In this paper the author demonstrates the understanding of original value cognition in the philosophy of M. Scheler and D. von Hildebrand. Scheler distinguishes between the feeling of value, the emotional reaction of response, preferring and 'placing after' and the act of love. In 'Die Idee der sittlichen Handlung' Hildebrand writes about the value feeling, the recognition of value (unfeeling) and the knowledge (that something is valuable). In 'Sittlichkeit und ethische Werterkenntnis' he distinguishes between value feeling, the seeing of value, and value knowledge (Kennen). Value response, so typical for Hildebrand, is not the cognition of value but only its basis.
This paper examines some of the difficulties and problems connected with hedonistic values. According to Hildebrand, pleasure is not a value at all. According to Scheler, Hartmann and Ingarden, it is a value but its axiological position is low. I consider two general issues. First, I analyze the relation between hedonistic values and other kinds of values. Secondly, I examine the ontological specificity of hedonistic values. I attempt to prove that hedonistic values have a true axiological character. I also show that pleasure is an element of every value-perception.
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