Full-text resources of CEJSH and other databases are now available in the new Library of Science.
Visit https://bibliotekanauki.pl

Results found: 1

first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last

Search results

Search:
in the keywords:  META-PHILOSOPHY
help Sort By:

help Limit search:
first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last
1

PANPSYCHISM: A META-VIEW IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF MIND

100%
Kosecki A.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
|
2024
|
vol. 31
|
issue 3
277 – 307
EN
Abstract: In this article, my aim is to present panpsychism as a meta-view in the philosophy of mind rather than as a position that can be juxtaposed with leading positions such as materialism and dualism. I argue here that proponents of some versions of dualism, dual-aspect theory, some non-standard forms of physicalism, or idealism may be guided by the assumptions of panpsychism as a meta-view. For example, the literature includes positions such as Chalmers’ naturalistic dualism, Strawson’s physicalist panpsychism, and Sprigge’s idealist panpsychism, along with Nagel’s remarks on dual-aspect theory. I argue that panpsychism, as a meta-view, provides a framework within which to analyse how these positions address the mind-body problem. Consequently, I conclude that the solution to the mind-body problem itself remains neutral toward these positions. Instead of focusing on the elaboration of these metaphysical positions, attention should be directed toward the crucial issue for panpsychism: the combination problem.
first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last
JavaScript is turned off in your web browser. Turn it on to take full advantage of this site, then refresh the page.