The aim of the paper is to analyze Dreyfus' phenomenological conception of moral maturity in a critical relation to the Kantian tradition of the ethics. A special attention is paid to the refutation of the Cartesian subject and a radical elimination of the subject-object relationship. These two points make the starting point of Dreyfus' philosophical reflection on the ideal of moral behavior, as well as on its implications for the ethics of the everyday life. The main objective of the paper is to show the problem of the freedom and choice as a crucial challenge of the Dreyfus primordial understanding of the ethical ways of the being.
The author compares the theory of moral behavior presented by Boguslaw Wolniewicz in his article 'Hedonism and Duty' with a theory of such behavior contained in the author's treatise on 'Sense and Truth in Ethics'. The author tries to show that the main source of the difference between them lies in the conception of moral cognition, as assumed by these theories; in contradistinction to Wolniewicz, the author ascribes to such cognition, besides descriptive, an emotive and prescriptive content. This makes it possible to explain moral motivation without recourse to the concept of character - essential in Wolniewicz's theory.
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