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Filozofia (Philosophy)
|
2012
|
vol. 67
|
issue 5
353 – 361
EN
Aesthetic judgments are intrinsically both subjective and normative. Asking what our aesthetic judgments are linked to leads us to the question about metaphysical commitments of the aesthetic experience. This fundamental metaphysical level opens up two basic positions: realism and non-realism. Realism claims that in our experience we face true aesthetic properties independent of our minds. Non-realistic theoretical framework presupposes an essential contribution of the recipient into the aesthetic experience insofar that it is not possible to identify work’s propositions as such. The paper argues for drawing the realistic position from the normative aspect of aesthetic judgments. It claims that normativity presupposes mind-independent actual aesthetic properties of the objects/artefacts. Subsequently, non-realistic claims are incompatible with accepting the normative character of the aesthetic experience.
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