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Kant a Newton (z perspektywy Opus postumum)

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Kupś T.
IDEA. Studia nad strukturą i rozwojem pojęć filozoficznych
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2015
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vol. 27/t.t.
203-220
EN
Kant’s attitude towards Newton is ambiguous though he owes much to him. Although Newton’s physics is a paradigm of science for Kant, he is fully aware that few appearances occur accurately according to the way described by mechanics. When he ties the principles of his philosophy with Newton’s mechanics, Kant makes a mistake, for due to the development of knowledge it began losing its absolute position in science in his day. In Opus postumum Kant recognizes the mistake and no longer refers to the rules of Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaft as the ultimate ones. Till the beginning of his work on Opus postumum Newtonian mechanics was a paradigm of science for Kant. It ceases to be so in Opus postumum, where Newton is present mainly as the object of Kant’s polemics. The progress of science, new phenomena, new methods, the development of chemistry. In Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaft chemistry was not referred to as science (since it was Newton’s mechanics that was the paradigm of science), whereas in Metaphysik der Sitten (1797) Kant defines Lavoisier’s chemistry as the only chemistry [AA VI 207]; in Anthropologie [AA VII 326] (1798) he ranks Lavoisier as high as Archimedes and Newton. New main problems appeared science which had to deal with: combustibility, origin of acids, the change of the state of matter, electricity, magnetism and – first of all – theory of heat. The main notion of the new theory of chemistry developed by Lavoisier (ether, the caloric) takes the central position also in Kant’s theory of transition (Übergang).
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Inercialita v kontextu Leibnizovy korespondence s Clarkem:

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Lochmanová K.
Teorie vědy (Theory of Science)
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2020
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vol. 42
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issue 2
201-229
EN
This study deals with a controversy between Leibniz and Clarke concerning the relativity of space. Although substantivalism, i.e. an approach treating space as a substance, is to be indicated as the main target of Leibniz’s attack, it has usually been replaced by Newtonian absolutism instead, as a proper opposition to Leibniz’s relationalism. However, such absolutism has not been defined ontologically, but dynamically, as if the difference between their conceptions consisted of a different approach to the inertiallity of motion. However, this would mean that while Leibniz intended to reduce all motion to an inertial one, Newton reduced it to a noninertial one instead, or that only one of them acknowledged the existence of noninertial motion at all. Nevertheless, none of them actually denied the existence of noninertial motion, and although all motion indeed seemed noninertial to Newton, Leibniz never responded to such a challenge in the course of their correspondence.
CS
Předmětem této studie je polemika mezi Leibnizem a Clarkem ohledně relativity prostoru. Přestože za cíl Leibnizova útoku by se v kontextu této polemiky patřilo označit v prvé řadě substantivalismus, tj. přístup nakládající s prostorem jako se substancí, obvykle bývá do opozice vůči Leibnizovu relacionalismu kladen spíše newtonovský absolutismus. Vzhledem k tomu, že takto pojatý absolutismus nebývá vymezován ontologicky, nýbrž dynamicky, musel by v takovém případě rozdíl mezi jejich pojetími spočívat v odlišném přístupu k inercialitě pohybu. To by tudíž jinými slovy znamenalo, že zatímco Leibniz veškerý pohyb redukoval na inerciální, Newton jej redukoval naopak na neinerciální, případně, že pouze jeden z nich uznával existenci neinerciálních pohybů. Existenci neinerciálních pohybů však ve skutečnosti nepopíral žádný z nich, a přestože Newtonovi se neinerciálním jevil být vskutku veškerý pohyb vůbec, Leibniz na takovou výzvu v rámci clarkovské korespondence již nereagoval.
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Newtonova metodologie a kritika mechanického materialismu:

100%
Zavadil R.
Teorie vědy (Theory of Science)
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2020
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vol. 42
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issue 2
285-304
EN
This article will introduce Isaac Newton’s fundamental methodological concepts applied for a solution concerning a question of gravity in his Principia Mathematica. The method of deduction of propositions from phenomena can be described as demonstrative induction. The main aim is to show that this method proposed by Newton explicitly contains a criticism of hypothetico-deductive methodology as an inadequate approach to the study of nature. As opposed to hypothetico-deductive method, demonstrative induction is capable of producing theories with much richer empirical and epistemological value. Delimitation against hypothetically deduced theories is closely connected with criticism of mechanical materialism, most notably in a form proposed by René Descartes. Consequently, it has led Newton to not only reject the universality of mechanical premise but also to certain level of immunization against all competitive hypothetically based theories.
CS
V tomto článku budou představeny základní aspekty metodologie Isaaca Newtona aplikované v Principia Mathematica na řešení otázky povahy gravitační síly. Metoda vyvozování propozic přírodních jevů může být označena jako demonstrativní indukce. Cílem článku je ukázat, že tato metoda, jak ji zastával Newton, v sobě explicitně obsahovala kritiku hypoteticko-deduktivní metody jako zcela neadekvátního přístupu ke zkoumání přírody. Oproti hypoteticko-deduktivní metodě je demonstrativní indukce schopna produkovat teorie empiricky i epistemologicky mnohem bohatší. Vymezení se vůči hypoteticky založeným teoriím je úzce spjato s kritikou mechanického materialismu především v podobě, v jaké ji zastával René Descartes. Ve svých důsledcích to Newtona dovedlo nejen k odmítnutí univerzálnosti mechanické premisy, ale také k určité imunizaci vůči veškerým konkurenčním hypoteticky založeným teoriím.
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Immensum v kontextu Leibnizovy korespondence s Clarkem

99%
Lochmanová K.
Studia theologica
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2020
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vol. 1
137-159
EN
This study challenges some interpretative strategies comparing Leibniz’s, or even Newton’s metaphysics of space to a Cartesian one. Not only did both Newton and Leibniz explicitly oppose Cartesian metaphysics as such, but neither of them had even the slightest intention of separating space from God, although they did not agree on the exact nature of such a space­-God relationship. Moreover, it was just a conceptual disagreement, since the identification of space with an attribute of God is to be found not only by Leibniz but also by Newton, as well as by his defender Samuel Clarke. Neither diverge the reasons why Leibniz no more than Clarke eventually argued for the category of modification rather than an attribute.
5
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Śladami „skradzionego” mózgu. Fantastyczne fabuły w romanetach Jakuba Arbesa

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Grigorowa M.
Czytanie Literatury. Łódzkie Studia Literaturoznawcze
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2017
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issue 6
207-223
EN
The article is concerned with the generic specifics of the romaneto, a literary mode established by Czech writer Jakub Arbes, taking as its vantage point the way in which fantastic storylines operate within it. Arbes’s romanettos can be characterized by the interplay of gothic writing and science fiction. The study focuses on his most wellknown romanetto Newton’s Brain (Newtonův mozek). The analysis aims at a comparative investigation of the stolen brain motif related to the popular story of Einstein’s stolen brain and its literary repercussions.
PL
Artykuł dotyczy wyznaczników romaneto – gatunku literackiego zapoczątkowanego przez czeskiego pisarza Jakuba Arbesa – przyjmując za punkt wyjścia sposób, w jaki rozwijają się w nim fantastyczne fabuły. Romaneta Arbesa charakteryzuje wzajemne oddziaływanie powieści gotyckiej i science fiction. Artykuł koncentruje się na najbardziej znanym romaneto Mózg Newtona (Newtonův mozek). Analiza skupia się na porównawczym rozpatrywaniu motywu ukradzionego mózgu w relacji do historii o ukradzionym mózgu Ensteina i jej literackich reperkusjach.
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