Full-text resources of CEJSH and other databases are now available in the new Library of Science.
Visit https://bibliotekanauki.pl

Results found: 2

first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last

Search results

Search:
in the keywords:  ONTOLOGICAL COMMITMENT
help Sort By:

help Limit search:
first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last
1

FICTION OF FICTIONALISM

100%
Zouhar M.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
|
2017
|
vol. 72
|
issue 8
603 – 615
EN
Fictionalism about fictional entities is an antirealist approach. It suggests that statements of literary criticism are to be understood in the same way as are fictional statements. The latter are naturally understood as being uttered in a pretend mode, i.e. not seriously. Fictionalism has it that the same holds for the former. It is sometimes argued that this is unfaithful to our actual linguistic practice with critical statements. The author ś aim is to strengthen this objection by pointing to some unwelcome consequences of the fictionalise position. It seems plausible that our practice with critical statements allows us: a) to supplement their utterances by remarks such as “And I mean it” or “What I have just said is true”; b) to report on their utterances by using statements such as ‘X asserted that C’ (where X is a speaker and C is a proposition expressed by a critical statement); c) to ask for arguments that would support the truth of critical statements; d) to agree or disagree with other speakers over the truth of critical statements. If fictionalism were correct, our practice with critical statements would not permit moves of these kinds.
2

W.V.O. Quine on What There Is

88%
Grobler A.
Przegląd Filozoficzny. Nowa Seria
|
2008
|
vol. 17
|
issue 4(68)
137-145
EN
The paper considers Quine's maxim: 'To be is to be the value of a variable'. After some remarks on the actual and possible Polish translations of ontological commitment, an analysis of the doctrine follows. In conclusion, Quine's restriction of ontology to the possible referents of terms, to the exclusion of the possible referents of predicates, is claimed unjustified, both in the light of subsequent development of Quine's thought and in the light of empiricism in general. Next, an attempt is made to account for the question of the referents of predicates in the framework of empiricism. A solution is sketched in terms of a revision of the so-called syntagmatic presuppositions. In this account, Quine's maxim is generalized to 'to be is to satisfy a syntagmatic presupposition'.
first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last
JavaScript is turned off in your web browser. Turn it on to take full advantage of this site, then refresh the page.