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1

PROSPECTS FOR EXPERIMENTAL PHILOSOPHICAL LOGIC

100%

Joaquin J. J.

Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu

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2019

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vol. 26

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issue 2

265 – 286

EN

This paper focuses on two interrelated issues about the prospects for research projects in experimental philosophical logic. The first issue is about the role that logic plays in such projects; the second involves the role that experimental results from the cognitive sciences play in them. I argue that some notion of logic plays a crucial role in these research projects, and, in turn, the results of these projects might inform substantive debates in the philosophy of logic.

2

NESKORÝ WITTGENSTEIN O LOGICKÝCH PRAVIDLÁCH

88%

Čana T.

Filozofia (Philosophy)

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2011

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vol. 66

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issue 2

109-121

EN

In his remarks from the late period, Ludwig Wittgenstein is frequently concerned with so-called external roots of our logical operations. He asks questions like: 'How is possible anything like logical necessity?'‚ How is possible anything like following a logical rule under normal circumstances?'‚ Where is the compelling force of a logical proof coming from?'; etc. In the philosophical community, it is generally accepted that the late Wittgenstein's remarks deal with these questions, but the philosophical motivation behind these remarks is still not clear. Instead, there is a growing disagreement among various interpretations over these remarks. The present consideration is built upon the belief that Wittgenstein's remarks try to communicate a new sense to us. The author argues that, contrary to the generally accepted view, there is a new and positive sense in these remarks. His aim in this paper is to clarify the philosophical motivation behind them.

3

Filozofia logiki i formalna LOGIKA NIESYMPLIFIKACYJNA

88%

Grzegorczyk A.

Zagadnienia Naukoznawstwa

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2011

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vol. 47

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issue 4(190)

445-451

EN

Starting from philosophical intuitive conception of the relation of a kind of equivalence (called here perceptive equivalence), which is stronger that the normal equivalence (considered in the classical, 2-valued, propositional calculus, and in this paper called speculative). Then an axiomatization of a part of the classical logical calculus is proposed. It is called: non-symplificational propositional logic.

4

WITTGENSTEIN ON THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL STATUS OF LOGIC

75%

Čana T.

Filozofia (Philosophy)

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2013

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vol. 68

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issue 4

309 – 318

EN

The problem of the epistemological status of logic is the core of Wittgenstein’s philosophy of logic. There are two known solutions to this problem: apriorism and aposteriorism. It appears that one solution or the other must be true. Scholars believe that the early Wittgenstein’s approach to the epistemological status of logic is a radical version of apriorism. The aim of the paper is to provide an adequate reconstruction of the later Wittgenstein’s solution. The main question is: Provided that there is a disagreement between the two Wittgenstein’s views of the epistemological status of logic, do we need to consider his later position as an example of aposteriorism? Our answer is: No. The later Wittgenstein’s position questions the conceptual framework of the whole philosophical discussion. His remarks on the epistemology of logic are directed against both apriorism and aposteriorism in the philosophy of logic.

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2 Filozofia (Philosophy)

1 Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu

1 Zagadnienia Naukoznawstwa

2 Čana T.

1 Grzegorczyk A.

1 Joaquin J. J.

1 2019

1 2013

2 2011

PROSPECTS FOR EXPERIMENTAL PHILOSOPHICAL LOGIC

NESKORÝ WITTGENSTEIN O LOGICKÝCH PRAVIDLÁCH

Filozofia logiki i formalna LOGIKA NIESYMPLIFIKACYJNA

WITTGENSTEIN ON THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL STATUS OF LOGIC