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EN
The aim of the paper is the characterization of mental representations in regard to their nature, kinds and ways of existence. The paper shows different approaches to mental representations in the philosophy of mind, and especially focuses on the theories of mental content. The main part of the paper deals with the problem of epistemological commitments of cognitive representational systems in regard to the nature and kinds of mental representations which play their role in creating our knowledge and our model of the world. Here also many controversial questions is asked and discussed. In conclusion, the representational standpoint is enriched by the requirement of the representation of 'self' and the representation of body.
EN
In his seminal book (Mind and World) John McDowell argues against the widely spread claim of empiricists that content of experience might be non-conceptual. His argumentation refers to the Kantian idea of spontaneity and the conceptual and propositional activity of mind on the one hand, and to demonstrative concepts as a tool enabling full conceptualization of the entire content of any experience on the other. In this paper I am focusing on the second argument. It seems to be clear that if we assume that demonstratives indeed have this extraordinary function, we have to accept a much deeper stipulation that concerns both the work of concepts in general and ontological consequences. My claim here is that three main possible relations between concepts and the content of experience (these are constitutive, possessional and transformative relations) may lead us to three different ways of understanding content in terms of ontology. Different relations give us distinct pictures of experience and different pictures of non-conceptual content.
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