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Ľudská prirodzenosť a norma: Metaetický pohľad na teóriu prirodzeného zákona Tomáša Akvinského

100%
Chabada M.
Studia theologica
|
2022
|
vol. 1
41-59
EN
The aim of the paper is to examine metaethical aspects of the theory of natural law in Thomas Aquinas. The theses of the paper is that Aquinas does not reduce the meaning of the term ‘good’ to something natural and does not derive value judgements from the factual. In the first part, the main arguments are presented in favour of irreducibility of the meaning of ‘the good’. In the second part, the main argument is introduced in favour of a dichotomy between fact and values (the difference between factuals and value judgments). In the third part, the understanding of the concept of good is introduced. Subsequently, the concept of the natural law is presented in which the idea of human nature is also present. In the fifth part, the relationship between human nature and practical reason is explained in the constitution of moral norms. In the penultimate part, the understanding of human affectivity/emotionality and rationality is introduced with regard to the problem of determining the source of moral good or evil. Finally, the article concludes that Aquinas’ Concept of Natural Law is an example of moderate cognitivism and naturalism. Aquinas does not commit the naturalist fallacy, because human nature is working as a data provider for a practical reason, which is the creator of moral norms.
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Minimalism and Expressivism

67%
McDonald F.
Ethics in Progress
|
2012
|
vol. 3
|
issue 1
9-30
EN
There has been a great deal of discussion in the recent philosophical literature of the relationship between the minimalist theory of truth and the expressivist metaethical theory. One group of philosophers contends that minimalism and expressivism are compatible, the other group contends that such theories are incompatible. Following Simon Blackburn (manuscript), I will call the former position ‘compatibilism’ and the latter position‘incompatiblism.’ Even those compatibilist philosophers who hold that there is no conflict or tension between these two theories-minimalism and expressivism-typically think that some revision of minimalism is required to accommodate expressivism. The claim that there is such an incompatibility, I will argue, is based on a misunderstanding of the historical roots of expressivism, the motivations behind the expressivist theory, and the essential commitments of expressivism. I will present an account of the expressivist theory that is clearly consistent with minimalism.
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