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PHENOMENAL CONCEPTS AND PHYSICAL FACTS: A DIALOGUE WITH MARY

100%
Kiymaz T.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
|
2019
|
vol. 74
|
issue 10
797 – 807
EN
This is a dialogue between an opponent of the phenomenal concept strategy and Mary from Frank Jackson’s knowledge argument. In this dialogue, Mary, who has complete physical knowledge about what it is like to see red, but has never seen red, is a physicalist and she defends the phenomenal concept strategy against her interlocutor’s objections. In the end, none of them is able to convince the other, but their conversation, through considerations of different versions of the knowledge argument and different applications of the phenomenal concept strategy, reveals the most basic disagreement, or clash of intuitions, they have. The implied conclusion of the dialogue is that the disagreement on the success of phenomenal concept strategy as a physicalist response to the knowledge argument cannot be resolved unless this particular clash of intuitions is resolved.
2

DOES THE CONCEIVABILITY OF ZOMBIES ENTAIL THEIR POSSIBILITY?

88%
Polcyn K.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
|
2020
|
vol. 27
|
issue 3
395 – 410
EN
According to the two-dimensional argument against materialism, developed by David Chalmers, the conceivability of zombies entails primary possibility, and the primary possibility of zombies entails further secondary possibility. I argue that the move from the conceivability to primary possibility of zombies is unjustified. Zombies are primarily impossible despite being conceivable if the corresponding phenomenal and microphysical concepts have coinciding primary intensions (refer to the same properties in all possible worlds considered as actual) despite being distinct concepts. But there is no good reason to think that phenomenal and microphysical concepts cannot have coinciding primary intensions despite being distinct concepts. As I argue, this conclusion follows from reflection on special cognitive features of phenomenal concepts.
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