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Diametros
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2017
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issue 52
64-80
EN
Leonard Nelson is known primarily as a critic of epistemology in the Neo-Kantian meaning of the term. The aim of this paper is to investigate the presuppositions and consequences of his critique. I claim that what has rarely been discussed in this context is the problem of the possibility of metaphysics. By the impossibility of epistemology Nelson means the possibility of metaphysical knowledge. I intend to devote this paper to the analysis of this problem in relation to the Neo-Kantian background.
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Mikołaj Bierdiajew a neokantyzm

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XX
The purpose of the article is to analyze the question of Neo-Kantianism in the thought of Nicolai Berdyaev. The author examines the roots of Berdyaev’s polemic with the school and tries to explain the reasons of his strongly critical attitude to it. The philosopher’s main accusations were those of meonism and of downplaying the sagacious ideal of philosophy as well as negating its anthropological dimension. The author discusses the arguments for and against Berdyaev’s criticism. The whole analysis is set against the problematic of Russian and European philosophical movements at the turn of the century.
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Emil Lask: między neokantyzmem a postneokantyzmem

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XX
In this paper the author shows that Emil Lask’s philosophy starts with considering of typical Neo-Kantian’s questions but at the same time it grounds a new philosophical perspective – Post-Neo- -Kantianism. The origin of Lask’s research is Heinrich Rickert’s theory of judgment, however Lask finds many new solutions and initiates new ideas adopted from him by Martin Heidegger. The article discuss an innovative elements of Lask’s thought like: problem of the material side of cognition, logic of object, logos-immanency of object, doctrine of the material determination of form, ontological theory of truth, problem of the individual subject. Although Lask does not create ontology he is the one Neo-Kantian philosopher, who make transcendental philosophy to ask ontological questions. When we study his considerations it starts to be obvious that theory of cognition is not possible without ontology.
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Wrocławski manifest neokantowski Jacoba Freudenthala

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EN
The initial part of the article focuses on the presentation of Jacob Freudenthal, his scientific activity and scientific achievements. The central point of the article is the analysis of the solemn speech that Jacob Freudenthal gave in front of the academic community of Wrocław on the hundredth anniversary of Immanuel Kant’s death. This speech — but also his didactic activity popularizing Kantian thought — was important because it gave rise to the relatively late Neo-Kantianism of Wrocław which was developed more extensively — after Freudenthal’s death — thanks to Richard Honigswald. Neo-Kantianism opposed the prevailing Kantian idealism and experimental psychology at the University of Wrocław.
EN
The specificity of Richard Hӧnigswald’s attitude to the issues raised in the Neo-Kantian philosophy was clearly visible in his approach to psychology. First of all, this covered the question of the objectivity of cognizance. Like other Neo-Kantian philosophers, Hӧnigswald undertook in his work both the problem of the relationship between philosophy and psychology and the problem of psychologism. Unlike the representants of both Neo-Kantians schools, he took up psychology practically. In the years 1916–1930 he led the psychological laboratory of the Philosophical Seminar at the University of Wrocław, where he conducted a study of the process of thinking. Hӧnigswald took up psychology as he intended to expand the question of objectivity by the subjectivity conditions of cognizance, among which the most important was a synthesis in the way that Kant used this term — primary apperception, i.e. the unity of Self-Knowledge. According to Hӧnigswald, there is no knowledge beyond the knowing subject — an experience centre in which cognitive acts take place. In this way, Hӧnigswald extended the epistemological questions by the notion of ontology of thinking — the theory of mental existence.
EN
The author of the present study is particularly interested in the a priori epistemology “shown” by the German philosopher, which is the heart of the transcendental method both for Kant and for the Marburg philosophers. In the context of Stammler’s philosophy of law it is essential first of all from the point of view of the structure of the a priori concept of law that presents the fundamental issue for the study of his formal philosophy of law.
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EN
The article poses the question of the contemporary validity and meaning of Hermann Cohen’s philosophical thought. It is argued that in order to understand its phenomenon one has to go beyond the epistemological and methodological perspectives in which Cohen’s work has usually been analyzed and probe into the philosopher’s deepest spiritual and intellectual formation — that of Judaism. The author claims that Cohen, otherwise a celebrated academic scholar, was first of all a rabbi, i.e. a teacher in the Judaist tradition. This is the context in which we can weigh his friendship with young Franz Rosenzweig — it was Rosenzweig who first recognized the revolutionary significance of Cohen’s philosophy of religion and utilized the latter in his seminal work The Star of Redemption (Der Stern der Erlosung) where he emphasized the late stage of Cohen’s intellectual evolution, especially the one associated with Religion der Vernunft aus den Quellen des Judentums (1919). This book is viewed as essentially a reinterpretation of Kant’s moral theory and philosophy of religion in terms of Judaism and the Bible, which in itself marks Cohen’s departure from critical idealism and his shift towards the dialogic philosophy. In this context one can see Cohen as a teacher of the German nation, someone who could accurately examine the dangers of the Romantic theory of the nation as well as the Romantic (especially Fichtean) version of Kant’s moral theory, dangers corroborated by 20th-century history. While stressing Cohen’s positive contribution to our understanding of the contemporary world, it should be added that the philosopher’s belief in the liberating potential of “pure reason” was heavily damaged in the face of the totalitarian ideas in modern Europe. It does not mean, however, that his thought has lost its potency. On the contrary, in the age of the crisis of rationality Cohen’s work may be seen as a vital testament. Its effectiveness, though, lies not in the power of “pure reason” but in the power of dialogue and the imperative to love one’s neighbor, a rational and free act which surpasses all religious and speculative constraints. Accordingly, the article concludes by pointing to the timeliness and validity of Cohen’s spiritual and intellectual legacy.
EN
The author of the present study is particularly interested in the a priori epistemology “shown” by the German philosopher, which is the heart of the transcendental method both for Kant and for the Marburg philosophers. In the context of Stammler’s philosophy of law it is essential first of all from the point of view of the structure of the a priori concept of law that presents the fundamental issue for the study of his formal philosophy of law.
EN
An attempt to compare the epistemological positions of two thinkers coming from different philosophical traditions requires turning to the sources of both philosophical programs. This will allow us to reveal the common and differentiating features of the described projects. On the one hand, we have Cassirer, the heir to neo-Kantianism and the creator of symbolism, on the other, we are rooted in the tradition of reflective philosophy and phenomenological hermeneutics, Ricoeur. Despite many differences in epistemological assumptions, we can find similar positions in both philosophers. The concurrence of the three Cassirerow base phenomena with three hermeneutic horizons manifests itself - as we will try to demonstrate - in the concept of the Work. The hermeneutic intuition of Cassirer turns into Ricoeur's reflection on self-understanding in the face of a work that affects our perception of the world and thinking about ourselves.In the article, we will consider how the contemporary philosophy of culture developed by Cassirer is taken up by contemporary hermeneutics. Is the convergence of the three base phenomena with the three horizons that combine with each other in the process of interpretation in the juxtaposition of the philosophy of culture with contemporary hermeneutics? Do we have the right to compare Cassirerow's base phenomena, I - You -Work is with hermeneutic communication which is presented on the line Author (Creator) -Text (Work) - Reader (Receiver)?
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Diametros
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2011
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issue 30
13-28
PL
Celem artykułu jest porównanie koncepcji poznania Ernsta Cassirera i Nelsona Goodmana, których łączy odrzucenie idei poznania jako odbicia rzeczywistości i przyjęcie koncepcji przekształcania. Owo przekształcanie nie jest całkowitym przeciwieństwem odbicia, lecz jego poszerzeniem w taki sposób, że poznanie oznacza zarówno twórcze wytwarzanie, jak i odtwórcze odbicie. Tym samym zniesiona zostaje tradycyjna epistemologiczna dychotomia: konstruowanie – odkrywanie. Wspólną dla obu filozofów przesłankę stanowi odrzucenie prymatu faktów i danych zmysłowych, a konsekwencją poszerzonej koncepcji poznania jest zaś dla nich irrealistyczna koncepcja reprezentacji symbolicznej. W artykule omówiono najważniejsze podobieństwa i różnice w poglądach tych dwóch myślicieli.
EN
The article elucidates and compares Ernst Cassirer's and Nelson Goodman's positions on the problem of cognition. They agree in rejecting the theory of reflection and accepting the concept of transformation. This transformation is not a total antithesis of reflection, but an extension of it: recognition means both creative production and imitative reflection. This eliminates the traditional epistemological dichotomy between constructing and discovering. The shared premise for both philosophers is the rejection of the primacy of facts and sense data, with the result that the extended concept of cognition becomes an irrealistic concept of symbolic representation. The article examines the most important similarities and differences in views of these two thinkers.
EN
The article focuses on the presentation of Kantian sources in Stanisław Brzozowski’s philosophy, who was an outstanding philosopher, writer, and critic. Due to the value of his work, appreciated for over a hundred years by both domestic and foreign researchers, in the article, I emphasize the issue related to the proper conduct of the analysis of its activities. I also point out the most frequent errors that lead to interpretative contradictions within the philosophical reflection that Stanisław Brzozowski created.
PL
Niniejszy artykuł koncentruje się na przedstawieniu kantowskich źródeł filozofii Stanisława Brzozowskiego, wybitnego filozofa, literata oraz krytyka. Ze wzgledu na wartość jego pracy, docenianej od ponad stu lat przez zarówno krajowych jak i zagranicznych badaczy, w artykule podkreślam kwestię związaną z właściwym prowadzeniem analizy jego działalności. Wskazuję również na najczęstrze błędy, które prowadzą do sprzeczności interpretacyjnych w ramach namysłu filozoficznego, jaki stworzył Stanisław Brzozowski.
EN
The subject of the article is the influence of the broadly understood NeoKantianism on the assimilating of Kantians ideas of critical philosophy (critical method) in Poland. I would like to present a philosophical and historical reflection on the dissertation of professor of University of Poznan Adam Wiegner (1889-1967), entitled Zagadnienie poznawcze w oświetleniu L. Nelsona (Problem of Knowledge in the Light of L. Nelson, 1925), in which he undertook a critical analysis of Nelson’s problem of impossibility of the theory of knowledge and possibilities of the metaphysics. The main aim of the article is to present the Neo-Kantians (as well as the Neo-Friesians) context of the above-mentioned Wiegners dissertation and to reflect on the reception of Nelson’s thoughts in Poznań. I would like to show that, contrary to the schematic simplification, Neo-Kantian thought had a significant influence on the shape of philosophy in Poland.
PL
Przedmiotem artykułu jest wpływ szeroko rozumianego ruchu neokantowskiego na przyswojenie kantowskich idei filozofii krytycznej (metody krytycznej) w Polsce. Pragnę zaprezentować filozoficzno-historyczną refleksję nad rozprawą przedwojennego docenta i powojennego profesora Uniwersytetu w Poznaniu Adama Wiegnera (1889–1967) pod tytułem Zagadnienie poznawcze w oświetleniu L. Nelsona (1925), w której podjął on próbę krytycznej analizy Nelsonowskiego problemu niemożliwości teorii poznania oraz możliwości metafizyki. Głównym celem artykułu jest przedstawienie neokantowskiego (a także neofriesjańskiego) kontekstu wspomnianej rozprawy Wiegnera oraz podjęcie refleksji nad poznańskim wątkiem recepcji myśli Leonarda Nelsona w Polsce. Chciałbym wykazać, że wbrew schematycznym uproszczeniom myśl neokantowska miała istotny wpływ na kształt filozofii w Polsce.
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Podmiotowość w neokantyzmie

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EN
The paper analyses Neo-Kantianism views on cognitive subjectivity: constructions by Heinrich Rickert (valuing subject and epistemological subject), by Bruno Bauch (proper subject – principium), by Hermann Cohen (a logical substitution linking rules of thinking, methods and cognitive procedures) and Paul Natorp’s exclusion of subjectivity. The Neo-Kantianism conceptions of subjectivity are determined by the Neo-Kantianism metatheses: anti-psychologism, objectivism, and epistemological fundamentalism. It is demonstrated that Neo-Kantianism elaborated a foundation to philosophize without the category of subject, and initiated the metaphilosophical transformation to the linguistic paradigm. The basis of this change holds that only the objective subject is able to acquire objective knowledge.
PL
W tekście analizuję neokantowskie poglądy w kwestii podmiotowości poznawczej, skupiając uwagę na relewantnych konstrukcjach Heinricha Rickerta (podmiot wartościujący oraz podmiot epistemologiczny), Bruno Baucha (podmiot właściwy – principium), Hermanna Cohena (logiczny zastępnik wiążący zasady myślenia, metody i procedury poznawcze) oraz Paula Natorpa wykluczenie podmiotowości. Stosunek neokantystów do podmiotowości jest określany przez trzy ich główne metatezy: antypsychologizm, obiektywizm oraz fundamentalizm epistemologiczny. Pokazuję, że neokantyzm dokonał destrukcji kategorii podmiotowości, wypracował podstawy do filozofowania bez pojęcia podmiotu, zainicjował metafilozoficzną zmianę do paradygmatu lingwistycznego. Aktualizując koncepcję Kanta neokantyści doprowadzili do porzucenia jej podstaw – poprzez przyjęcie aksjomatu głoszącego, iż wiedzę obiektywną jest w stanie uzyskać tylko niesubiektywny podmiot.
PL
Aksjologia jako teoria wartości zajmuje ważne miejsce nie tylko w filozofii ogólnej, lecz także w filozofii prawa. Prawoznawstwo i prawo nie mogą być ostatecznie neutralne aksjologicznie, gdyż związek między prawem a wartościami ma charakter pierwotny, wieczny, konieczny i immanentny. Autor omawia to zjawisko na przykładzie filozofii prawa Gustawa Radbrucha. Jego zdaniem, pisząc o Radbruchu jako filozofie prawa, należy poczynić pięć bardzo ważnych zastrzeżeń. Po pierwsze, Radbruch był przedstawicielem neokantyzmu. Po drugie, nie był to neokantyzm „w ogóle”, tylko specyficzny wariant zwany neokantyzmem badeńskim (południowoniemiecki, oparty na Heidelbergu). Po trzecie, Radbruch nie był filozofem „w ogóle”, gdyż interesował go neokantyzm przeszczepiony do filozofii prawa. Po czwarte, można obecnie zauważyć wielki powrót filozofii Kanta (np. J. Habermas, J. Rawls, O. Höffe), ale zjawisko to należy dokładnie odróżnić od neokantyzmu jako zdeterminowanego czasowo i przestrzennie kierunku filozoficznego okresu fin de siècle. Po piąte, jeśli w ogóle można mówić o jakimś przełomie aksjologicznym w ewolucji poglądów filozoficznych Radbrucha, to jest to raczej rok 1933 niż 1945.
EN
An axiology as a theory of values takes an important place not only in general philosophy but in legal philosophy as well. Jurisprudence and law cannot ultimately be axiologically neutralised since the relationship between law and values is of a primary, eternal, necessary and immanent character. The author discusses this phenomenon on the example of Gustav Radbruch’s legal philosophy. In his opinion when one writes about Radbruch as a philosopher of law, one should make five very important reservations: firstly, Radbruch was a representative of Neo-Kantianism; secondly, it was not Neo-Kantianism ‘in general’, but a specific variant called Baden Neo-Kantianism (south-German, Heidelberg-based); thirdly, Radbruch was not a philosopher ‘in general’, as he was interested in Neo-Kantianism transplanted to the philosophy of law; fourthly, we may currently notice a great comeback of the philosophy of Kant (e.g. J. Habermas, J. Rawls, O. Höffe), but this phenomenon should be precisely distinguished from Neo-Kantianism as the temporally and spatially determined philosophical direction of the fin de siècle period; fifthly, if one can even speak of some kind of axiological turning point in the evolution of Radbruch’s philosophical views, it is 1933 rather than 1945.
EN
In the article, Anna Musioł, by referring to the assumptions of Marian Massonius’s doctoral dissertation and taking into account the assumptions of his several smaller works, considers Massonius’s approach to the Kantian system of critical philosophy. Analyzing, inter alia, the problem of analytical and synthetic judgments, and a priori synthetic judgments, Musioł addresses the issue of the possibility of pure mathematics. She considers the problem of time and space and analyzes the ways of presenting Kantian antinomies and the theory of cognition developed in the context of idealism and realism as well as the realism of time and space. Additionally, Musioł focuses on the problem of Massonius’s moderate agnosticism and his scientific approach to philosophy. Finally, she proposes an answer to the fundamental question, Why did Massonius, like the early neo-Kantist Liebmann in 1865, challenge a return to Kant (Zurück zu Kant!) and advocate as necessary the development of a critical formula of the a priori forms of the mind?
PL
Autorka artykułu odniosła się do założeń rozprawy doktorskiej Mariana Massoniusa, a także uwzględniła założenia jego kilku pomniejszych prac dotyczących sposobu ujęcia Kantowskiego systemu filozofii krytycznej. Poddała analizie problem sądów analitycznych i syntetycznych oraz sądów syntetycznych a priori. Podjęła zagadnienie możliwości istnienia czystej matematyki, problem czasu i przestrzeni, opisała także sposoby ujęcia Kantowskich antynomii oraz teorii poznania rozwijanej w kontekście idealizmu oraz realizmu czasu i przestrzeni. Uwagę skupiła również na problemie umiarkowanego agnostycyzmu w filozofii Massoniusa oraz ujęciu filozofii w perspektywie nauki. Podjęła również wysiłek udzielenia odpowiedzi na fundamentalne pytanie: dlaczego Marian Massonius, podobnie jak w 1865 roku wczesny neokantysta Otto Liebmann, rzucał wyzwanie powrotu do Kanta (Zurück zu Kant!) oraz głosił postulat koniecznego wypracowania krytycznej formuły apriorycznych form umysłu.
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