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1

MIND AND ONTOLOGICAL SPACE. A CRITICAL OUTLINE IN MODAL EPISTEMOLOGY

100%
Filipczyk H.
Kwartalnik Filozoficzny
|
2008
|
vol. 36
|
issue 1
69-85
EN
The paper focuses on one of the problems haunting contemporary thought about possible worlds - namely, that of the relation between conceivability and possibility. 'Conceivability arguments' (based on the premise that the conceivability of a given situation implies its possibility) are often used carelessly, not being properly rooted in any explicit and full-fledged ontology. In the paper the reasons that are commonly proposed for the 'liberal' use of 'conceivability arguments' are critically discussed and certain suggestions as to the proper application of such arguments are presented. It is then pointed out that the issue discussed in fact refers to a deeper problem, that of the opposition between combinatorial and combination ontology. The above is also shown to be a modern version of the classical dispute between Descartes and Leibniz. Finally, the authoress presents some general comments on 'modal epistemology'.
2

MODAL EMPIRICISM AND KNOWLEDGE OF DE RE POSSIBILITIES: A CRITIQUE OF ROCA-ROYES’ ACCOUNT

70%
Preleviċ D.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
|
2015
|
vol. 22
|
issue 4
488 – 498
EN
Accounting for our knowledge of de re modalities is probably the main reason why the proponents of modal empiricism think that their view should be preferred to modal rationalism. In this paper, the author addresses Sonia Roca-Royes’ account, which is taken to be a representative modal empiricist view, in order to show that modal empiricism faces serious problems even in explaining our knowledge of possibility de re, something which seems to be the easiest thing to explain on this view. He argues that Roca-Royes’ account does not prove what she claims it does, that it can hardly be articulated in a non-redundant way, and that her account of our knowledge of possibility de re can hardly be reconciled with the essentiality of origin principle, to which modal empiricists sometimes appeal while criticizing the modal rationalist account.
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