Full-text resources of CEJSH and other databases are now available in the new Library of Science.
Visit https://bibliotekanauki.pl

Results found: 18

first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last

Search results

Search:
in the keywords:  National Council of the Judiciary
help Sort By:

help Limit search:
first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last
EN
The opinion is based on the analysis of a number of detailed problems related to the procedure for submitting candidatures for members of the National Council of the Judiciary, from among judges, in relation to the provisions of the Act of 8 December 2017 amending the Act on the National Council of the Judiciary and some related acts. The author is of the opinion that the time limits specified in the abovementioned act and the amending act of 8 December 2017, related to the procedure for nominating judges — members of the Council, worded as follows: “in the period of […] days beginning with the day […]”, begin to run on the day following the day of an event effecting the running of a time limit. The author also points to inconsistencies of particular, newly introduced, provisions of the act on the National Council of the Judiciary
EN
With its decision ref. No. I OSK 1917/18, the Supreme Administrative Court dismissed the motion for exclusion of a judge on the basis of the defectiveness of the appointment of the “new” National Council of the Judiciary. The Court pointed out that the reasons for a motion are decided by the circumstances of a “speci c case”, and not its “general nature” and referred to the traditional, constitutionally justi ed signi cance of the President’s act of appointing a judge (a person authorized to adjudicate). An opposite decision would lead to far-reaching systemic consequences: (a) it would establish judicial oversight of the President’s discretio- nary acts, thus far inacceptable; (b) it would transfer the “burden of proof” (of a judge’s lack of impartiality) from the party requesting exclusion of a judge; (c) it would change the nature of the motion, which would become an instrument in the “battle” for the desired nominating procedure for a judge. Hence, it shall be stated that the formation of the system of the Na- tional Council of the Judiciary and the nominating procedure is of general nature and as a rule abstracts from the circumstances of a speci c case.
EN
In the proposed Sejm draft position on the case, ref. no. K 5/17, concerning methods of election of members of the National Council of the Judiciary’s, provided by rules the Act on the National Council of the Judiciary, the author claims that these rules are incompatible with the Constitution. Omission of regulations which state that terms of office of all members should commence on the same date is another reason of unconstitutionality of these provisions.
4
88%
EN
The opinion refers to two problems: Can a judge delegated to the Ministry of Justice be a member of the National Council of the Judiciary? Can a retired judge be a member of the National Council of the Judiciary? As regards the fi rst issue, the author points to the fact that a judge delegated to the Ministry of Justice is still a judge, although s/he does not pass judgments, and the act on the National Council of the Judiciary does not condition the admissibility to run for the position of its member thereon, but on having the status of a judge. Hence, a judge delegated to the Ministry of Justice may be a candidate to the National Council of the Judiciary. As regards retired judges, they may not be candidates to the National Council of the Judiciary, as they do not hold offices (are not in service); retirement results primarily in the removal of the judicial power, as well as particular corporate rights and obligations. The jurisprudence of both the Supreme Court and the Constitutional Tribunal defi nes the essence of retirement, recognizing a retired person as “inactive” in the sphere of the holding an offi ce. It is emphasized in the literature that judges nominated to the National Council of the Judiciary must be elected “from among judges”. It stems therefrom that they must be persons holding positions of a judge within a given category of courts and that nominating a retired judge is inadmissible. In addition, as regards members of the Council who retire or are moved into retirement during the term, their mandates expire before the end of the term, which manifests the legislator’s will for the positions of members of the National Council of the Judiciary not to be fi lled by retired judges
5
Content available remote

Krajowa Rada Sądownictwa w Polsce

88%
EN
The article concerns the position of the National Council of the Judiciary in light of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland of 2 April 1997. The author analyses the constitutional basis for the functioning of this body and its tasks in safeguarding the independence of the courts and judges. The author draws attention to the changes that were introduced in the previous term of office of the Sejm with regard to the functioning of the National Council of the Judiciary. He criticises in particular the procedure for the election of judges to the National Council of the Judiciary by the Sejm, indicating that adopted regulations concerning this matter are inconsistent with the Constitution.
EN
The draft Sejm’s position regards an application of the National Council of the Judiciary, addressed to Constitutional Tribunal, in which the Council applied for determination of conformity to the Constitution of some provisions of the Act on National Council of the Judiciary. It was stated that some provisions, indicated in the application, do not conform to the Constitution, inter alia regarding the possibility to appeal from some resolutions of the National Council of the Judiciary, or allowing to suspend the power of the President of the Republic of Poland to appoint a judge. Moreover it was claimed that the rule referring to appointing a judicial member of the National Council of the Judiciary by the Sejm conforms to the Constitution.
EN
Consideration and evaluation of candidates for the office of judge, and then presentation to the President of the Republic of Poland of applications for the appointment of judges are among the most important competences of the National Council of the Judiciary. The standard of this assessment has essentially been set by constitutional standards and the provisions of the Act on the National Council of the Judiciary. According to these standards and provisions, the assessment should be based on transparent, uniform and fair selection criteria. Consequently, the assessment carried out by the National Council of the Judiciary should meet a specific methodological standard. The aim of the study is to define a constitutional and statutory methodological standard for the assessment of candidates for the office of judge by the National Council of the Judiciary.
EN
The Act on the National Council of the Judiciary establishes two collective subjects entitled to submit a candidature for its member, i.e. a group of at least (a) 2,000 Polish citizens, (b) 25 active judges. Those two subjects are equal. An effective withdrawal of support by a judge would result in equally treating the citizens’ support, which would cause considerable implementation diffi culties. Admissibility of support withdrawal is inconsistent with the principle of fi nality of citizens’ support, dominating in the Polish legal system; moreover, it lacks substantive justifi cation — the supported candidate could not have changed radically in the period of a few days. The finality of support emphasizes the signifi cance of responsible decision-making in this scope, which ensures no interruption in the further stages of proceedings. Hence, it shall be concluded that the act on the National Council of the Judiciary contains a legal loophole — it may be filled by applying the systemic interpretation, which leads to the opinion on the finality of submitting the candidature of a judge for a member of the National Council of the Judiciary.
EN
The changes introduced into the judiciary system within the last few years have actually led to the infringement of the principle of a tripartite division of power – Poland is inclining towards authoritarianism. The Constitutional Tribunal affected by formal changes and (partially) filled with persons who cannot guarantee independence – has ceased to perform their constitutional functions and ensure the constitutionality of laws long time ago. The “reforms” have already had impact on the judiciary authority, i.e. the courts. The above-described situation alerted the international opinion, thus, apart from the individual countries, many international organisations have also voiced their concerns. From among of the aforesaid organisations, the European Union (EU) is responsible for the key task. The changes in the structure of the Supreme Court and National Council of the Judiciary have become the subject of the preliminary procedure addressed to the Court of Justice of the European Union. In response thereto, the European Court of Justice located in Luxembourg stated that the cases concerning judges may not be tried by the court which is not independent or unbiased. The preliminary procedure is based on conciliation, which guarantees uniform application of Community law in all Member States. Therefore, it is always the national court that is responsible for the final resolution of the case. In the analysed case, it is the Supreme Court.
EN
The need to pass a new Act on the National Council of the Judiciary became apparent after the Constitutional Tribunal’s judgment of 19 November 2009 (ref. no. K 62/07), which ruled that leaving the proceedings before the National Council of the Judiciary (KRS) and the procedure for its functioning beyond the statutory regulation is unconstitutional . This judgment compelled the legislature to on the bill which was adopted on May 12, 2011. The author attempts to examine the extent to which the standards developed in the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court have been reflected in the Act. The article is based on the analysis of 114 decisions of the Supreme Court. Those decisions are thematically diverse, but can be classified according to their content. They cover the following issues: the formal requirements that appeals from the resolutions of KRS in individual cases must comply with, and the scope of cognition of the Supreme Court; criteria used by KRS for assessing candidates for the position of a judge, the relationship between KRS and the President of the Republic in the appointment procedure, retirement of judges on grounds health, consent to further holding of the position by a judge who has attained 65 years of age; procedural standards aaplied in KRS in individual cases. The overall assessment of the Supreme Court case law on matters related to KRS leads to several conclusions. First of all, the Court accentuated the significance of its own review for individual proceedings held before KRS, and rightly reduced strict formal requirements relating to the appeal. Similarly, one should assess the thoroughness with which the Court controlled the criteria of assement of the parties to the proceedings, used by KRS. Recognition is also deserved by consistency with which the Court challenged the conduct of the Council on matters concerning the health status of judges, when KRS adopted resolutions on the basis of judgments of ZUS (Social Insurance Institution) evaluating doctors, without sufficient examination of all the relevant circumstances. The course work on the draft Law on National Court can does not allow us to declare whether and to what extent the shape of the statutory solutions depend on the case law the Supreme Court. Such explanations are not included in the explanatory statement to the bill. Comparison of the text of the Act with the content of the Supreme Court’s judgments, however, suggests that its jurisprudence has had a significant impact on the provisions of the bill.
EN
The Act on the National Council of the Judiciary establishes two collective subjects entitled to submit a candidature for its member, i.e. a group of at least (a) 2,000 Polish citizens, (b) 25 active judges. Those two subjects are equal. An effective withdrawal of support by a judge would result in equally treating the citizens’ support, which would cause considerable implementation difficulties. Admissibility of support withdrawal is inconsistent with the principle of fi nality of citizens’ support, dominating in the Polish legal system; moreover, it lacks substantive justifi cation — the supported candidate could not have changed radically in the period of a few days. The finality of support emphasizes the signifi cance of responsible decision-making in this scope, which ensures no interruption in the further stages of proceedings. Hence, it shall be concluded that the act on the National Council of the Judiciary contains a legal loophole — it may be filled by applying the systemic interpretation, which leads to the opinion on the finality of submitting the candidature of a judge for a member of the National Council of the Judiciary
12
75%
EN
The article deals with immunity of Members of Parliament in collegial extra-parliamentary bodies in which their participation is required by the provisions of the Constitution or statutes. The author poses the question of whether such activities may be considered as “parliamentary activities” i.e. those falling within the scope of the exercise of their mandate (and therefore subject, in particular, to protection by parliamentary non-liability or material immunity) or rather the performance “other public function” (which results only in their protection by inviolability or formal immunity)? The Act on the Exercise of the Mandate of a Deputy or Senator does not give a defi nitive answer to this question. The author points to the relevant jurisprudence of the Supreme Court and the Constitutional Tribunal. The main criterion for distinguishing between “acting as Member of Parliament” and performance of “other public function” is the existence of a connection between the functions of a given body and the functions of parliament. In the author’s opinion, there are four of such bodies in Poland, of which only participation in the Council of Labour Protection is considered as parliamentary activity, whereas participation in the National Council of the Judiciary, the National Prosecution Council and Civil Service Council is considered as performance of “other public function”
EN
The article deals with the prerogatives of the President of Republic to appoint judges on the motion of the National Council of the Judiciary. Its aim is to give arguments in favor of the thesis that neither Article 179 nor Article 144, para. 3, subpara. 17 of the Constitution cannot provide a basis for the President’s decision refusing to appoint the judge. In a democratic state ruled by law and implementing the principle of legality in the exercise of powers of public authorities, one cannot unquestioningly accept the thesis that the prerogative is a personal privilege of the President, which may be enjoyed irrespective of the constitutional regulation of rights and without a specifi c legal procedure. Article 179 in conjunction with Article 144 para. 3, subpara. 17 of the Constitution provides a basis for the reconstruction of two norms: a competence norm and a norm requiring President to make use of the powers granted to the him. This provision cannot provide a basis for the president’s decision refusing to appoint the judge. The National Council of the Judiciary, due to its constitutional authority to safeguard the independence of courts and judges, is competent to carry out a detailed and substantive evaluation of the candidate for the position of judge. However, in view of the limitations of Article 10 in conjunction with Article 173 of the Constitution, the President may apply to the National Council of the Judiciary to reconsider the case.
PL
Przedmiotem artykułu jest ukazanie problematyki związanej z instytucją immunitetu sędziowskiego i jej znaczenia dla pociągnięcia do odpowiedzialności karnej sędziów na gruncie aktualnie obowiązujących przepisów konstytucyjnych i procesowych. Rozważania te autor uczynił punktem wyjścia do analizy zagadnienia delegitymizacji władzy sądowniczej na kanwie zachodzących w ostatnim czasie w Polsce procesów ustrojowych dotyczących Krajowej Rady Sądownictwa oraz nowoutworzonej Izby Dyscyplinarnej Sądu Najwyższego. Całość została ulokowana na płaszczyźnie przepisów prawa UE, norm prawa krajowego oraz orzecznictwa organów władzy sądowniczej.
EN
The subject of the article is to show the issues related to the institution of judicial immunity and its importance in bringing judges to criminal liability on the basis of current constitutional and procedural provisions. The author made these considerations a starting point for an in-depth analysis of the issue of delegitimization of the judiciary on the basis of recent processes in Poland concerning the National Council of the Judiciary and the newly established Disciplinary Chamber of the Supreme Court. The whole is issue situated on the level of EU law, national regulations and rich jurisprudence of the judicial authorities.
EN
Judicial control over the correct course of parliamentary elections is an important element of the broadly understood electoral procedure in a democratic state ruled by law. Such control is provided for in Article 101 of the Polish Constitution, which entrusts the Supreme Court with examining electoral protests and confirming the validity of elections to the Sejm and Senate. As a result of serious reservations indicated in the doctrine of constitutional law as to the constitutionality of the current National Council of the Judiciary and, as a consequence, constitutional doubts as to the appointment of certain persons to its position in 2018 in this Court, doubts may be raised not only in the scope of the Supreme Court’s control over parliamentary elections carried out on 13 October 2019, made with the participation of these people, but also in the matter of validity of the elections themselves. The glossed decision, despite its substantive correctness in leaving one of the electoral protests without further progress, is an example of these procedural doubts.
PL
Sądowa kontrola prawidłowości przebiegu wyborów parlamentarnych stanowi istotny element szeroko pojętej procedury wyborczej w demokratycznym państwie prawnym. Kontrolę taką przewiduje art. 101 obowiązującej w Polsce Konstytucji, który Sądowi Najwyższemu powierza rozpoznawanie protestów wyborczych oraz stwierdzanie ważności wyborów do Sejmu i Senatu. Na skutek wskazywanych w doktrynie prawa konstytucyjnego poważnych zastrzeżeń co do konstytucyjności obecnej Krajowej Rady Sądownictwa i w konsekwencji konstytucyjnych wątpliwości w zakresie powołania na jej wniosek w 2018 r. niektórych osób na stanowiska w tym Sądzie, wątpliwości budzić może nie tylko kontrola Sądu Najwyższego w zakresie wyborów parlamentarnych przeprowadzonych 13 października 2019 r., dokonana z udziałem tych osób, lecz także ważność samych wyborów. Glosowane postanowienie, mimo jego merytorycznej prawidłowości w zakresie pozostawienia jednego z protestów wyborczych bez dalszego biegu, stanowi przykład tych wątpliwości proceduralnych.
EN
This paper concerns the main problems of the influence of judicial administration bodies on the disciplinary proceedings of judges of administrative courts. This issue is of key importance in terms of research on the administrative supervision over courts and judges. In this respect, the most important issue is the protection of judicial independence. The article discusses the problem of the influence of the President of the Supreme Administrative Court, presidents of courts of first instance, and the National Council of the Judiciary on the disciplinary proceedings of judges of administrative courts and assessors. Attention is paid to the pros and cons of applicable legal solutions. It should be emphasized that in the administrative courts the structure of the disciplinary judicial system is different from that of the judiciary subject to judicial review supervised by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Administrative Court is the disciplinary court in the disciplinary matters of judges of administrative courts and assessors. The article discusses the most important features of this solution, especially the advantages of the lack of significant influence of the Minister of Justice on these proceedings.
PL
Niniejszy artykuł dotyczy wpływu organów administracji wymiaru sprawiedliwości na postępowanie dyscyplinarne sędziów sądów administracyjnych. Problem ten ma kluczowe znaczenie w zakresie badań nad nadzorem administracyjnym nad sądami i sędziami postępowaniem. W tym zakresie najistotniejsze znaczenie ma ochrona niezawisłości sędziowskiej. W artykule omawia się problem wpływu Prezesa NSA, prezesów sądów I instancji oraz Krajowej Rady Sądownictwa na postępowanie dyscyplinarne sędziów sądów administracyjnych i asesorów sądowych. Zwraca się uwagę na wady i zalety obowiązujących rozwiązań prawnych. Należy przy tym podkreślić, że w sądach administracyjnych funkcjonuje odmienna od sądownictwa podległego nadzorowi judykacyjnemu SN, struktura sądownictwa dyscyplinarnego. Sądem dyscyplinarnym w sprawach dyscyplinarnych sędziów sądów administracyjnych i asesorów sądowych jest Naczelny Sąd Administracyjny. W artykule omawia się najistotniejsze cechy tego rozwiązania, zwłaszcza zalety braku istotnego wpływu Ministra Sprawiedliwości na to postępowanie.
PL
Celem niniejszego artykułu jest przedstawienie proponowanych zmian Konstytucji RP z 1997 r. w zakresie kadencji i funkcji Sejmu i Senatu w Polsce. Przeprowadzona analiza wskazuje, że przepisy zawarte w konstytucjach Czech i Słowacji są w tym zakresie bardziej precyzyjne, między innymi wyraźniej określają kompetencje kreacyjne parlamentu w stosunku do organów władzy sądowniczej. Ponadto czeskie regulacje dotyczące Senatu pozwalają na wzmocnienie jego pozycji względem pierwszej izby parlamentu, między innymi ze względu na jego większą rolę w procedurze ustawodawczej. Z kolei przepisy zawarte w Konstytucji słowackiej zabezpieczają parlament przed zaniechaniami ze strony głowy państwa. Te unormowania powinny być wzorem przy dokonywaniu zmian polskiej ustawy zasadniczej.
EN
The scope of this article is to show the proposed amendments to the Constitution of the Republic of Poland of 1997 with regard to the term and functions of the Sejm and the Senate in Poland. The analysis shows that the provisions of the constitutions of Czechia and Slovakia are more precise, among other things, they more clearly define the parliament’s creative function in relation to the organs of the judicial power. Moreover, the Czech regulation concerning the Senate allows it to strengthen its political significance and position in relation to the first chamber of parliament, i.a. because of its greater role in the legislative procedure. In turn, the provisions contained in the Slovak Constitution protect the parliament against omissions of the head of state. These regulations should serve as a model for amending the Polish basic law.
PL
Przedmiotem niniejszego tekstu jest ustalenie, czy art. 9a ustawy o Krajowej Radzie Sądownictwa jest zgodny z Konstytucją RP. W celu udzielenia odpowiedzi na to pytanie przeanalizowano relacje, jakie powinny panować pomiędzy poszczególnymi władzami w systemie opartym o zasadę podziału władz. Następnie rozwiano wątpliwości co do tego, czy KRS jest organem występującym w pionie władzy sądowniczej. Ostatecznie stwierdzono, że w RP Sejm nie powinien mieć innych kompetencji kreacyjnych wobec organów władzy sądowniczej, niż tylko te, które wyraźnie przewiduje Konstytucja RP. W przeciwnym razie izba postawiona jest w pozycji nieuzasadnionej supremacji względem judykatywy, a władza sądownicza nie daje gwarancji, iż o wolnościach i prawach człowieka rozstrzygać będą niezależne i bezstronne sądy obsadzone przez niezawisłych sędziów.
EN
The subject of this text is to determine whether Article 9a of the Law on the National Council of the Judiciary is compatible with the Constitution of the Republic of Poland. In order to answer this question, the relationship that should prevail between the various authorities in a system based on the principle of separation of powers was analyzed. Then, doubts were resolved as to whether the NCJ is a body appearing in the division of powers of the judiciary. In the end, it was concluded that in the RP, the Sejm should have no other creative powers over the judiciary than those expressly provided for in the Constitution of the RP. Otherwise, the chamber is placed in a position of unjustified supremacy vis-àvis the judiciary, and the judicial power provides no guarantee that human freedoms and rights will be decided by independent and impartial courts staffed by independent judges.
first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last
JavaScript is turned off in your web browser. Turn it on to take full advantage of this site, then refresh the page.