This paper explores the realm of Heidegger’s writings to examine how moral ideas intersect with non-human creatures from a phenomenological standpoint. The human-animal dilemma becomes more urgent over time, and our future becomes less predictable. The paper commences by examining the significance of attending to the particularities of Dasein, as understood in the Heideggerian framework. This entails moving beyond the limited boundaries of contemporary scientific and technocratic paradigms and illuminating the potential for investigating not only human experiences but also those of animals. This study examines Heidegger’s phenomenological understanding of animals, focusing on the post-humanist emotional aspects of human morality. It acknowledges the presence of inter-subjectivity and investigates the underlying intersectionality. Additionally, it suggests potential directions for future research and inquiry.
While natural rights are typically understood as applying only to humans, there are in fact no suitable criteria which justify such an assumption. Indeed, arguments from marginal cases show that characteristics which are considered innately human are not in fact shared by all humans and can even be identified in some non-human animals. However, if we try to dismiss the issue by implying that the fact of being human is itself a sufficient criterion, the problem of evolutionary theory then arises, with the gradual evolution of the human species suggesting that several different human species coexisted at some point in the past. In order to ensure the universality of human rights, we must draw the line not only in the present but also in the past, and in this context it would seem logical to extend natural rights to non-human animals. However, regardless of the criteria which we apply to this issue, it remains problematic to justify why the ones we have chosen are relevant to the existence of natural rights.
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