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Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2021
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vol. 76
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issue 10
752 – 765
EN
This paper not only summarizes Hempel`s analysis of the D-N model that shows how it is possible for the covering-law model to provide both a causal account of particular facts and a non-casual one, but also offers four prominent examples of non-causal explanation. Subsequently a detailed analysis of the examples shows that there is a common denominator between these examples: the presence of a law that describes an empirical system in its atemporal state. But the paper also shows what differences are there in the applicability of the laws in the given explanations. Finally, it reviews the evolution of the conception of non-causal explanation with respect to the discussed examples.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2022
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vol. 77
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issue 8
590 – 607
EN
The paper investigates possible forms of explanatory monism for the cases of non-causal explanations (primarily Reutlinger 2018; Woodward 2018). In the conceptual analysis, the advantages and weaknesses of the counterfactual view of explanation are examined. Although this conception of explanation provides a common explanatory framework, it cannot sufficiently take into account the specificity of individual nomic generalizations and, in the non-causal case, it is difficult to construct a non-interventionist form of counterfactual. Therefore, the paper offers a return to the unificacionist view of explanation (primarily Kitcher 1981), which is a type of explanatory monism, does not suffer from the mentioned problems, and also offers a solution to the problem of asymmetry of noncausal explanations.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2021
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vol. 76
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issue 6
407 – 422
EN
In this paper, I provide a conceptual analysis of the issue of asymmetry in non-causal explanations. I aim to fulfil three sub-tasks: 1) To define a conceptual space for problem solving (Cf. Reutlinger and Saatsi 2018; Lange 2017); 2) To reflect ongoing debates (Cf. Jansson and Saatsi 2019; Lange 2019; Khalifa et al. 2018); 3) To reflect a model of topological explanation (Cf. Kostić 2020). I focus only on non-causal explanations in the context of scientific research. I formulate several counter-arguments against distinctively mathematical explanations. I reflect the ongoing debate on the question of the universal applicability of a counterfactual solution to the problem of asymmetry for both causal and non-causal explanations (Cf. Woodward 2018). I reveal that none of the approaches discussed is without problems and that the proposed solutions to them are unsatisfactory. I consider the model of topological explanation in Kostić's view to be the most cogent solution to the discussed problem. His model successfully incorporates a counterfactual approach and also offers a solution to the problem of explanation asymmetry in non-causal explanations from a pragmatic point of view.
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