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EN
The assessment of the Round Table was extraordinarily stable. The political environments accepting the Polish Third Republic, taking part in ruling the country, are generally positive about the talks between the government of the Polish Third Republic and the opposition. In 2014, even the representatives of “Prawo i Sprawiedliwość” (Law and Justice) party maintained the opinion from the previous years, formulated by Jarosław Kaczyński and Lech Kaczyński, that the Round Table, as a tactical action, was a necessary undertaking at that time in history. The negative assessment of the event were characteristic of non-parliament parties and ones with small social support. The following anniversaries of the start of the debate were a good opportunity to mark one’s difference from the establishment by negation. Change of the assessment was a result of the evolution of the situation in Poland. Hard political fight in the Polish Third Republic caused a change of positions e.g. with regard to former political opponents or even enemies. The verbal change of position of W. Frasyniuk towards gen. Jaruzelski can only be explained with the attack of the Jarosław Kaczyński establishment on the politicians of the Democratic Union and Freedom Union. The environments reluctant to PiS for the same reasons forgot that the government led by Tadeusz Mazowiecki could only take place because of the activity of Jarosław Kaczyński. Many of the evaluations, both on the side of the Round Table architects and its opponents had no connection to the subject of the proceedings.
EN
The institution-legal model of the chair of the President of PPR, designed within the Round Table understanding, was characterised by a strong regime position and many competences, among which an important part took a shape of prerogatives. An important role in shaping the political profile of the one-man head of state was played by political decisions, in light of which this organ was supposed to be given to a representative of a communist party and as a consequence serve to control the transformations in a country, as well as keep the alliances and international commitments. In the catalogue of fourteen ruling and independent competences a special role has been played by the right to present the parliament with commissioning and decommissioning the leader of the Councils of Ministers, a right that has been used by gen. Jaruzelski twice during his presidency. In the light of the factorial decisive analysis, the personal choices of the president, made in the conditions of the increasing political crisis, were dictated by trying to secure the interest of the government-coalition camp, but with regard to the newly accepted rules of political rivalry. The president saw a key role for his home party in the initiated process of political and economic changes, but did not try to preserve the political monopoly of the communist party, and in consequence to keep a part of the opposition from ruling. He was led by a need to achieve social support for the reforms and aimed at realising it with the workflow created for the decisive situations, the immanent part of which was splitting responsibility to other subjects and creating multipersonal decisive centres.
EN
A modification of Polish political system without undermining the predominant role of Polish United Workers’ Party was declared in the resolutions of the Round Table agreement. However, the election of June and following agreement between “Solidarity”, United People’s Party and Alliance of Democrats changed this situation. The coalition between “Solidarity”, United People’s Party and Alliance of Democrats was above all realistic and played a key role in the process of transition from authoritarianism to democracy.
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PL
Celem artykułu jest przedstawienie wyników analizy ostatnich miesięcy funkcjonowania GUKPiW oraz OUKPiW między styczniem 1989 a kwietniem 1990 r. Cezura początkowa to wejście w życie ustawy z 23 grudnia 1988 r. o działalności gospodarczej (tzw. ustawy Wilczka). Cezurę końcową stanowi ustawa z 11 kwietnia 1990 r. o uchyleniu ustawy o kontroli publikacji i widowisk, zniesieniu organów tej kontroli oraz o zmianie ustawy prawo prasowe. Opracowanie stanowi próbę odpowiedzi na pytania: W jaki sposób liberalizacja prawa w Polsce w latach 1989–1990 wpłynęła na pracę GUKPiW oraz OUKPiW? Jaka była skala ingerencji w treść prasy, publikacji i widowisk w analizowanym okresie? Jakie treści stanowiły podstawę ingerencji cenzorskich? Z jakimi problemami, w związku z wykonywaną pracą, mieli do czynienia cenzorzy z GUKPiW oraz OUKPiW w latach 1989–1990?
EN
The goal of this article is to present the results of analysis concerning last months of functioning of the Main Authority for Control of Publications and Spectacles (Główny Urząd Kontroli Publikacji i Widowisk) and Regional Authority for Control of Publications and Spectacles (Okręgowy Urząd Kontroli Publikacji i Widowisk), between January 1989 and April 1990. The fi rst crucial date is the introduction of the law dated 23th of December 1988 on economic activity (so called Wilczek’s law). The fi nal date is the law dated 11th of April 1990 on repeal of the law on control of publications and spectacles, removal of control organs and amendment to the act press law. The essay undertakes to answer the following questions: In what way the liberalization of the law in Poland in years 1989–1990 infl uenced the work of GUKPiW and OUKPiW? To what extent was the content of the press, publications and spectacles interfered in the analyzed period?
EN
The situation in Poland at the end of 1988 as well as the dynamic changes in the first half of 1989 were a subject of many analyses in West Germany conducted by politicians and trade unionists. First of all, they were interested in the development of opposition’s power and also the condition of internal reforms. On this base they tried to predict directions of the future of Polish development. In West Germany the following questions were raised: What will the Polish political scene look like? What will democracy and Solidarity be in Poland? Furthermore, West German observers were tracking political “trends” of newly created political and social organizations. From the analysis emerges not only a picture of the country’s internal division and complicated domes­tic relations, but also a lack of a positive programme, internal tensions and contradictory interests. In that crucial time, public consciousness of the importance of changes had accompanied to passivity great part of society. Foreign observers more than once expressed anxiety that Poland could miss the opportunity which arose from the citizens’ mobilizations and the Solidarity movement from the beginning of the 1980s.
PL
Stefan Kisielewski związał się z „Tygodnikiem Powszechnym” na blisko 45 lat i należał do najpopularniejszych redaktorów tego pisma. Przyjaźń jego i Jerzego Turowicza nie należała do najłatwiejszych, co wynikało nie tyko z różnych wizji roli, jaką powinien odgrywać „Tygodnik Powszechny”, ale ze swoistości Kisielewskiego. Współpracę z tygodnikiem zakończył w 1989 r., choć nie wycofał swojego nazwiska ze stopki redakcyjnej i ku zaskoczeniu wielu zaczął regularnie udzielać wywiadów telefonicznych tygodnikowi „Wprost”.
EN
Stefan Kisielewski worked for „Tygodnik Powszechny” for nearly 45 years. He was one of the most popular editors of the paper. His friendship with Jerzy Turowicz was not the easiest one. This was due to their different visions of the role that „Tygodnik Powszechny” was to play, but also due to Kisielewski’s very character. He left the weekly in 1989, however, he did not delete his name from the publisher’s imprint. To the surprise of many people he began to regularly give telephone interviews to another weekly paper –„Wprost”.
7
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EN
It might be argued that the election of 4 June 1989 was of essential importance for the future of Poland. The agreement reached at the ‘Round Table’ merely provided for the presence of democratic opposition in Parliament, allowing it to exercise some control of the apparatus of power. The intention of that concession was to pass onto the opposition a share of responsibility for the state. However, as a result of the election that followed, the ruling communists had to actually hand down power to their opponents. This paper describes the efforts that the Citizens’ Committee in the State Election Commission made to protect the integrity of the election. It also describes the process of electoral law formation in Poland, as well as the development of the legal culture of society.
PL
Można postawić tezę, że wybory z 4 czerwca 1989 r. miały dla przyszłości Polski znaczenie zasadnicze. Porozumienie zawarte przy Okrągłym Stole umożliwiało opozycji demokratycznej jedynie obecność w parlamencie i tym samym kontrolę aparatu władzy. Miało też przerzucić na opozycję część odpowiedzialności za państwo. Wynik wyborów spowodował, że obóz komunistyczny musiał władzę oddać w ręce dotychczasowej opozycji. W artykule przedstawiono wysiłki przedstawicieli Komitetu Obywatelskiego w Państwowej Komisji Wyborczej zmierzające do zabezpieczenia rzetelności wyborów. Jest to jednocześnie obraz powstawania w Polsce prawa wyborczego charakteryzującego demokratyczne państwo oraz tworzenia się kultury prawnej społeczeństwa.  
PL
Przygotowania do Okrągłego Stołu i negocjacje między stroną społeczną (Solidarnością) a rządową (PZPR) w 1989 r. wywoływały różne krytyczne oceny w kręgach opozycji demokratycznej. Okrągły Stół przez wiele lat był punktem spornym debat historycznych i politycznych. Artykuł prezentuje sposoby argumentacji politycznych przeciwników Okrągłego Stołu – radykałów, którzy w latach 1988–1989 kontestowali linię działania Lecha Wałęsy i jego otoczenia.
EN
The Round Table (February – April 1989) has been a thorny issue for many years, igniting debates among historians and politicians of the Third Polish Republic, and opinions about it – favourable or unfavourable – corresponded with the opinions of general achievements of the transformation of the Polish political system. Already during the negotiations, the Round Table talks caused controversies and deepened personal and ideological divisions within Solidarność and the opposition. The end of 1988 brought about the emergence of a tendency to contest the line of action of Wałęsa and his circle, and especially rejected the need of Round Table talks with the communist government. The tendency was shared by political groups originating from Solidarność and newly formed political parties, numerous but weak, existing on the margin. The article presents the most important arguments of political opponents of the Round Table talks – the radicals of the crucial time of changes in 1988 and 1989. The author answers the question whether it is right to use the term “radicalism” and attempts to determine the scope of a social base of radicals; he points out that many arguments put forward by the opponents of the negotiations were also presented by journalists and oppositionists supporting Lech Wałęsa. He thus advances a thesis that it was not political concepts that distinguished radicals from the rest of the opposition, but their specific psychological attitude; this, however, requires further study.
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