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Jevení a okrasa: tělesnost a animalita u Merleau-Pontyho a Deleuze

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Rodrigo P.
Filosofický časopis (Philosophical Journal)
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2010
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vol. 58
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issue 1
9-22
EN
The author in this study concerns himself with the question of animality especially as understood by Merleau-Ponty in his courses at the Collège de France. Merleau-Ponty’s starting point is a reading of Husserl’s manuscripts which, in a certain sense, define themselves in distinction to Heidegger’s position. In these manuscripts certain concepts appear in embryo which will later become decisive in Merleau-Ponty’s conception of animality – one example is inter-animality. In his lectures Merleau-Ponty enriches Husserl’s original outlook by his reading of Portmann, Konrad and Uexküll, so that his conception of animality is now informed by concepts such as Umwelt and building plan. In this way he gradually outlines a new and original conception of animality which is now not understood by a relation to the human world, but rather as an attempt to find the authentic animal mode of being, while still maintaining the characteristic emphasis of phenomenology on appearing. In the concluding part of the text, Merleau-Ponty’s conception of animality is compared with that of Gilles Deleuze, presented in his book What Is Philosophy? Both differences and resonances between the two perspectives are emphasised.
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Rola ciała w kształtowaniu świadomości – inspiracje filozoficzne i naukowe

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Nowacka-Dobosz S., Femiak J., Pędraszewska-Sołtys B.
Rozprawy Naukowe Akademii Wychowania Fizycznego we Wrocławiu
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2015
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vol. 48
56-62
EN
Since time immemorial man has been trying to understand his origin and sense of being. He has been seeking to define himself and to find the right answer both through philosophical considerations and scientific inquiries and observations. If we ask what human consciousness is, how it happens that we possess it, how consciousness of our being and agency is formed in us, science will direct us towards neurobiological studies, whereas philosophy refers to its numerous representatives. One of the thinkers who, at the beginning of the 20th century, tried to answer the aforementioned questions, was Merleau-Ponty whose views are discussed in this paper.
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Tělesnost a metafyzika : Dekonstrukce mezi dobrou a špatnou dialektikou

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Trnka J.
Filosofický časopis (Philosophical Journal)
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2010
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vol. 58
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issue 1
56-64
EN
The article investigates Merleau-Ponty’s late thought from the position of Derrida’s deconstruction, focusing on the possibility of thinking otherness in the framework of embodiment. We examine the thought movements in The Visible and the Invisible which open up such possibilities, as well as those which close them down. The basis for this investigation is a comparison of Derrida and Merleau-Ponty in relation to the thinking of Husserl, de Saussure, and Hegel. We demonstrate, above all, how Derrida’s deconstruction occupies a middle position between Merleau-Ponty and Hegel. In conclusion we outline an ambivalence which is to be found throughout Merleau-Ponty’s final work.
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Theoretical Controversies-Terminological Biases: Consciousness Revisited

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Kondor Z.
Studies in Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric
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2015
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vol. 41
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issue 1
143-160
EN
Although scientific practice sometimes encounters philosophical difficulties, it cannot shoulder the burden of resolving them. This can lead to controversies. An unavoidable difficulty is rooted in the linguistic attitude, i.e., in the fact that to a considerable extent we express our thoughts in words. I will attempt to illuminate some important characteristics of linguistic expression which lead to paradoxical situations, identifiable thanks to philosophy. In my argument, I will investigate how the notion of consciousness has altered over the course of philosophical investigation and how it relates to recent scientific practice. In conclusion, I will focus on a few recent so-called radical positions in philosophy with regard to a framework within which consciousness and more generally mental phenomena can be regarded in a new light, as well as on the barriers we face when trying to unify scientific results.
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Vzájomné presahovanie telesnosti sveta a telesnosti tela ako otvorenosť pre vnímanie

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Hroncová P.
Filosofický časopis (Philosophical Journal)
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2011
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vol. 59
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issue 7, Special No: Fenomenologie tělesnosti
129-142
EN
The author concentrates on the motive of the flesh of the world and flesh of the body in Merleau-Ponty’s late philosophy, devoting her attention to the relation between them and on the specific features of the relation which come to the fore precisely in perception One of its principal specific features is the reversible nature of this relation. The author considers the flesh as a constitutive structure of the possible encounter of man with the world and as a principal openness towards the possibility of perceiving. The paper attempts to pinpoint the similarity as well as the difference between the flesh of the body and flesh of the world. The respective natures of those two forms of flesh and the nature of their relation form the basis for explaining the principal presuppositions of the reality of perception, which culminate in the notion of overlapping. The overlapping reveal the dynamic structure of perception and is understood as a realization of the basic openness created by the flesh.
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Sen, tělo a duch : Topologie zkušenosti

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Koubová A.
Filosofický časopis (Philosophical Journal)
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2010
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vol. 58
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issue 1
35-48
EN
“What is experience?” asks phenomenology, so as to uncover the essential structure of experiencing, and founding experience, from which true and philosophically defensible thinking may be derived. “What is dream?” asks Maurice Merleau-Ponty in The Visible and the Invisible so that he may complicate the first question of phenomenology and sketch an absolutely non-trivial topology of the experiential field. A partial description of this topology will be the theoretical starting point of my reflection. From this point of departure I will embark on a phenomenological analysis of the concrete experience of dreaming and of falling asleep. On the basis of this analysis I will then follow the implications – backwards so to speak – to the consequences for the nature of Merleau-Ponty’s topology of experience. At the same time I would like to show how the phenomenon of dreaming and the imaginary has a central place in the description of the structure of experience, because without it we cannot give a description of the chiasm of the soul (consciousness) nor of the perceiving and the perceived body. I present dreaming as a phenomenon that unfolds at the blind spot of the waking self-concious consciousness and embodiment, and thus also as a specific basis (Stiftung) of Being, which is the concern of Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology.
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Mezi tělem a reprezentací: sexualita ve „Fenomenologii vnímání“

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Fulka J.
Filosofický časopis (Philosophical Journal)
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2010
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vol. 58
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issue 1
23-34
EN
This study is a commentary on the chapter of Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception that deals with the question of sexuality. In opposition to the traditional causal conception of sexual behaviour as a series of reflexes, Merleau-Ponty conceives sexuality as a specific type of intentionality and a relation between the individual and the world. Figuring in his complex argumentation is clinical casuistry, as well as references to Freudian and Binswangerian psychoanalysis. Special attention is given to Merleau-Ponty’s comment on Babinsky’s conception of hysteria which provides the impetus for a new treatment of the ambivalence of consciousness and embodiment. The aim of this text is, however, also to show that Merleau-Ponty’s analysis is in no way intended just as a particular analysis of one type of behaviour. Rather, sexuality becomes, in Merleau-Ponty’s work, a truly emblematic structure which exemplifies human existence itself in its significative and expressive dimension. As such, sexuality resonates with, for example, Merleau-Ponty’s conception of language, the radicalisation of which led him to his final analyses in The Visible and the Invisible.
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Mít tělo a být tělem : Analýza těla v Merleau-Pontyho „Fenomenologii vnímání“

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Čapek J.
Filosofický časopis (Philosophical Journal)
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2011
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vol. 59
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issue 7, Special No: Fenomenologie tělesnosti
99-114
EN
The present paper analyses the conception of the body, presented by Merleau-Ponty in Phenomenology of Perception, from the perspective of the following question: does the analysis of the body as a body proper imply a certain form of dualism? Merleau-Ponty’s approach does not allow the formulation of the problem of dualism as a problem of relation between two substances (non-extensive one and extensive one). Experience of one’s own body, however, does imply a duality of pre-personal capabilities of the body and personal performances in which the individual in question uses “its own” body. The author proposes the distinction between the identifying and the possessive way of speaking about the body proper and attempts to apply this distinction on the duality in perceiving one’s body, as described by Merleau-Ponty. Therefore, the investigation of one’s own body does imply certain form of dualism.
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Topologický prostor jako model bytí v pozdních pracovních poznámkách Maurice Merleau-Pontyho

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Nitsche M.
Filosofický časopis (Philosophical Journal)
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2010
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vol. 58
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issue 1
49-56
EN
This interpretational sketch focuses on a reading of several remarks about “topological space” as a “model of being” in Merleau-Ponty’s notes towards a projected work, the torso of which was published under the title The Visible and the Invisible. The reason for choosing topological space as a model of being is, on the present interpretation, because it constitutes an attempt to find a place for consciousness which does not bring with it the requirement of underpinning the world.
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Sartre a Merleau-Ponty tváří v tvář totalitarismu

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Pechar J.
Filosofický časopis (Philosophical Journal)
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2010
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vol. 58
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issue 2
221-226
EN
An example of how difficult it was for some left-orientated French intellectuals to come to terms with information about the real situation in the Soviet Union is provided by the conflict between M. Merleau-Ponty and J.-P. Sartre in 1953, which led to Merleau-Ponty’s departure from the editorship of the review journal Temps modernes. Prior to this, in 1950, Sartre had lent his signature to an article in which Merleau-Ponty reacted to information coming out about the Soviet punitive and prison system by calling into question the very socialist character of the Soviet regime. After the outbreak of the Korean war, however, Sartre adopted an unequivally pro-Soviet and pro-communist standpoint and did not wish to see Temps modernes give space to the opinions of this opposing viewpoint. In this article we provide an analysis of the letters which the two philosophers exchanged on this matter
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Jak tělu rozumět tělem. Příspěvek fenomenologie k překonání limitů mecha nistického paradigmatu ve fyzioterapii

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Kříž P., Halák J.
Teorie vědy (Theory of Science)
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2022
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vol. 44
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issue 1
3-35
EN
This article aims to explain how Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological account of embodiment contributes to the theory and practice of physiotherapy. The mechanistic conception of the body, to which physiotherapy usually refers, assumes a universal model of its functioning and interprets its relationship to the environment causally. In fact, however, it does not allow a satisfactory explanation of the effi ciency of the therapeutic methods used in practice. In contrast, Merleau-Ponty’s concept of motor intentionality points to the fact that the body “understands” the practical meaning of a situation. Bodily understanding is then manifested in particular by the ability to adequately diff erentiate, adapt or vary motor and postural responses to environmental challenges. This change in the conception of embodiment also has important implications for understanding the therapist-patient relationship and the intervention itself. Physiotherapists should draw more on the fact that they are themselves a body and, on this basis, guide the patient’s bodily intentionality towards a more developed understanding of the practical meaning of situations.
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Cílem článku je vysvětlit přínos Merleau-Pontyho fenomenologického pojetí tělesnosti pro teorii i praxi současné fyzioterapie. Mechanistické pojetí těla, na něž se fyzioterapie zpravidla odvolává, předpokládá univerzální model fungování těla a jeho vztah k prostředí vykládá kauzálně. Ve skutečnosti však neumožňuje uspokojivě vysvětlit principy účinků v praxi používaných terapeutických metod. Naproti tomu Merleau-Pontyho koncepce motorické intencionality poukazuje na fakt, že tělo „chápe“ praktický význam určité situace. Tělesné porozumění se pak projevuje zejména schopností adekvátně diferencovat, adaptovat či variovat motorické a posturální odpovědi na výzvy prostředí. Tato změna pojetí tělesnosti má zásadní důsledky i pro pochopení vztahu fyzioterapeuta s pacientem i samotnou terapeutickou intervenci. Fyzioterapeut by měl více vycházet z toho, že je sám tělem, a na základě toho vést tělesnou intencionalitu pacienta k rozvinutějšímu porozumění praktickému významu situací.
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Neither Heresy Nor Renewal: Phenomenology as Permanent Self-Correction and Self-Improvement

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Przyłębski A.
Dialogue and Universalism
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2015
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issue 3
51-61
EN
The article considers the problem of the redefinition of the concept of phenomenol-ogy after Heidegger’s critique of the idea of presuppositionlessness, Ricoeur’s criticism of the beginning of the transcendental ego, and Merleau-Ponty’s criticism of Husserl’s perceptual apprehension.
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Typika taktilního světa

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Petříčková T.
Filosofický časopis (Philosophical Journal)
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2011
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vol. 59
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issue 7, Special No: Fenomenologie tělesnosti
115-127
EN
The present study concentrates on the problem of tactile experience, drawing on Merleau-Ponty’s investigations in Phenomenology of Perception. We follow the most important sources of inspiration of Merleau-Ponty’s analyses of tactile phenomena (David Katz, Erwin Straus) and point out especially the differences between them in order to reach a deeper understanding of Merleau-Ponty’s conception of touch a to create a basis for our own development of the given problem. This development consists in showing the correspondence between the constitution of tactile phenomena and the corporeal "synergic unity", and also in reflecting upon touch as a borderline bodily experience.
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Tělo a morální fenomenologie : Mezi Merleau-Pontym a Levinasem

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Urban P.
Filosofický časopis (Philosophical Journal)
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2011
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vol. 59
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issue 7, Special No: Fenomenologie tělesnosti
203-218
EN
The “corporeal turn” which has taken place in 20th century thought, is closely related with the discovery of corporeality as a key motive of philosophical ethics. The aim of the present paper is to present and compare two phenomenological contributions to „bodily ethics“ – the first one consists in an ethical interpretation of Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy, while the second one is explicitly contained in the thought of E. Levinas. The starting point of our analysis is the conception of intersubjectivity which differs radically in the thought of the two philosophers. While Merleau-Ponty stresses especially the primordial inter-corporeal resonance and empathy between myself and the other, Levinas’ view is based on the idea of an irreducible alterity of the other, which makes him to consider the relation between myself and the other as essentially asymmetrical. We attempt to show that the relation between Levinas’ and Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy of intersubjectivity is far more complex than it seems and that in order to develop the moral phenomenology of corporeality in a productive way, it is necessary to overcome certain one-sidedness both in Levinas and Merleau-Ponty. This overcoming is unthinkable without taking over the most productive motives of both philosophers’ views of intersubjectivity and corporeality.
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Pojem živelnosti u Merleau – Pontyho a Bachelarda

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Vydra A.
Filosofický časopis (Philosophical Journal)
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2011
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vol. 59
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issue 7, Special No: Fenomenologie tělesnosti
143-155
EN
In a small note in the Visible and the Invisible, Merleau-Ponty states that he conceives of being and the imaginary as elements rather than objects or entities. Moreover, he adds that those elements are to be understood in Bachelard’s sense. It is precisely the elemental nature which represents one of the characteristics of the flesh (la chair) in Merleau-Ponty’s unfinished last work. If the living body is supposed to open an ontology and to solve certain ontological problems, we need to be careful while analysing its elemental character: the notion of „element“ is not to be taken for granted. Therefore, the author begins by examining Bachelard’s conception of elements, his attitude towards the history of sciences and towards the rupture between modern and contemporary science (for example in relation to non-substanciality and processuality on the micro-level of matter). In the second part of the paper, we return to Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of the living body, which is, according to him, different from the substancialized body in cartesian philosophy, and we develop the topic of the elemental – a notion derived from that of element – and of inter-elemental relations. After that, we point out several consequences which the reflexion on the elemental nature of the world may imply in relation to non-cartesian medicine. The fundamental axis of the text concerns also the poetic and metaphorical language and its use in the texts of both philosophers.
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Toward an affective pedagogy of human rights education

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Hung R.
Journal of Pedagogy
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2014
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vol. 5
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issue 1
48-64
EN
This paper explores the notion of Affective Pedagogy of Human Rights Education (APHRE) on a theoretical level and suggests a concept of curricular framework. APHRE highlights the significance of affectivity and body in the process of learning, factors usually neglected in the mainstream intellectualistic approach to learning, especially in areas under the Confucian tradition. The paper’s first section explores the thinking of three philosophers - Rorty, Merleau-Ponty, and Beardsley - who serve as sources for APHRE. The second section explains how their concepts contribute to APHRE’s development. In the third section, a practical curricular framework is presented. Finally, the paper discusses implementing the framework and concludes by recognizing APHRE as a pedagogic approach for crossing borders among nationalities, cultures, and languages
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The embodied classroom - A phenomenological discussion of the body and the room

61%
Alerby E., Hagström E., Westman S.
Journal of Pedagogy
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2014
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vol. 5
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issue 1
11-23
EN
A (Western) school is, among other things, a building with its own spatial formations and boundaries. In educational settings, the place for learning, as well as the human body in the place, is significant. In this paper, we explore the theory of the lived body as it was formulated by Maurice Merleau-Ponty and argue why we think this theory can be used fruitfully in educational research, and specifically in a study of learning places such as classrooms. We also discuss what a classroom is and can be drawing upon the work of Otto Friedrich Bollnow. As humans, we access the world through our bodies and the knowledge we develop is always embodied. The body and the world are two aspects of a reversibility, which Merleau-Ponty terms flesh. He also stresses that the body inhabits the world, and our corporeality can therefore be tied to the room-we are affected by and affect the room in a mutual interplay. In this paper, we develop this further and argue that teachers and students inhabit the classroom. Corporeality is therefore closely connected to spatiality and is understood as a prerequisite for being involved in relationships. We argue for the importance of exploring the notion of embodiment in educational settings with a special focus on the embodied classroom using the phenomenology of the life-world
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Subjekt jako infans

61%
Fulka J.
Filosofický časopis (Philosophical Journal)
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2011
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vol. 59
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issue 7, Special No: Fenomenologie tělesnosti
167-182
EN
The aim of the present paper is to investigate the manner in which Merleau-Ponty’s reflexion interacts with his interest in children psychology. Through interpretation of certain passages of Merleau-Ponty’s course on children psychology and of the article entitled „Child and His Relations to Others“, we draw certain hypotheses which might allow us to cast some light on various passages from Merleau-Ponty’s late philosophical works, namely The Visible and The Invisible. One of the fundamental starting points of The Visible and The Invisible seems to be a lack of distinction between structural and genetic perspective. We attempt to explain the status and possibility of this indistinction on the kibasis of Merleau-Ponty’s criticism of Piaget’s psychology and his specific interpretation of the „mirror stage“ both in its Wallonian and Lacanian version. Especially the Lacanian understanding of this phenomenon allows a perspective in which the genetic and structural perspective do not represent two incompatible registers – Merleau-Ponty’s notion of „ontological narcism“, developed in The Visible and The Invisible, is in many respects precisely a reinterpretation of this specific conception.
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Merleau-Pontyho pojetí těla jako pole strukturace a jeho ontologický význam

61%
Halák J.
Filosofický časopis (Philosophical Journal)
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2015
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vol. 63
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issue 2
197-214
EN
Merleau-Ponty’s analyses of the pathology of perception show “objctive” and “subjective” events have sense for the living body only in relation to its whole equilibrium, that is, to how it organises itself overall and how it thus “meets” those events. If we apply this conception to Husserl’s example of two mutually-touching hands of one body we must then state not that we perceive here a coincidence of certain subjective sensations with certain objective qualities, but rather that my body, in the sense of an object, results from a restructuralisation of the whole field of the body accomplished by the body as the performer of perceptual intentions. The body-object, and for the same reasons also the body-subject, is therefore the product of the analysis of the body in the sense of a field of structuralisation or polarisation, not its original phenomenological “stratum”, as in Husserl. If the body grasps itself as perceptible only by a change of its own structure, inasmuch as it is a certain field of structuralisation, then an “external” thing, which is likewise a pole of such grasping, must belong to the same ontological “field” as the body. Merleau-Ponty’s “flesh”, that is the circularity between questioning of perception and answering of the perceived, is thus a phenomenon taking place beyond the boundary of the body as a singular being. This fact allows the concept of flesh to be extended and to be understood as an “element”, that is, as a dimension in which individual beings only appear
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Understanding Obstacles in Psychiatric Research: An Analysis of the Structure of Mood via Merleau-Ponty

61%
Cacciatore R.
Eidos. A Journal for Philosophy of Culture
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2020
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vol. 4
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issue 2
39-51
EN
It is no secret that the methodology within psychiatric research has been challenged to the point of a possible paradigm shift. After decades of failed attempts to determine biological markers for the mental illnesses classified by the Diagnostic Statistical Manual, we are witnessing a radical transformation of the way we think about mental illness. While research seems to be on the right track by migrating from a discrete categorical approach to a dimensional matrix of the neurobiological conditions responsible for cognition, there are concerns that the neurosciences involved in the development of this dimensional framework will be unable to arrive at a diagnostic system appropriate for clinicians. Consequently, it has been suggested that researchers and clinicians should develop distinct ontologies. I argue that such an approach will not do justice to the complexity of mental illness and offer insight into the applicability of a phenomenological approach in psychiatric research.
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