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Nahrazování směrnic nařízeními : (důvody, skutečnost, možnosti)

100%
Křepelka F.
Právník. Teoretický časopis pro otázky státu a práva (The Lawyer - Scientific Review for Problems of State and Law)
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2017
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vol. 156
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issue 3
213-234
EN
Besides the founding treaties, regulations and directives are the principal documents of the law of the European Union. Terminology is misleading. They form genuine legislation of the European Union adopted by the European Parliament and the Council. Therefore, the failure of the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe renaming regulations to European laws and directives to European framework laws is regrettable.Regulations are addressed directly to individuals.Directives are addressed to the member states. They shall amend and enact their statutes and other laws within prescribed period of time. This paper emphasises the burdens and risks related to directives and their application.Ministries, cabinets and parliaments must make a great effort when transposing the directives.Directives shall be considered while related national law is interpreted.Direct application is envisaged in some cases of missing or botched implementation.Regulations are more feasible, despite they also need to be accompanied with national laws specifying procedures, sanctions and institutions. Indeed, the European Union has replaced several directives with regulations. Therefore, examples are listed. Eventual extensive replacement of directives with regulations is considered, but obstacles to this transformation of law of the European Union are admitted. At the moment, there is no considerable support for such transformation. Necessary debate is at the beginning.
CS
Vedle zřizovacích smluv představují právo Evropské unie nařízení a směrnice. Označení je zavádějící, jedná se o skutečnou legislativu Evropské unie vytvářenou Evropským parlamentem a Radou. V tomto ohledu lze litovat neúspěchu Smlouvy o Ústavě pro Evropu, která měla přejmenovat nařízení na evropské zákony a směrnice na evropské rámcové zákony.Nařízení zakládají oprávnění a povinnosti jednotlivcům. Směrnice jsou určené členským státům, které mají ve stanovené lhůtě upravit či vytvořit své zákony či další předpisy. Článek vyzdvihuje zátěž spojenou se směrnicemi a úskalí doprovázející jejich uplatnění.Ministerstva, vlády a parlamenty členských států musejí věnovat značné úsilí jejich provedení. Potřebné je zohledňování směrnic při výkladu souvisejícího práva členských států. Připustilo se jejich uplatnění v některých situacích při opožděném či vadném provedení. Vhodnější jsou tak nařízení, jakkoli též potřebují doprovodné právo členských států určující procedury, sankce a instituce. Evropská unie začala směrnice nařízeními skutečně nahrazovat. Uvádějí se tak příklady takového nahrazení. Zvažují se možnosti rozsáhlejšího nahrazení směrnic nařízeními a překážky takové proměně práva Evropské unie. Lze připustit, že nyní taková proměna práva Evropské unie postrádá podporu. Debata je teprve na počátku.
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Non-Originalism Differently: the Obligation of the Legislator to Respond to Changing Conditions

75%
Kokešová J.
Adam Mickiewicz University Law Review
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2018
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vol. 8
217-236
PL
The question that the paper seeks to answer is formulated through reflections on the is-sues of non-originalism. Non-originalism refers to an approach to the interpretation of the Constitution where the text of the Constitution adapts to new conditions without any formal change. This approach is applied by courts which, in the light of new circumstances, interpret the Constitution in a different way. The question is whether the same approach should also be applied by the legislator. Should it be the legislator who monitors whether the Constitution has changed in substance as a result of changes in society and that some existing statutes thus have become unconstitutional? The paper concludes that the legisla-tor has an obligation to monitor and respond to such changes by amending or abolishing certain statutes or by adopting new ones. If the legislator fails to respond, then his behav-iour – inaction – is unconstitutional. However, the paper does not claim that the legislator must respond to all the changes in society, but only to those that are significant and obvi-ous. The legislator is understood as an institution, not as a member of the legislative body (based on the theory of the legislative intent). However, the institution of the legislator is a human creation and composed of individuals, and it is their knowledge that makes up the knowledge of the legislator. And it is precisely their possibilities that determine the bound-aries of what the legislator should know. In this text, the creation of law is understood as communication between the legislator, who is the author of statutes, and public bodies, who interpret and apply them. As with any communication, context is what determines it. The legislator’s obligations are derived from the content of the context, its function, and its essential position in communication.
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