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Austin rejected the objectification of “meanings” and was also critical of the identification of meaning with truth-conditions. Much of his work appears to be inspired by a conception of meaning as use. In particular, apparently at least, his “performative utterances” are utterances whose understanding amounts to the understanding of their use. But Austin did not endorse the tendency, common in Ordinary Language Philosophy, to explain the meaning of linguistic expressions in terms of their use alone. His distinction between locutionary meaning and illocutionary force was designed to avoid such a reduction. But it is unclear whether (and if so, how) speech act theory can escape paying the price of a new objectification of meaning (as consisting of “propositions” to which “forces” apply).
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