First I present a puzzle involving two opaque objects and a shadow cast on the ground. After I offer a solution to this puzzle by identifying which of the objects is causally responsible for the shadow, I argue that this case poses a counterexample to David Lewis’s latest counterfactual account of causation, known as his influence theory. Along the way, I discuss preemption, over determination, absence causation, and trumping preemption.
Causal overdetermination - i.e. instances in which x, y, and z all occur and intuitively the occurrence of x alone is sufficient for the occurrence of z and the occurrence of y alone is sufficient for the occurrence of z - has been long considered as a problem for counterfactual analyses of causation. Intuitively, we want to say both x and y caused z, but standard Lewisian counterfactual analysis yields the result that neither x nor y caused z. David Lewis, himself, suggested that overdetermination ought to be left as 'spoils to the victor'. The author shows how, if we modify Lewis' account of events slightly, we can bring counterfactual analysis in line with our intuitions about overdetermination.
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