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1

Structure and Relevance of the Aristotelian Critic toward the Eleatics (Ph. I 2–3)

100%

Volpe E.

Peitho. Examina Antiqua

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2016

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vol. 7

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issue 1

149-166

EN

The first book of the Aristotelian Physics may be considered as a sort of general introduction to the whole work. In particular, chapters 2 and 3 result very interesting for the foundation of the science of nature according to Aristotle; indeed, in these two chapters, the Stagirite criticizes the position of the Eleates Parmenides and Melissus. These two philosophers are considered as those who claim that change does not exist because the existence of the not-being is impossible to suppose. For this reason, since the Eleates deny that motion and change really exist, the refutation of their thesis results essential for the logical and ontological foundation of the Aristotelian science of nature. This paper wants to make light on the argumentations that Aristotle uses against Parmenides and Melissus. Indeed, since the Stagirite makes often use of his philosophical categories (like substance; the categories, the continuum and so on), it seems that his critics sound a little bit anachronistic. In many passages of the text is seems that Aristotle “simply” replace the presupposition of the Eleatic philosophy (i.e. the being is and not-being does not) with the thesis of the evidence of moving and plurality, in general. The aim of this contribution is to reflect on the critics present in Ph. I 2–3 in order to underline the importance of the Eleatic philosophy for the Aristotelian science of nature.

IT

The first book of the Aristotelian Physics may be considered as a sort of general introduction to the whole work. In particular, chapters 2 and 3 result very interesting for the foundation of the science of nature according to Aristotle; indeed, in these two chapters, the Stagirite criticizes the position of the Eleates Parmenides and Melissus. These two philosophers are considered as those who claim that change does not exist because the existence of the not-being is impossible to suppose. For this reason, since the Eleates deny that motion and change really exist, the refutation of their thesis results essential for the logical and ontological foundation of the Aristotelian science of nature. This paper wants to make light on the argumentations that Aristotle uses against Parmenides and Melissus. Indeed, since the Stagirite makes often use of his philosophical categories (like substance; the categories, the continuum and so on), it seems that his critics sound a little bit anachronistic. In many passages of the text is seems that Aristotle “simply” replace the presupposition of the Eleatic philosophy (i.e. the being is and not-being does not) with the thesis of the evidence of moving and plurality, in general. The aim of this contribution is to reflect on the critics present in Ph. I 2–3 in order to underline the importance of the Eleatic philosophy for the Aristotelian science of nature.

2

From Parmenides’ To Mē Eon To Melissus’ To Mēden

100%

Galgano N. S.

Organon

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2019

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vol. 51

5-22

EN

Parmenides warns against inquiring on the dead–end way of non–being (ouk esti): it is impossible to know and speak of what–is–not (to mē eon). At DK 28 B 8.6–9, he denies that not–being can be treated as real, and that it can be considered in any reliable reasoning. Melissus, in contrast, at DK 30 B 1 treats non– being as a possible state of affairs, as a possibility worth considering as a part of argumentation, though one from which generation remains impossible. This paper focuses on this radical shift regarding non–being between these two Eleatic thinkers, resulting in very different ways of seeing the world.

3

Melissus and the Problem of the Void: Apology and/or Misapprehension of the Parmenidean Monism?

100%

Volpe E.

Peitho. Examina Antiqua

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2017

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vol. 8

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issue 1

91-106

EN

With respect to Parmenides’ thought Melissus was regarded as a dissident thinker already in antiquity. His polemical introduction of the concept of void and the relative idea of infinite Being seemed particularly controversial. The aim of the present paper is to examine the origins of the Melissian understanding of void in order to trace its philosophical genesis to the criticism of the Atomist Leucippus. According to the philosopher from Abdera, the Eleatic fundamental principles had to conform to the obviousness of bodies’ motion, which is why the Eleatic not-Being had to be understood as void. Melissus took issue with this view and criticized the idea of the void’s reality by means of a methodical argument. In the course of doing so, the philosopher from Samos distorted the original Parmenidean ontology, which is why his theories were often criticized severely as theoretically weak.

4

Trilemmas: Gorgias’ PTMO Between Zeno and Melissus

86%

Rossetti L.

Peitho. Examina Antiqua

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2017

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vol. 8

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issue 1

155-172

EN

The present paper makes the following points. (1) The summary given in Sextus Emp. Math. VII is of much greater value than usually acknowledged, since it preserves several key elements of Gorgias’ communicational strategy. (2) A sketchy trilemma is available in the opening sentence of Philolaos (DK 44B2) as well as in a passage of Plato’s Parmenides. This is evidence in favor of the hypothesis that the very first known trilemma was devised by Gorgias and not by Sextus himself or Aenesidemus. (3) Not unlike Zeno, Gorgias enjoyed to be neither serious nor joking, but remained somewhat halfway. This point is seldom acknowledged, though it is crucial in order to understand that he pretends to claim (e.g. that p), but his claims do not amount to any points of doctrine. (4) That he remains halfway should not prevent us from appreciating some of his ideas, but, at the same time, we should not expect full intellectual adhesion to what he tells us. Besides, something similar occurs in most of Plato’s dialogues. (5). Gorgias owes a lot to Melissus.

5

Melissus, Time and Eternity

86%

Pulpito M.

Peitho. Examina Antiqua

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2017

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vol. 8

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issue 1

107-124

EN

The traditional interpretation of Eleatism has it (1) that Melissus was a disciple of Parmenides (albeit with some divergences) and (2) that Parmenides believed in the timeless eternity of Being. It seems, on the contrary, (3) that Melissus acknowledged the reality of time by conceiving eternity as infinite time. Failing to justify this particular divergence from Parmenides’ approach, certain authors held that it was necessary to reinterpret the Melissan eternity as a form of infinite timelessness. This paper attempts to demonstrate that this reading is groundless and that if the traditional interpretation is questioned then one should reconsider the assumptions (1) and (2) but not (3).

6

On the Origins of the Very First Principle as Infinite: The Hierarchy of the Infinite in Damascius and Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite

72%

Ottobrini T. F.

Peitho. Examina Antiqua

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2019

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vol. 10

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issue 1

133-152

EN

This paper discusses the theoretical relationship between the views of Damascius and those of Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite. While Damascius’ De principiis is a bold treatise devoted to investigating the hypermetaphysics of apophatism, it anticipates various theoretical positions put forward by Dionysius the Areopagite. The present paper focuses on the following. First, Damascius is the only ancient philosopher who systematically demonstrates the first principle to be infinite (traditional Greek thought tended to regard the arkhē as finite). Second, Damascius modifies the concept and in several important passages shows the infinite to be superior and prior to the finite (previously this assumption was held only by Melissus and, sporadically, by Gregory of Nyssa and Plotinus). Third, Damascius’ theory of being (infinite, endless and ultrarational) is the strongest ancient articulation of the nature of the One which is a clear prefiguration of the negative theology developed by Dionysius the Areopagite.

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5 Peitho. Examina Antiqua

1 Organon

2 Volpe E.

1 Galgano N. S.

1 Ottobrini T. F.

1 Pulpito M.

1 Rossetti L.

2 2019

3 2017

1 2016

Structure and Relevance of the Aristotelian Critic toward the Eleatics (Ph. I 2–3)

From Parmenides’ To Mē Eon To Melissus’ To Mēden

Melissus and the Problem of the Void: Apology and/or Misapprehension of the Parmenidean Monism?

Trilemmas: Gorgias’ PTMO Between Zeno and Melissus

Melissus, Time and Eternity

On the Origins of the Very First Principle as Infinite: The Hierarchy of the Infinite in Damascius and Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite