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Kwartalnik Filozoficzny
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2012
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vol. 40
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issue 1
25 - 40
EN
In this paper I propose an interpretation of Karl Jaspers’ project of metaphysics as a form of Post-Neo-Kantianism. Jaspers makes Kantian philosophy one of the most important starting points of his own philosophical thinking. But, like Nicolai Hartmann and Martin Heidegger, he rejects the Neo-Kantian epistemological interpretation of Kant’s philosophy. Neo-Kantians claimed that Kant rejected metaphysics and wished to set up the theory of cognition as a new philosophia prima. In opposition to this, Jaspers emphasizes the metaphysical sense of Kant’s philosophy. Moreover, in his project of the philosophy of the Umgreifenden he gives a positive meaning to transcendental physiology, the part of metaphysics which, according to the common reading of Kant, was definitely rejected by him.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2010
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vol. 65
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issue 1
27-39
EN
The paper deals with some major themes in early Cassirer's philosophy of mathematics. It appears, that the basis of his thinking about mathematical objects and mathematical concept formation is his Neo-Kantian idealistic (transcendental) theory of concepts which he developed in opposition to what is called the 'traditional theory of concepts' going back to Aristotle. Cassirer often seeks to confirm his philosophical insights concerning mathematics by the interpretations the works of significant mathematicians. Therefore, the second part of the paper deals with Cassirer's attempt to find such a confirmation in famous Dedekind's theory of natural numbers. Cassirer's philosophical attitude to Dedekind's theory is compared with that of Russell. The author raises the sceptical question of whether Cassirer's view of mathematics - as developed in his early period - could be a sufficient or at least plausible basis for solving philosophical problems of the foundations of mathematics of that time.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2010
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vol. 65
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issue 2
120-129
EN
The paper gives an analysis of the Neo-Kantian philosophy of the 1920s and 1930s, which was a shared philosophical platform for Hartmann and Heidegger. Both philosophers are to be conceived of mainly in the context of Neo-Kantianism, which ends, when the conception of epistemology as prima philosophia is replaced by ontology. While Hartmann conceived of metaphysics through the optics of what remains unknowable in grasping the problems logically, Heidegger saw the metaphysics of that time on the background of the forgetfulness of being.
EN
Models are the coin of the realm in current philosophy of science, as they are in science itself, having replaced laws and theories as the primary strategy. Logical Positivism tried to erase the older neo-Kantian distinction between ideal constructions and reality. It returns in the case of models. Nowak’s concept of idealization provided an alternative account of this issue. It construed model application as concretizations of hypotheses which improve by accounting for exceptions. This appears to account for physical law. But it raises the problem of uniqueness: is the result unique, as physical law should be? Neo-Kantianism failed this test. Its solutions were circular justifications for claims of uniqueness. Nowak inherited the problem without resolving it.
EN
The article compares epistemological views of the Russian philosopher, Siemion Frank, and the Neo-Kantians of the Marburg School. Developing their views from Kant's philosophy the Germans assumed that the object of cognition can only be referred to as an unknown variable, which is neither given or postulated in the inquires but must be constituted in the process of cognition. Frank claims, however, that the unknown variable can be identified with an objectively existing absolute or an all-encompassing-unity. Entering in a direct polemic with the Neo-Kantians Frank argued that the process of cognition is dependent on the object of cognition even though the object remains 'inconceivable'. This view amounts to stressing the priority of what there is over what is known, and has been called 'ontologism'. It is characteristic for a large segment of Russian philosophical thought.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2012
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vol. 67
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issue 3
254 – 261
EN
The paper focuses on the influence of I. Kant and German classical philosophy on the Russian philosophical thought. It deals with the challenge of “returns to Kant” in Russian philosophical culture. Kant's philosophy stimulates the field of the metaphysics of faith. The paper shows that in their confrontation with German classical thought, and especially with Kant’s philosophy, Russian philosophers have various aims and use various methodologies and languages. Further, it shows Kant’ philosophical legacy from the two different points of view represented by two philosophical magazines – Logos and Put (Way). The paper also explains the importance of the notions of Kantianism and Neo-Kantianism in Russian philosophical thought from the 1850s up to the present day. Attention is paid in particular to A. I. Vvedensky and his understanding of the relationship between faith and reason as well as his confrontation with the philosophy of I. Kant.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2011
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vol. 66
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issue 10
994 – 1002
EN
The paper deals with neo-Kantianism and the value theory in Hungarian philosophy at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries. It shows as the transformations of neo-Kantianism in the works of its leading representatives. It also offers a detailed analysis of the value theory of K. Bohm, who created the first original Hungarian philosophical system.
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