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Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2010
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vol. 65
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issue 7
664-671
EN
The article presents different views of understanding the meanings of historical facts and the nature of historical narratives. It also points to the problems related to understanding the historical work and historical narratives in selected works of the representatives of naive realism, constructivism and critical realism. It is assumed that Eugen Zelenak's presentation of the basic ideas of critical realism (which stresses the importance of applying various conceptual frameworks) could have constructivist consequences.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2008
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vol. 63
|
issue 8
670-682
EN
The theory of the social fact faces the problem of differentiating between the ontological, epistemological and methodological aspects of the social fact. The discussion of the problem began when the naive realism has been criticized, and resulted in contrasting ontological constructivism and critical or scientific realism. A fact is the state or a change of the state of the object (thing for us), which are identified by the subject as something real and reconstructed in his mind in the form of true propositions about facts. The latter should be clearly distinguished from our beliefs about facts, which could be true or false. A social fact is the state or a change of the state of social system and human action. It serves as the basis of an integrative social explanation, which is a combination of the nomological explanation and humanistic interpretation. It is also necessary to distinguish between theoretical-methodological, valuation and ideological interpretations of the facts.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
|
2009
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vol. 64
|
issue 7
625-633
EN
The aim of the paper is to discuss the definition of the fact presented by Vaclav Cernik. At first, the author outlines the views of the defenders of the naive realism, constructivism (or narrativism), and critical realism in historiography. The leading proponents of narrativism hold that what the historians construe are not single facts, but general narrative interpretations. The second part offers a critical analysis of some notions and distinctions introduced by Cernik in his theory of the social fact. The most questionable is his concept of observation statements and his way of differentiation between observational and theoretical statements. The author's conclusion is that the most reliable is the middle ground between naive realism and constructivism in their radical forms.
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