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WORD PROBLEMS AND MAKE-BELIEVE: USING FRAME ANALYSIS AND ETHNOMETHODOLOGY TO EXPLORE ASPECTS OF THE CULTURE OF SCHOOLING

100%
Benincasa L.
Pedagogický časopis (Journal of Pedagogy)
|
2017
|
vol. 8
|
issue 2
77 - 99
EN
The paper applies Goffman’s frame analysis and ethnomethodology to student performance on mathematical word problems. In educational research, frame analysis has usually been limited to primary frames. Instead, in this paper the author focuses on the kind of secondary frame that Goffman calls ‘utilitarian make-believe’. The data consist of a fragment of verbal interaction between a teacher and a 12-year-old pupil during an oral mathematics exam. Word problems introduce pupils to a make-believe world by evoking the idea of ‘as-ifness’. The text consists only of ‘filler words’ because what really matters are the figures. Word problems and possibly other aspects of schooling can be interpreted in terms of a utilitarian make-believe key. Readiness to adopt this make-believe frame when required may be the difference between school success and failure. She argues that maths achievement takes more than just ‘being good with numbers’. It is a joint enterprise of people interacting within a culturally-shaped setting, organized so as to make some phenomena stand out rather than others. Finally, the author argues that ‘word problems and possibly other ‘school genres’ could be added to the list of utilitarian make-believe frames provided by Goffman.
2

MEANINGS OF FICTIONAL NAMES

86%
Salis F.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
|
2021
|
vol. 28
|
issue 1
9 – 43
EN
According to Millianism, the meaning of a name is exhausted by its referent. According to anti-realism about fictional entities, there are no such entities. If there are no fictional entities, how can we explain the apparent meaningfulness of fictional names? Our best theory of fiction, Walton’s theory of make-believe, makes the same assumptions but lacks the theoretical resources to answer the question. In this paper, I propose a pragmatic solution in terms of two main dimensions of meaning, a subjective, psychological dimension and an intersubjective, public dimension. The psychological dimension builds on the notion of mental files; the public dimension builds on Stalnaker’s notion of common ground. The account is coherent with two main theoretical principles, parsimony and uniformity. Furthermore, it satisfies three explanatory conditions posed by the intentionality of our thought and discourse about fiction, object-directedness, counter fictional imagining and intersubjective identification.
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