Full-text resources of CEJSH and other databases are now available in the new Library of Science.
Visit https://bibliotekanauki.pl

Results found: 3

first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last

Search results

Search:
in the keywords:  MORAL EMOTIONS
help Sort By:

help Limit search:
first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last
1

POSTOJE MAJORITY NA SLOVENSKU K RÓMSKEJ MENŠINE

100%
Lešková D., Uhrin M.
Etnologické rozpravy (Ethnological Disputes)
|
2020
|
vol. 27
|
issue 1
71 – 92
EN
The paper pays attention to the attitudes of people belonging to the majority population of Slovakia toward an ethnic minority of Roma people. The data presented in the paper were collected during the ethnographic research in 2015 in a village located in central Slovakia, in Horehronie region. After presenting the results of the data analysis we outline a theoretical framework, which could be used in designing a future field research. We suggest that the concept of symbolic classifications by Mary Douglas (2003, 2014) and the theory of moral emotions developed by a cultural psychologist Jonathan Haidt (2003) can be combined and implemented. We focus in particular on the group of other-condemning moral emotions.
2

HANBA, ZÁZRAČNÝ PRSTEŇ A PLATÓNOV SOKRATES

75%
Cepko J.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
|
2023
|
vol. 78
|
issue 4
259 – 272
EN
There are two passages in Plato’s Apology with questions introduced by a verb relating to shame. In 28b, a representative of the Athenian citizens asks Socrates, if he is not ashamed to follow his philosophical occupation even when it might cost him life. Later, in 29d, it is Socrates who asks an imaginary Athenian, if he is not ashamed to care for things of illusory value and neglect those that are really important. The verb used in these two questions apparently refers to two different notions of shame: the first one is marked by fear of being disregarded by the others, the other one is an outcome of endeavour for an inner coherence. The article maps this process of internalization of shame as a transformation of the shame before others into shame relating to oneself. This change of perspective will be documented via two versions of the tale of Gyges and his magic ring (in Herodotus and in Plato). Herodotus’ Gyges acts as a heteronomous agent moved by the will of the others; the character in Book 2 of Plato’s Republic, on the other hand, is, thanks to the power of a magic ring, autonomous and immune to the gaze of the other but acts unjustly in the end. The Socratic moral agent in this context appears to be Anti-Gyges, determined to act justly with no regard for external approval or its lack. He does not necessarily disregard shame, but his shame is based on an aesthetics of self and on his power to transform his character by means of care of the self.
3
Content available remote

EXPRESSIVISM AND THE NATURALIZATION OF THE LANGUAGE OF MORALS: ON THE FRUITFULNESS OF EVOLUTIONARY PERSPECTIVE IN METAETHICS (Naturalizacja jezyka etycznego w ramach ekspresywizmu, czyli o owocnosci perspektywy ewolucjonistycznej w metaetyce)

63%
Kuzniar A.
Analiza i Egzystencja. Czasopismo Filozoficzne
|
2010
|
issue 12
91-105
EN
Descriptivists' method of naturalizing moral language is neither the only nor the most promising one in metaethics. The paper deals with attempts to combine the expressivistic account of moral concepts with an evolutionary research programme. As Allan Gibbard (1990, p. 70) puts it: 'Normative discussion is part of nature but it does not describe nature'. First, Gibbard's expressivism is outlined against the background of the theory of evolution. Then the Author proceeds to his own metaethical theory according to which, to take but one example, the judgment that 'a' is morally wrong consists of a belief that it is possible to avoid a, a belief that there is a universal property 'P' which 'a' exemplifies, a desire not to actualize 'a', a disposition (1) to desire not to actualize anything that instantiates the property 'P', and a disposition (2) to desire to subject everyone who does 'a' to coercive measures (including punishment). Language thus interpreted is shown to be an opposite tool for negotiating a stable normative consensus; it addresses specific problems of cooperation viewed from the evolutionary perspective. Finally, it is argued that the Author's proposal exhibits some important advantages over Gibbard's theory.
first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last
JavaScript is turned off in your web browser. Turn it on to take full advantage of this site, then refresh the page.