Search results - CEJSH

1

What Future for NATO after 2014?

100%

Kulesa Ł.

The Polish Quarterly of International Affairs

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2014

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issue 2

7-12

EN

When the concept of the current issue of The Polish Quarterly was first formulated, the end of the ISAF operation in 2014 was universally assumed to become the main point of reference for discussions about the future of NATO. Some argued that the alliance would be faced with an almost existential crisis of finding the next unifying cause after the end of the extensive out of area deployments. The Secretary General spoke eloquently about the upcoming transition from a “deployed” to a “prepared” NATO, but it remained unclear what exactly the post-2014 alliance should be preparing itself for. Most Central Europeans called for NATO to “come home” and cultivate its core collective defence task, while others noted that global developments would very soon force the alliance into initiating out of area actions again.

2

Comment to Wojciech Lorenz’s Article “NATO at a Critical Crossroads”

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Šedivý J.

The Polish Quarterly of International Affairs

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2016

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issue 1

107-114

EN

NATO’s expansion steps—lately to Montenegro—will almost perfectly cover the European Union except for a few states. We cannot indefinitely divide the security of Europe into the EU and NATO. It is increasingly evident that is necessary to think of both organisations as a unified Euro-Atlantic area. In this sense, there must be a change in policy for all NATO members, including Turkey. The agreements between NATO and the EU signed on 16 December 2002 have had the potential to increase the effectiveness of full-scale cooperation if completely applied.

3

NATO’s Challenges as Seen from Asia: Is the European Security Landscape Becoming Like Asia?

100%

Tsuruoka M.

The Polish Quarterly of International Affairs

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2016

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issue 1

124-133

EN

Seen from the ground, Asia remains far from quiet when it comes to regional security: the situation in the South China Sea keeps worsening; China challenges Japan’s control of the Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea more forcefully; and North Korea conducted nuclear and ballistic missile tests as recently as January and February 2016. The reality is that Asians are also too busy dealing with the problems in their own region, and generally do not pay much attention to the problems with which Europeans are now preoccupied. That said, however, we are also beginning to see more similarities between the European and Asian security landscapes, and the two regions share an increasing number of common security challenges, mainly caused by those who are prepared to change the status quo by force or coercion, namely Russia and China. In addition, the increasing similarities between the situations in Europe and Asia mean the two are using more common terminology to describe their challenges.

4

“In the Area or Out of Business:” Building Resilience to Hybrid Attacks

100%

Nicolini M., Janda J.

The Polish Quarterly of International Affairs

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2016

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issue 1

77-87

EN

Even though Article 5 is NATO’s ultimate security guarantee, it is only the very last in a long chain of measures that need to be functioning in order to respond to today’s most probable and lethal threats. The Alliance has spent the last two years implementing the agreed Readiness Action Plan and reassuring eastern members not only with rhetoric, but also by taking more action and putting more troops on the eastern border. This is all what one would expect a political-military alliance to do when it is threatened. The evolution of NATO’s posture towards Russia has proven to NATO members, and, arguably, to their adversaries, that the Alliance still has a mission.

5

A Few Things to Be Considered in View of the Warsaw Summit

100%

Camporini V.

The Polish Quarterly of International Affairs

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2016

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issue 1

31-36

EN

First of all, the summit should reaffirm in practical and concrete terms NATO solidarity, calling on the nations to provide their contribution outside their specific geographical proximity. In organisational terms, a thorough reconsideration of the financial mechanisms of the Alliance appears to be necessary, stopping to keep the “costs lie where they fall” principle as a truth of faith. Also, a new task should be given to the Secretary General to revise and possibly partially reverse the recent reorganisation of the NATO Command Structure in order to grant effectively a consistent match with the agreed level of ambition, which, in the present strategic scenarios, seems to be more realistic than ever. And finally, on the political side, a new approach should be tested with Russia, making it clear that there are no hostile intentions from NATO and that Moscow has no reason to be aggressive in countries such as Ukraine and Georgia, with whom negotiated agreements must be found and complied with in order to solve the controversies.

6

Państwa nordyckie w NATO – potencjalna reakcja głównych interesariuszy rozszerzenia Sojuszu Północnoatlantyckiego

100%

Wąsowski K.

Sprawy Międzynarodowe

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2017

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issue 1

42-57

EN

NATO membership has been widely debated in Finland and Sweden, so the North Atlantic Alliance might soon be confronted with an official membership application from one or even both countries. Hence the article examines NATO enlargement northwards in Europe and its consequences from the international perspective, focusing on key stakeholders’ potential reactions. While NATO is likely to welcome the new members, Russia’s hostile response is analysed with a view to outlining the scope of its potential reaction rather than predicting specific measures that might be taken by Moscow.

7

Dealing with NATO’s Security Challenges—Where the East Merges with the South

100%

Sutyagin I.

The Polish Quarterly of International Affairs

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2016

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issue 1

115-123

EN

As the challenges will be coming mainly from areas to the south of the NATO zone, the southern Allies will most probably be their first victims. That will happen in circumstances of NATO’s diminished ability to make friends to solve its problems, brought about by Moscow’s current divisive tactics. One could doubt whether those politicians among NATO’s southern allies, currently opposing the idea that Putin should be deterred, will feel more secure in a world based on the Putinesque principle of coercive actions instead of compromise-seeking and negotiations as the cornerstone of international relations. It will be too late by then to quarrel about whether or not it was necessary to allocate resources to reinforce NATO’s eastern flank and who bears the greater responsibility for that change in the way in which world works. It seems much wiser to prevent that change from happening, and concerted efforts to deter Moscow and prove its tactics unsuccessful can achieve this. That is how deterrence of threats existing on the eastern flank of NATO contributes to the security of the Alliance’s southern members.

8

A Middle Eastern Perspective on Partner Capacity Building

100%

Sayah H. M.

The Polish Quarterly of International Affairs

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2016

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issue 1

98-106

EN

Overall, counterinsurgency should be rethought from the perspective of Arab-Muslim host states facing a domestic or regional insurgency, far from orthodox conceptions of this paradigm. A renewed, indigenous understanding of COIN could become the strategic operating concept, guiding the “positioning and application of kinetic (military) and political (non-military) uses of power to achieve national (strategic) aims,” underpinning MENA states’ national efforts to address their domestic and regional challenges and improving cooperation between them and their NATO allies. For these purposes we should adopt a holistic, flexible approach to COIN, and train and prepare armies and civilian players to respond adequately to complex insurgencies.

9

NATO’s Strategic Adaptation, the Warsaw Summit and Beyond

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Giegerich B.

The Polish Quarterly of International Affairs

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2016

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issue 1

61-68

EN

Against this background, NATO’s strategic adaptation has only just begun. The Alliance’s 2014 summit in Wales initiated the process and defined the short-term goals to reassure allies against the context of a shifting and deteriorating security environment. The 2016 Warsaw summit will rightly celebrate what has been achieved since Wales. Strategic significance, however, will be achieved only if NATO’s heads of state and government use the occasion to agree a strategic adaptation plan that balances tasks and geographies and embraces the idea that adaptation is a process not a result, and make a firm commitment to improving the resources available to meet the security needs of the Euro-Atlantic security community.

10

Adaptacja NATO bez szerszej strategii

100%

Lorenz W.

Polski Przegląd Dyplomatyczny

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2018

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issue 1

106-117

EN

Last year’s Russian-Belarussian manoeuvres in Belarus gave rise to many strategic questions, which Wojciech Lorenz tries to answer.

11

deren j.

Rocznik Bezpieczeństwa Międzynarodowego

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2013

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vol. 7

234-244

EN

Political, military and economical factors affecting defence planning process frame the research problem steering this article. These principal theses were confronted with theoretical and empirical approaches to the standardization in the research process conducted by the author, and considered as a primary tool for the interoperability achievement. The execution of a scientifically well-founded analysis of standardization is the main objective of this research. Finally, the scientific process is concluded by setting a dependence model which takes into account seamless relations and the correlation amid Force Goals (NATO Force Planning Process) and NATO defence process. It is worth stressing that the research follows in accordance with the commonly recognized methodological principles (systemic analysis, modeling). The author’s effort has been focused on the capabilities-driven model of NATO force structure shaped by military standardization requirements (effects- based approach EBA) in spite of the influence of the theories applied to the threat-assessment driven model (Threat Assessment Approach).

PL

Polityczno-wojskowe oraz ekonomiczne implikacje standaryzacji na proces planowania obronnego wyznaczają obszar zainteresowań badawczych prezentowanych w artykule. Autor dowodzi, że proces standaryzacyjny, rozpatrywany w aspekcie procesu planowania obronnego (sił), jest warunkiem koniecznym osiągania interoperacyjności. Celem badawczym – realizowanym przy wykorzystaniu analitycznych metod badania standaryzacji w NATO oraz modelowania są procesy: Celów Sił Zbrojnych (element w procesie planowania sił NATO) oraz planowania obronnego NATO, pozostające w korelacji i harmonizacji z procesem standaryzacji. Struktura problemu badawczego jest oparta na poszukiwaniu odpowiedzi na pytanie: jak jest realizowana polityka standaryzacyjna w Instytucjach i Dowództwach Struktury Dowodzenia NATO oraz Dowództwach Struktury Sił NATO? Jest warte podkreślenia, że w trakcie badań wykorzystano ogólnie dostępne narzędzia metodologiczne (analiza systemowa, modelowanie) przy wyborze modelu zorientowanego na budowanie zdolności (podejście oczekiwanych efektów – Effect Based Approach) ograniczanego wymaganiami standaryzacyjnymi, niezależnie od wpływu na rezultaty badań teorii uwzględniających modelowanie skierowane na zagrożenia (Threat Assessment Approach).

17

Czy NATO jest jeszcze potrzebne? Nieortodoksyjne spojrzenie na strategię Sojuszu Północnoatlantyckiego na przykładzie konfliktu afgańskiego

71%

Gruszczak A.

Rocznik Bezpieczeństwa Międzynarodowego

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2010

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vol. 4

EN

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is facing the necessity of redefining its identity. NATO is working on a new strategic concept as an institution. NATO will be responsible not only for the security of its members, but also for the global stability and prevention of threats to the international order. It has been emphasized many times that for NATO the Afghan conflict is a task and not a test. However, it is in fact both a test and a task. It is an operation which will determine the role of the Treaty in the second decade of the 21st century. It does seem that this asymmetrical in its character test of the management of local crisis and conflicts will fail. The task of escaping from the Afghan trap will be undertaken by the United States. This solution results from the logic of NATO existence and its raison d’être as an organization protecting Western territory against aggression. Military operations under the aegisof NATO – the organization which is composite and has limited operation capacities, will expose it to loss of identity and will deepen the conflicts and reduce NATO to the role of the ‘US adjutant’.

PL

Organizacja Paktu Północnoatlantyckiego stoi przed koniecznością określenia swej tożsamości, również w świetle prac nad nową koncepcją strategiczną, jako instytucji odpowiedzialnej nie tylko za bezpieczeństwo swych członków, ale także za stabilność globalną oraz przeciwdziałanie zagrożeń ładu międzynarodowego. Niejednokrotnie podkreślano, że dla NATO konflikt afgański to „zadanie”, nie „sprawdzian” (task, not test). A jednak Afganistan to i test, i zadanie, to operacja, która określi rolę Sojuszu w drugiej dekadzie XXI wieku. Wiele wskazuje na to, że sprawdzian globalnej zdolności zarządzania lokalnymi kryzysami i konfliktami o charakterze asymetrycznym zakończy się negatywnie, zaś zadanie wydostania się z afgańskiej pułapki spocznie na Stanach Zjednoczonych. Takie rozwiązanie będzie wszakże skutkiem logiki istnienia NATO, jego pierwotnego raison d’etre jako organizacji broniącej terytorium Zachodu przed agresją. Zbrojne operacje pod egidą NATO, organizacji niejednorodnej i o ograniczonych zdolnościach operacyjnych, narażą Sojusz na utratę tożsamości, pogłębią podziały i zredukują jego rolę do „adiutanta Ameryki”.

18

“Extended Cooperative Security” in the Baltic Sea Region

63%

Wieslander A.

The Polish Quarterly of International Affairs

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2016

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issue 1

134-144

EN

The forthcoming Warsaw summit will be the time to assess the Enhanced Opportunities Program (EOP), which was introduced at the Wales summit in 2014. In the following it is argued that, due to the high degree of security interdependence in the Baltic Sea area, and the degree of interoperability gained by Sweden and Finland, regional cooperation between NATO, Sweden and Finland should be deepened further, thereby strengthening security and stability in a strategically crucial region for the Alliance. Given that neither Sweden nor Finland is likely to apply for NATO membership any time soon, NATO should develop “extended cooperative security.” Such cooperation includes not only the military dimension, such as common situational awareness, exercises and improved partner representation in the military structure, but also elaboration of political consultation mechanisms, to assure common assessments and a rapid response to situations that may arise.

19

NATO beyond Afghanistan: A U.S. View on the ISAF Mission and the Future of the Alliance

63%

Nordenman M.

The Polish Quarterly of International Affairs

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2014

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issue 2

13-26

EN

Many in Washington have drawn the conclusion that NATO largely failed in Afghanistan, in no small part due to insufficient political will in Europe coupled with lacklustre military capabilities and forces contributed by America’s NATO allies. However, on closer examination, this conclusion about America’s European allies appears hasty. Indeed, European nations have exhibited a surprising level of political will, considering the circumstances, and the Afghanistan mission has generated a major, and sometimes painful, transformation of European forces towards a more expeditionary construct. This is precisely what Washington has sought from its allies in Europe since the end of the Cold War.

20

Dyplomacja osobista szefów państw i rządów w procesie decyzyjnym NATO

63%

kupiecki R.

Sprawy Międzynarodowe

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2016

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issue 3

7-26

EN

The term summit implies a well-established in international relations yet specific form of diplomacy waged personally by the heads of state and government according to their constitutional powers. The evolution of this international phenomenon has shaped its forms and expected deliverables, while modern means of transportation and communication have increased their frequency, making them a visible sign of leaders’ involvement in foreign relations, pursued sometimes at the expense of „traditional” diplomacy. NATO summits have evolved as a key instrument of strategic decision-making and public diplomacy of the Alliance. They raise the political profile of the organisation, rubber-stamping the daily diplomatic efforts of its member-states. While consuming the results of these efforts, they also set the highest-level agenda for the short and mid-term perspective. They also consolidate NATO outreach activities beyond collective defence.

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