position and, furthermore, author argues that his doctrine of Will to Power does have some political implications. In opposition to Kaufmann's critics, on the other hand, the author argues that Nietzsche's attacks in his final period, on what he calls 'herd morality', are compatible with constitutional liberalism.
6
Content available remote

Aksjologiczna dezintegracja w UE? Przypadek Węgier

80%
EN
Hungary since 2010 has entered into the new chapter in its history, described on domestic scene as the „era of fight for freedom”, of national independence (from any foreign diktat) and „unorthodox economy”, which led also to the „opening to the East” (including China and Russia). Even the unquestioned leader of the State, prime minister Viktor Orbán confirmed, that this is „an illiberal system”, moving ever since further and further away from liberal democracy established in 1990. The author of this study, using mainly Hungarian and Hungarian language sources, is trying to describe, what is the essence of the new system, how it works and looks like. This Hungarian case study seems to be important, as it shows yet another challenge on the road of European integration, with so many other obstacles recently. Is the new Hungarian system a showcase for the others in the region, and the whole EU? No one knows the answer, but it is the highest time to know, how the Hungarian system is looking from the inside, after withdrawal from the principles of the rule of law, liberal democracy and the separation of powers, or checks and balances.
7
80%
EN
The understanding of freedom from a Protestant point of view is out¬lined in Luther’s writing “On the Freedom of a Christian Man” from 1520. The debate about the “post-secular” relationship between political freedoms and religious freedom, which was initiated by Jürgen Habermas, provides the context for the contemporary impact of Luther’s notion of freedom. The “royal freedom” of the Christian person is profiled within this discussion about the current meaning of political liberalism. Examples of the political-ethical debate in the present-day Germany are being discussed. The “priestly freedom” of the Christian person is being dealt with in the view of the recent establishment of the Evangelical Lutheran Church in Northern Germany and its constitution. Lastly, the current importance of Luther’s theology of the communion becomes obvious by introducing the Holy Communion as the place for “priestly freedom”.
EN
A constitutive part of the political opposition in Austria-Hungary in the second half of the 19th century against the political and philosophical stands of the liberally oriented New school were also the pro-government newspapers 'Krajan' and 'Vlastenec'. Although their formal ground were the principles of the civic liberalism, they in fact subordinated the last to the idea of Hungarian patriotism and the strategy of preserving the status quo. These pro-government periodicals defended politically the idea of exclusivity of the political rights of the previous 'natio hungarica'. Concomitant to it was the idea of the meritocracy and superiority of the fatherland over the individual nations, or the whole over the part. The dominating interpretation of Hegel's philosophy of history, adopted by the Hungarian political elite, as well as its romantic one-sidedness (transparent in enforcing of the political objectives, i.e. setting out the patriotism in the Hungarian style, regardless to the cultural diversity) made it in the long run impossible to implement the liberal principles of the civic and cultural equality in the Hungarian region of the Austrian-Hungarian monarchy.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
|
2017
|
vol. 72
|
issue 9
736 – 747
EN
This essay attempts to contextualise the purported novelty of Alexis de Tocqueville’s particular brand of liberalism. It regards the author not as an heir or precursor to any given political tradition, but rather as a compelled syncretist whose primary philosophical concern was the moral significance of the democratic age. It suggests that Tocqueville devised his ‘new political science’ with a keen view to the existential implications of modernity. In order to support that suggestion, the essay explores the genealogy of Tocqueville’s moral and political thought and draws a relation between his analysis of democracy and his personal experience of modernity.
EN
The author outlines the argument he pursued in the last two decades of the 20th century, while working at British and American universities. In scholarly discourse of the time, the notion of totalitarianism was already abandoned in political science in general, and in sovietology in particular. Rejecting this commonly dominated position, the author assumed that the totalitarian project constituted the most radical opposition to the liberal one. Accordingly, he adopted the critical apparatus of classical liberalism, especially that of methodological individualism, to analyze totalitarianism. Above all, he used the categories of John Locke’s political thought, such as the state of nature, social contract, and especially that of civil society, as the key to understand the phenomenon of the explosion as well as implosion of totalitarianism. In fact, he assumed that the presence of civil society constituted the essence of liberal experience and its absence indicated the essence of totalitarian experience. In this interpretation, the chronological and conceptual point of departure was the state of affairs in Russia as well as in Central and Eastern Europe before the communist takeover. What dominated there could be considered a three-way social and political relationship of the individual, society and the state. The individuals constituted various associations, such as political parties, business corporations, trade unions, religious, scientific, artistic organizations or sports clubs which formed the ranks of civil society. They usually pursued different pluralistic visions of common good while influencing state policies. After the communist takeover, these three-way relationships were replaced by the two-way relationships of the individual and the Center. The latter consisted of the Communist party as well as state leadership and combined three mutually interacting branches: the political (control of the police and army), the economic (planning and control of economic activity and distribution), and the ideological (imposition of the offi cially established ideology and control of the channels of mass communication). The Center destroyed the ranks of civil society and exposed the individual to its three dimensional power causing a true atomization of society. This state of affairs lasted until the emergence of dissident groups which restored pockets of civil society and deprived the Center of the ideological power over their members. The next step towards the restoration of civil society in the region was the appearance of mass vindication movements such as Solidarity in Poland in 1980, Popular Fronts in numerous Soviet Republics in 1988–1989, and in Czechoslovakia, East Germany and Bulgaria in 1989. The nationwide dimensions of these initiatives finally deprived the Center of its ideological power over the greatest part of population and considerably weakened the other two branches of its power — the economic and political ones. The political power of the Center was defi nitely challenged when these movements divided themselves along political lines and independent political parties emerged. The agenda of these parties was to compete with the Communists for political power in open and competitive elections. The final restoration of civil society took place when these parties managed to implement their agendas. When they did take political power the dissolution of the Center followed. The two-way social and political relations of the individual and the Center were defi nitely abolished and three-way ones of the individual, society and the state reemerged. The author admits that this interpretation had both methodological strengths and weaknesses. Yet, he argues that its main achievement was to indicate the fundamental conflict between the dynamics of the Center and the dynamics of civil society. The explosion of the totalitarian system caused by the Center led to the total annihilation of civil society. In turn, the implosion of the totalitarian system was the result of the reemergence of civil society which finally eliminated the Center.
EN
The article analyses two main economic trends (liberalism and keynesism) in the context of possible theoretical and practical answers they can give to questions related to the essence and causes of economic crises and counteraction against them. The author shows a significant connection between the appearance of global crises and domination of liberal thinking among economic theoreticians, practitioners and politicians. This connection is illustrated by historical examples of economic crises. The author also presents the reasons for crises (usually liberal thinking) and ways of counteraction against them (indicating that the keynesism recipes are the most effective). Finally, the author states that in present political conditions, Polish economy is unlikely to quickly and successfully oppose the dangers resulting from the existence of crises phenomena as there is a fundamental ideological obstacle, which is liberal government, rejecting all keynesism recipes for an economic crisis.
12
Content available remote

Ke kořenům ruského liberalismu

80%
EN
The article focuses on political thinking in the 18th century Russia, which preceded the 19th and 20th century Russian liberalism. It is divided into two sections. The first sections focuses on certain difficulties connected with clarification of the term Russian liberalism (or more precisely liberalism in Russia) and the course of its existing research, i.e. the heterogeneous periodicity of Russian liberalism, the problematic specification of the term 'liberal' in the Russian milieu and the fluctuation of liberalism in Russia from positive to pejorative nuances. The second section pursues viewpoints of political thinkers and the development of public political life in the 18th century Russia, which was followed by Russian liberalism in the 19th and 20th century. The author pays attention to political ideas and standpoints of I. T. Pososhkov, D. M. Golicyn and V. N. Tatishchev and their attempts to weaken the tsarist power in 1730. He analyses the rise and advance of public movement and West European political thinkers' influence on the Russian political activity in the second half of the 18th century. Next, he analyses constitutionals projects of N. I. Panin, P. I. Panin and D. I. Fonvizin and ideas of S. J. Desnickij and A. N. Radishchev.
EN
The most relentless attack on socialism in Britain in the late nineteenth century was made by W. H. Mallock. He was one of the few Conservatives to take socialism seriously enough to subject it to a rigorous criticism and thus he did more than probably anyone else to convince Conservatives that socialism, and not liberalism, was their real enemy. Mallock was dissatisfied with evolutionary sociology, but neither could he rely - in constructing his defence of the man of ability - on the concepts of traditional conservatism. Consequently, he tried to elaborate a new theoretical framework to prove his main thesis, i.e. the connexion between the inequalities in human capacity and the inequality of wealth. He insisted that any changes that tend to abolish inequalities would tend also to destroy civilization. This conviction led him, however, to an exaggerated defence of individualism, neglecting the corporate needs of society.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
|
2017
|
vol. 72
|
issue 4
306 – 311
EN
The essay shows that some political views from the times of Athenian democracy are acceptable even today. Although the essence of democracy has changed, its long journey has now entered a dead end street. Liberal democracy, coupled with globalization and the neo-liberal principles of market economy, is now in crisis that needs to be resolved. Maintaining its framework is important; otherwise we risk the rise of illiberal democracies. One way to overcoming this crisis is to revive democracy through various forms of participation, basically active citizenship, which for Aristotle was embodied by a democratic constitution, especially the Athenian one.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
|
2021
|
vol. 76
|
issue 2
110 – 124
EN
Berlin’s division of liberty into its positive and negative variants is usually mentioned as a point of reference in the debates about freedom. However, I consider as more fundamental the difference between liberal freedom and freedom based on responsible relations with other people and the surrounding world. In other words, I question the meaning of freedom, which - with a reference to the conception of Ladislav Hejdánek, proponent of the Czech practical philosophy – I do not consider to be an elimination of various life bonds, but instead their acceptance, fulfilment, or improvement. However, such binding freedom can also find its “allies” in liberalism – namely in the so-called liberalism of fear (B. Williams, J. Shklar), which is surprisingly close to Hejdánek’s conception and represents at least one of the contemporary currents of liberalism, able to unite with a seemingly opposing tradition. In addition to introducing Hejdánek’s conception of freedom, the aim of the paper is also to outline this connection.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
|
2021
|
vol. 76
|
issue 8
624 – 635
EN
The problems of contemporary individualism, referring to the ideology of liberalism, can also be perceived through the current pandemic crisis. In civil and political society, we can see the phenomenon in which regulations of legal authorities are accepted by a certain part of the population with reluctance, not taking into account the fact that these authorities have a legitimate authority to implement them. Nevertheless, at certain moments we are confronted with views on the restriction of personal freedom. In this paper, we address the question of whether, in the context of the current crisis, personal freedom is not confused with Rousseau's concept of unlimited noble savage autonomy in its natural state. In the text, we aim to reflect on the possibilities and limits of legitimate authority to interfere in the personal freedom of the individual in the context of the liberal tradition. We chose the liberal framework of our work because it is precisely liberalism that is least open to interfering with the freedoms of individuality. If we confirmed the possibilities of such action of the state within the civil and political society, which is ideologically based on liberalism, while we consider it as the greatest protector of personal freedom, our hypothesis of the possibility of approaching of such actions of authorities would gain valuable arguments.
Kwartalnik Filozoficzny
|
2017
|
vol. 45
|
issue 3
143-163
EN
John Crell (1590-1633) was one of the most influential representatives of the intellectual school of the Polish Brethren. For many years he worked as a lecturer at the antitrinitarian Rakow Academy, and his writings were known throughout Europe. His idea of tolerance laid out in the treatise On the freedom of conscience was particularly interesting and in all likelihood influenced John Locke’s concept of tolerance. The purpose of this article is to present Crell’s protoliberalism, which emerges from his idea of tolerance. This protoliberalism consists of a number of values, concepts, and insights that will eventually become the constitutive traits of modern liberal thought.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
|
2009
|
vol. 64
|
issue 2
155-165
EN
The starting point of the following considerations is the assumption that philosophical communitarian discourse as well as the juridical discourse about communitarian rights represent two sides of the same phenomenon. When the European Union was founded, the ideological basis of the liberal democracies, concerning human and individual rights, seemed to be insufficient. Therefore we need to return to the communitarian elements of culture and tradition that will ensure real autonomy.
EN
The article is devoted to the phenomenological consideration of the idea of fraternity as a component of a liberal doctrine that opens its inter-subjective dimension. The interpretation of liberalism as a political ideology that implies the primacy of the individual over the community is a consequence of etatism's predominance in continental political philosophy. Etatism in political phenomenology is shown by means of analysis of Merleau-Ponti's, Heidegger's, Levinas', Waldenfels' texts. Being connected with etatism, political philosophy's attention to the question of the best regime leads to elimination of the concept of fraternity from the liberal doctrine, because its meaning does not 'work' in the questions of legitimation of authorities. The path to etatistic political thinking starts from metaphysical understanding of freedom as the subject's ability to cause things and events. The political analogue of metaphysical freedom is public activity of a person as a subject of power. Moral freedom in a private life serves as an alternative to metaphysical freedom. In the political sphere, a person as a participant of the brotherly community corresponds to moral freedom. Analyzing the phenomenological texts about fraternity one may come to the conclusion that fraternity is an inter-subjective relation that specifies the community disconnected with a state. In liberal doctrine such a community is considered to be a source of political rights that arise from the ideas of freedom, equality, and fraternity.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
|
2020
|
vol. 75
|
issue 10
832 – 844
EN
The subject of this study is the axial feature of social change that exhibits the environmental and economic tendencies towards crisis and civilisation risk. Change also affects the identifying marks of rationality that should be processing and evaluating the transformation of post-industrial countries during the Anthropocene, and directing human behaviour according to our current level of knowledge. Analysing rationality is the task of philosophy: a philosophy that is critical, is supposed to understand, comprehend and explain. Philosophy does not as such rectify, change, prescribe or direct anything. But if philosophy is critical, political and social, it is obliged to find ways to give humanity at least one more (not two, not a do-over, not the last, but just at least just one more) chance. The author is attempting to make that possible using a triple negation: No to the further liberalisation of the open and diverse liberalism of late modernity, no to the further post-industrialisation of a post-industrial political economy and no further rationalisations of modernistic rationality.
first rewind previous Page / 3 next fast forward last
JavaScript is turned off in your web browser. Turn it on to take full advantage of this site, then refresh the page.