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EN
The paper reconstructs three main stages in the development of Carnap's approach to language in the years 1931-1947. It starts with Carnap's approach to metalogic in his Viennese 'Zirkelprotokolle' (1931) and his 'Logische Syntax der Sprache' (1934) from the point of view of one-level approach to the relation between metalanguage and its object-language. It then analyzes Tarski's turn to semantics in his paper presented at the Paris conference in September 1935, as well as the implications of his view for Carnap's approach to semantics from 1935 until 1943. Finally, it analyzes Church's rediscovery of Frege and its impact on Carnap's shift to the extension/intension distinction in his semantics in the years 1943-1947.
EN
Following Carnap’s Principle of Subject Matter, Pavel Tichý proposed a methodological principle the author calls the “Denotational Principle of Aboutness”. It says that expressions are about their denotata. Denotata are modelled as possible world intensions or (common) extensions. Nearly the same principle was recently defended by Marie Duží and Pavel Materna under the name the “Parmenides Principle”. However, Duží and Materna did not react to Tichý’s late proposal which the author calls the “Constructional Principle of Aboutness”. It says that the subject matter of expressions consists not in their denotata but in their meanings. The meanings are explicated by Tichý, and also by Duží and Materna, as so-called constructions; constructions are complex entities akin to algorithms, they construct intensions or extensions. In this paper, he argues in favour of the Constructional Principle of Aboutness. He shows that there are not only single arguments, but the whole net of methodological principles which support it. This is why the topic largely transcends the debate among Tichý’s followers.
EN
This paper focuses on the theory of deduction, developed by the Czech logician Pavel Tichý. Research on deduction in Tichý’s logic is still not very advanced. Tichý’s own deduction system is a generalization of Gentzen’s natural deduction and although it is an interesting topic in itself, I’d rather focus on the theory or philosophy of deduction that motivates Tichý’s choice of deduction system. Some of Tichý’s expressions suggest that in the question of the status of the theory of deduction in logic he held the prevailing modern approach, but this contradicts the fact that most of his writings concern selected problems of logical semantics. Having introduced Tichý’s original conception of deduction, I pay attention to the so called object-conception of logic, which explains the special position of the theory of deduction in his conception.
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