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Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2018
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vol. 73
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issue 9
693 – 706
EN
The paper deals with the fact-value distinction within the context of the value-free ideal of science. Drawing on some views of H. Putnam and J. Searle the author criticizes the dichotomy understanding of the fact-value relationship and argues that a strict distinction between science as a world of facts and morals as a world of values is unsustainable. Abandoning the fact-value dichotomy opens the space for rethinking the value-free ideal and for considering various types of values operating in science and influencing knowledge production. The author also tries to show that the recognition that science is free from neither cognitive nor non-cognitive values does not mean that we have to abandon the principle of objectivity. Instead of considering objectivity as an opposition to valueladeness, we should rather conceive it as connected with the social and communal character of knowledge producing practices.
EN
This paper is a critical appraisal of the most recent attempt from cognitive science in general, developmental and evolutionary biology in particular, to understand the nature and mechanisms underlying consciousness as proposed by Anton J.M. Dijker. The proposal, briefly stated, is to view consciousness as a neural capacity for objectivity. What makes the problem of consciousness philosophically and scientifically challenging may be stated as follows: If consciousness has the first-person ontology and our best scientific theories have the third-person ontology, how can we come up with a satisfactory theory? Moreover, if the reduction of one to the other is impossible, what are we supposed to do? By neglecting what Chalmers calls the “hard problem” of consciousness, Dijker’s proposal seems unable to respond to the foregoing questions, and these questions, I maintain, are the very motivations that most of us have when we inquire about consciousness.
EN
The author presents those of the views of Davidson that are connected one way or another with epistemic objectivity and the boundaries of knowledge. He discusses Davidson's conception of 'radical interpretation' together with Davidson's theory of truth, and shows how these two conceptions underlie Davidson's specific arguments. The idea of 'triangulation' of premises is also examined in order to amplify Davidson's preconception about coordination of presuppositions. Having competed this exposition the author argues that a fundamental assumption about creation and growth of holistic knowledge is communication. Which in turn indicates that the level of objectivity and the precision of true propositions by which we are affected can be enhanced in the process of communication.
EN
The claim of linguistics to be a ‘science’ is connected to its ‘objectivity’. The same is true of the philosophy of language. This implies a clear distinction between the language analyst as a ‘knowing subject’ and linguistic phenomena as an ‘external object’. The picture of everyday verbal communication contains the idea of speakers as ‘knowing subjects’ of verbal signals as ‘external objects’. Also, the correspondence theory of truth for natural languages presupposes that the language analyst is a ‘knowing subject’ who can assess the truth of objectified statements in relation to the factual world. The paper questions those ideas, and suggests that the objective orientation in linguistic analysis is a convenient fiction. It is suggested that analysts and speakers are components in a complex communicational totality, and can never be external objective observers of the verbal communication process. Consequently, a coherence theory of truth is more appropriate for language analysis of all types and for our understanding of speaker behaviour.
EN
In this paper, the author investigates the logical relation between two claims: (1) observations are theory-laden and (2) there is no empirical common ground upon which to evaluate the successive scientific theories that belong to the different paradigms. At first, he constructs an argument where (1) is the main premise and (2) is the conclusion. He argues that the term 'theory-laden' has three distinct senses: semantic, psychological and epistemological. If 'theory-laden' is understood in either epistemological or psychological senses, then the conclusion becomes a claim about people. If incommensurability is to be a claim about theories, then 'theory-laden' in the main premise should be understood in the semantic sense. The author then argues, that there is a further distinction to be drawn between the absolute and relative senses of theory-laden. The relative sense of theory-laden allows the observations that are relatively neutral between the theories under examination. He then concludes, that the argument from theory-laden only shows that foundational empiricism is not a tenable philosophical position, but it fails to show that no empirical test can decide between successive theories that belong to different paradigms.
EN
This article is a response to Howard Sankey’s (2010) ‘Witchcraft, Relativism and the Problem of the Criterion.’ It seeks to refute two central arguments that are brought forward by Sankey. First, the relativist is sceptic about norm-justification and second that naturalism could serve as a response to the relativist. The author will demonstrate, by the use of historical cases, that epistemic norms cannot be subjected to empirical evaluation without using the very norms that are the target of analysis. Finally, he will reject the assertion that the conclusion of his critique implies a form of equal validity.
EN
The attempt to build philosophy beyond metaphysics and the theory of cognition was dubbed by Paul Hofmann 'philosophy as the investigation of sense' (Sinnerforschung). The merit of Paul Hofmann's philosophical project - presented here only in its basic features - lies in overcoming a mental stereotype according to which 'sense' belongs to a group of indefinable basic concepts. Deep formal analyses of sense as such do not focus on the sense of objectivity alone, but also strive to grasp the sense of the subject as someone who is capable of an objective (objectifying) reflection on himself. Hofmann's studies on the sense of objectivity and subjectivity can enrich our existential understanding of the sense of life with new forms of the consciousness of sense. This is because a clarification of the coherence of the objective content of the concept of sense facilitates the development of subjective forms of experience-relevant consciousness of sense. However, a basic drawback of Hofmann's philosophy consists in the fact that a formal (a priori) definition of sense, even if it is a penetrating and accurate one, cannot replace what is currently experienced as senseful. The concept of the sense of life will never itself be the sense of life, but just its mental representation and a cognitive-volitive experience.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2022
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vol. 77
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issue 4
268 – 282
EN
Ideologically different alternative media define themselves in opposition to mainstream journalism, and attacks on the perceived lack of objectivity of its authors are especially common for them. This paper examines their role in the context of Habermasian concept of the public sphere and distinguishes between alternative media as institutions of the counter public or anti-public. It also presents a proposal for a typology of contemporary attacks on journalistic objectivity (emancipatory, postmodernist, populist) and analyses their main features in more detail. On the basis of standpoint theory, we conclude that members of counter publics, due to their strategic position in society, have a unique potential for constructive emancipatory critique, which can reveal that an apparently objective stance represents only the perspective of the dominant class. Concerning postmodernist and populist attacks, we, on the contrary, draw attention to the fact that these are purely antagonistic positions misused for political propaganda, especially by the representatives of the right-wing populism movements constituting an anti-public rejecting the norms of rational democratic discourse. Postmodernist critique describes objectivity as a myth and resigns on its pursuit in advance or makes demands for public broadcasting to present various perspectives without considering the criteria of truthfulness. Populist criticism of the alleged liberal bias of the mainstream media relies in turn primarily on evoking negative emotions, misinterpretations of various notions (e.g., censorship, fake news), and paranoid condemnation of elites or expert knowledge.
EN
This article provides a historical analysis of intellectual and institutional development of the early American sociology. The two most frequent historical narratives, one of the 'intellectual irrelevance', and the other of the 'institutional triumph', examining the legacy of the first American sociologists are confronted and dissected in detail. It is argued that the reconstructions of early American tradition often project current problems into historically specific contexts of the formative period. The problem of continuity/discontinuity of American sociology is interpreted in terms of a historically conditioned 'quest for objectivity and coherence'. The design of the article is historical, theoretical, and conceptual. Its main intention is to identify the key problems put forward by the first American sociologists and to address their conceptions aimed at founding a unified theoretical and methodological approach. Detailed attention is also paid to the attempts at disciplinary separation and identity formation of the early American sociology.
EN
Photography is able to express all kinds of time that man can sense and be conscious of. The author tries to show how time of nature, time of culture and psychic time co-exist in photographic image which is the result of interactions between man and his surroundings. Included is a review of photography definitions with analysis of how they relate to the notion of time. Discussed are close links between the concept of objectivity in time and photography. On the other hand he points at differences between mathematical and psychological interpretation of time and discusses an usefulness of treating photography as a model. Next the authorI ties to explain the conflict between scientific and artistic uses of photography, taking into account art manifestations at the break of 19th and 20th century where the important problem was how time and movement may be represented. He also explains the ideas of time presence in paintings and how they were adopted in photography. The problem of 'decisive moment' in photography is discussed on that occassion. Next he refers to problems of memory and to the question of how can we identyfy ourselves with the past through photography. In conclusion the author states that defining photography as a model of time or reality misleads us in some respects and finds the term expression much better to explain how time can be felt in our dynamic relations with photography image.
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EN
This article treats of an issue of Kant's metaphysics of perception as a specific sphere where concept of sense perception within transcendental philosophy seems to be rooted into a wider context of metaphysical presuppositions. The text is an epitome of a few Kant's aporias which appear when he does not notice a metaphysical background which constitutes basic relation between subject and object in sense perception.
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