Full-text resources of CEJSH and other databases are now available in the new Library of Science.
Visit https://bibliotekanauki.pl

Results found: 4

first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last

Search results

Search:
in the keywords:  MARKET STRUCTURE
help Sort By:

help Limit search:
first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last
1

Formy rynku i konkurencji we wspolczesnej gospodarce. Ujecie teoretyczne

100%
Zabrzewski R.
Contemporary Economics
|
2007
|
issue 4(4)
141-148
EN
In the article author analyses the subjective structures of markets (as abstract notion). Bases of these structures are quantitative criteria. The main mechanismvwhich changes these structures is the non-perfect competition. Twenty years ago M.E. Porter, the famous American economist, was formulated a concept of new stage of market rivalry. Above the article, the author makes a critical remark on Porterís concept of market competition.
2

TRANSACTION COST ECONOMICS AS A THREE DIMENSIONAL EXTERNALLY DRIVEN RESEARCH PROGRAM

80%
Hardt L.
Studia Ekonomiczne (Economic Studies)
|
2006
|
issue 1-2(48-49)
7-31
EN
Transaction cost economics (TCE) is a multidimensional research program which takes its origin from contributions made by Hicks (1935), Coase (1937), Alchian and Demsetz (1972). Therefore, TCE can be divided into three complementary domains: exchange branch, governance branch and measurement branch. The first one deals with the costs of making transactions (e.g., broker's fee). The second one focuses on the impact of transactions' characteristics on the mode of governing them. The last one is twofold. First, it is concerned with measuring inputs productivity and assuring a close correspondence between inputs and rewards in team production. Second, it deals with the costs of measuring attributes of the good and their impact on the choice of contractual form. It is argued that the development of TCE can be understood as the continuous process of the operationalization of the ideas developed by the above-mentioned authors. Furthermore, it is shown that TCE is an externally driven research program, namely that is driven by observed facts. The reflection on the research perspectives of TCE finishes the article.
3

FIRMS' CONNECTIONS WITHIN OLIGOPOLY MODELS FRAMEWORK (Polaczenia przedsiebiorstw w ramach modeli oligopolu.)

80%
Czerwonka L.
Pieniądze i Więź
|
2009
|
vol. 12
|
issue 4(45)
159-167
EN
The article presents oligopoly models of Cournot, Bertrand and Stackelberg and the use of models to firms' connections modeling. The presented three oligopoly models, despite they have over 150 or almost 100 years, they are still in use. The aim of the article is presentation of horizontal merger model, in which firms have Cournot conjectures and there is also an analysis of relation between merger profitability and a rivalry coefficient.
4

MATHEMATICAL MODELS OF MERGERS TAKING INTO ACCOUNT MANAGEMENT FACTORS (Matematyczne modele polaczen przedsiebiorstw uwzgledniajace czynniki menedzerskie)

61%
Czerwonka L.
Pieniądze i Więź
|
2009
|
vol. 12
|
issue 3(44)
EN
This article presents models of horizontal mergers extended with management factors. The paper contains an analysis of mathematical models of mergers irrespective of exogenous and endogenous mergers division. The analysis shows that even when a merger may be potentially more efficient, managers in a merged firm do not necessarily want this to happen. The problems due to a lack of trust can even offset the possible synergies thereby making a merged firm less efficient.
first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last
JavaScript is turned off in your web browser. Turn it on to take full advantage of this site, then refresh the page.