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EN
At the turn of the twentieth century, the debate between supporters of internal and external relations showed how our assumptions on the nature of relations result in ontological, epistemic, and ethical commitments. In this debate, Alfred North Whitehead provided the most articulated and satisfying account through his “philosophy of the organism,” which holds relations to be internal yet vectorial, without excluding completely external relations. Today, the debate has become once again topical and constitutes a core issue for speculative realism. This paper aims to show how the theory of external relations endorsed by some leading figures of speculative realism (Meillassoux, Harman, Bryant) does not suffice to preserve the desiderata it was designed for, and how a more serious consideration of Whitehead’s theory would have beneficial effects on the ontological and ethical issues of this rejuvenated metaphysical discourse.
PL
Tekst dowodzi, że Quentin Meillassoux wprawdzie zasługuje na uznanie za sprawą swojego projektu przedstawionego w Poza skończonością – ponieważ słusznie zauważa, że należy odnowić wiarę filozofii w zdolność nauki do otwierania nowych wymiarów myślenia – lecz mimo to jego propozycja posiada dwie poważne słabości. Po pierwsze, opis nauki jako tworzenia twierdzeń ancestralnych nie wydobywa istoty naukowej kreatywności. Po drugie, teza o „koniecznej przygodności” stoi w fundamentalnej sprzeczności z wiedzą naukową. Dlatego autor artykułu przeciwstawia zasadzie koniecznej przygodności Meillassoux zasadę wydobytą z historycznej epistemologii Léon Brunschvicga i Antoine-Augustin Cournot. To znaczy, że zamiast zasady bezracji tekst broni zasady zmiennej racji bądź zmiennego rozumu (principle of a metamorphosing reason), opartej na tezie, iż żadna nieredukowalna przygodność nie jest praktycznie możliwa.
EN
The article argues that, while Quentin Meillassoux‘s project, undertaken in After Finitude, merits attention, since the French philosopher is right that faith in sciences‘ capacity to open up new domains to thought must be restored, the solutions he offers have two serious shortcomings. 1) His depiction of science as the producer of ancestral statements does not capture satisfactorily the essence of scientific creativity. 2) The claim that everything is necessarily contingent is fundamentally incompatible with scientific knowledge. The article, then, contrasts Meillassoux‘s principle of the necessity of contingency with a principle that is extracted from the historical epistemology of Léon Brunschvicg and Antoine-Augustin Cournot. Instead of a principle of unreason, the article defends a principle of a metamorphosing reason founded on the practical impossibility of irreducible contingency.
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