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1

INTERPRETÁCIA – MAĽOVANIE – POZOROVANIE. MAĽBA RASTISLAVA PODOBU: POZOROVANIE

100%
Šedík M.
ARS
|
2023
|
vol. 56
|
issue 1
63-71
EN
The paper analyses mutual relationships between three processes from the title on the example of three paintings by Slovak painter Rastislav Podoba. The analysis of the painting Observation from 2011 leads to the need for a deeper examination of the character of relations between observation, painting, and interpretation. The central problem is the problem of observation which leads to questioning the place and the role of theoretical reflection in the creation, experience, and perception of the work of art. The standard philosophical approach to interpreting as an ascription of meaning is questioned. Finally, the paper proposes a different approach to interpretation that could better explain running processes in analysed works.
2

THEORY-LADEN OBSERVATIONS AND EMPIRICAL EQUIVALENCE OF THEORIES

100%
Bielik L.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
|
2013
|
vol. 68
|
issue 7
562 – 570
EN
The paper examines Dickson’s (1999) question how it is possible to hold the theory-laden observation thesis and, at the same time, to uphold the thesis of the empirical equivalence of theories. After the elucidation of several semantic distinctions we propose the definitions of empirical equivalence of expressions and theories, respectively. In the next step, we scrutinize the theory-ladenness thesis more closely and propose three distinct, but related specifications of it. Finally, we reconsider the two theses in question order to show that they could be interpreted as fully compatible.
3

PREDMETY, KAUZALITA A VEDECKÝ REALIZMUS

88%
Schmidt M.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
|
2010
|
vol. 65
|
issue 7
643-651
EN
There is a growing pessimism about objects based on the view that objects are mysterious un-observables. According to this line of thought objects can disturb our senses or measuring devices only indirectly, via properties or relations - only properties or relations are observables, not the objects per se. As a result, inaccessible objects open a gap between science and reality and scientific realism is lost. Defenders of objects may respond that the scope of this reasoning is rather limited, because its truth is restricted to very specific views of objects and scientific realism. The paper is concerned with three forms of scientific realism confronting them with three basic ontologies of objects. It appears, then, that seen from the perspective of scientific realism the least problematic picture of objects is given by the Spinozian conception of objects and their modes. However, even this conception faces some difficulties and it seems that the traditional metaphysics is not able to provide a scientifically unproblematic notion of object.
4

THEORY-LADEN OBSERVATION AND INCOMMENSURABILITY

88%
Elgin M.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
|
2008
|
vol. 15
|
issue 1
3-19
EN
In this paper, the author investigates the logical relation between two claims: (1) observations are theory-laden and (2) there is no empirical common ground upon which to evaluate the successive scientific theories that belong to the different paradigms. At first, he constructs an argument where (1) is the main premise and (2) is the conclusion. He argues that the term 'theory-laden' has three distinct senses: semantic, psychological and epistemological. If 'theory-laden' is understood in either epistemological or psychological senses, then the conclusion becomes a claim about people. If incommensurability is to be a claim about theories, then 'theory-laden' in the main premise should be understood in the semantic sense. The author then argues, that there is a further distinction to be drawn between the absolute and relative senses of theory-laden. The relative sense of theory-laden allows the observations that are relatively neutral between the theories under examination. He then concludes, that the argument from theory-laden only shows that foundational empiricism is not a tenable philosophical position, but it fails to show that no empirical test can decide between successive theories that belong to different paradigms.
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