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True or False World - the Devaluation of Rationality

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The article is an attempt to present the difficulties encountered by people who want to apply rationality in science at any price. The text discusses an approach which competes with rationality and suggests the participation of an element belonging to the mythical - metaphysical order in forming scientific theories. The authoress wonders where the boundary between the true and false world (as understood by Nietzsche) runs. She tries to answer the question - is metaphysics actually ballast which makes the development of science impossible?
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The paper presents an attempt at synthetic expression of main ideas forming the scientific output of Professor Janusz Gockowski. His works are interpreted as multi-layered attempt at forming a rationalistic utopia that would provide science, as a specifically human capacity of aspiring to knowledge, a due place in institutional and axiological structure of contemporary world. This project consists of various layers: critical, diagnostic, therapeutic and descriptive-analytic that complement each other and form together an original and impressive work.
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INTEGRAL NATURALISM

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Relationship between science and philosophy is analysed and the conclusions are mainly baased on Quine's and Lelas' conceptions of naturalising. It is argued that between the exclusion of science from philosophy and complete reduction of philosophy to science, there is a third possible way, of a dialogue character, taking science indirectly, selectively, and - after conceptual transformations - as a source of philosophical theories that remain autonomous,
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A Special Character of Economics as a Discipline

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The paper describes specific, rarely met in other sciences, features of economics in the second half of the 20th century. The analysis of general positions which had appeared in the philosophy of science makes us conclude that economics was hardly influenced by them. From the point of view of philosophical foundations, economics remained conservative and did not change much since the middle of the century. In fact, the evolution of economics was limited because new economic theories included many elements of old theories. The paper ends with the explanation of what made economics to develop in this specific way.
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The paper is composed of three parts. In the first part the authoress deals with the criteria of demarcating science elaborated by philosophers of science, in the second she discusses the presence of demarcation within science itself, and in the third part she refers to the external socio-economical and political system as a source for still different criteria of demarcation.
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The Rationality of Science on the Meta-metalevel

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In this paper, the authoressI defends the thesis that it is impossible to resolve the problem of rationality of science on a meta-metalevel, which practically means that the debate between classical and non-classical conceptions of rationality is unable to solve the problem but generates new paradoxes. Instead of going endlessly 'up', it would be better to go 'down' and ask, if philosophers of science properly recognized the object level on which scientific practices took place. If the debate between so called classical and non-classical conceptions of rationality of science took the form of radical antinomy, it means that it would not be epistemically important anymore and it could not be continued in this form. If so, it is time for a new solution, a new Copernican turn.
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Criticism and the Models of Scientific Rationality

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In the article, the authoress mainly discusses the problem of the relationship between epistemic fallibilism and the form of falsificationism endorsed by Popper and Lakatos. According to Popperian-Lakatosian view, it is demanded that methodological rules of assessment be unified and applicable to every fully articulated theoretical system. At the same time, falsificationism is expected to reflect and specify some of the central ideas of fallibilism. Fallibilism is in turn based on the assumption that each part of science should be put to continuous criticism. In other words, it is required that no element of the discourse be placed beyond the scope of evaluative procedures. However, as the analysis reveals, falsificationism and fallibilism can hardly go together. Whereas fallibilism states the absolute corrigibility of every piece of knowledge, falsificationism presupposes uncritical acceptance of certain statements and may result in dogmatic rejection of some parts of science. As a result, the model of scientific rationality built upon fallibilism must in important respects differ from that based on falsificationism.
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The Soft Rationality in Science

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The paper is an attempt to give an explanation of the existence of irrational elements (irrational theories, irrational theoretical assumptions, and irrational interpretations of experiment) in modern science. Author's claim is that there are internal (connected with scientific reason) and external (social and cultural) reasons of scientific irrationality. The paper presents several examples of scientific irrationality.
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The paper examines questions which are essential for philosophical interpretation of the notion 'philosophical logic' (PhL): How is PhL possible and relevant?What is PhL called? For what scientific and practical reasons did the term 'PhL' become popular? The common usage of the term 'PhL' and the common objections against it. Is PhL a kind of logic? What are the relations between PhL, logic and philosophy? We consider four meaningful interpretations of the term 'PhL': PhL as a collection of logical systems in connection with philosophy; 'PhL' as logic in (of) philosophy; 'PhL' as a philosophy of logic, the latter is the main goal of the second part of this paper. The development of logic is evaluated in respect to the popular conceptions of philosophy of science (Kuhn's concept of scientific revolutions and Lacatos' concept of proliferation connected to the problem of monism and pluralism in logic). We also survey two different revolutions in modern logic: a transition from traditional to classical logic and a transition from classical to non-classical logic. The reason for both revolutions was that the development of practical applications of logic has gone ahead in relation to logical theory. We propose the idea of 'logical neofundamentalism', concerning the problem of the universality of logic and classifications of logical systems.
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This short paper is devoted to questions concerning the essence and role of cognitive values whose realization is deemed a guarantee of the rationality of science. In this context, the author quotes theses formulated (in philosophy of science) by different authors (Hacking, Walczak) - expressing the positions that defend the idea of scientific rationality (e.g. logical empiricism and critical rationalism) as well as those that undermine it (e.g. historical and sociological relativism) - and identify cognitive values connected with particular theses. In the final part of the paper, encouraging to the discussion concerning cognitive values in science, he suggests a reflection on the problem whether a descriptivist or a expressivist evaluative terms meaning conception works in favour of any of the sides in the philosophical issue about scientific rationality.
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Lucio Russo's Concept of Science

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Russo offers a concept of science that is anti-empirical according to his declarations. However, he permanently includes empirical elements in his models of natural sciences, and even of mathematics. A tension between empirical and non-empirical character of science in the Russo's model leads it to non-consistency and even to contradiction.
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In the paper I put to analysis the reticulated model of scientific change, introduced by Larry Laudan in his Science and Values, aiming at reconstruction of the concept of rationality it presupposes. In elaborating on the model's structure I draw on Jurgen Habermas' s theory of speech acts and discuss the concept of instrumental rationality. I argue that in the area of philosophy of science, the model heralds the demise of a classical ideal of rationality, based solely on the notion of justification of judgments. My claim is that reticulated model demands that the analytical paradigm, the scope of which remains confined to a semantic dimension of science, should be replaced with a properly understood instrumental model of rationality, displaying both semantic and pragmatic facet of cognition.
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Cartesian Metaphysics as a Philosophy of Physics

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The aim of the paper is to present and stress the role of Cartesian metaphysics in establishing the bases of modern physics. It is usually undervalued, that the originality of Cartesian idea rests on the fact that the French philosopher approaches metaphysics not traditionally, as a theory of reality, but as a theory referring to the bases of physics, being is fact the theory of reality itself. In this perspective, such basic metaphysical issues as the problem of God or soul receive completely untraditional sense. In Cartesian system God is necessary not as a base of reality but as a guarrantor of truthfulness of our geometric, mechanistic knowledge of the world. The soul, however, if it indeed is a serious issue here, it is certainly not because of its immortality or substantial separation from the body but only as mind which is a place of formation of the above-mentioned picture of reality. Definitely, however, more important issue for the philosophy of physics is the problem of God and God's veracity. Referring the theological argument while searching for bases of veracity of physical recognition Descartes created not as much positive metaphysical idea as he rather gave an expression of his deep doubts in the question of certitude and veracity of physics, doubts which couldnot be cancelled by modern physics. At least this look at his philosophy seems to be at least more interesting from today's point of view.
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The paper is concerned with the fundamental dichotomies that organize the ways of investigations in today's philosophy of science: normative versus naturalized epistemology, context of justification versus context of discovery, rationality versus irrationality, theory versus experience. It is shown that these dichotomies are not sustainable. They result in inadequate, even false images of science.
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The subject of the paper is an analysis of a programme of sociology of scientific knowledge, initiated by Florian Znaniecki in his book 'The Social Role of the Man of Knowledge' (1940) and his other works in science of science. Author points out to a series of significant affinities between Znaniecki's sociological theses and the claims of the philosophy of science put forward by Karl Popper. He argues that, despite the fact that Popper, an epistemologist, stressed that 'the course of human history is to a large extent dependent upon the growth of human knowledge', while Znaniecki's approach may be summarised by saying that 'the growth of human knowledge is to a large extent dependent upon the course of human history', both of these perspectives complement each other and provide a fuller understanding of human knowledge. Through a comparison of Znaniecki's view of science with Jacob Bronowski's conception of scientific knowledge, the author also points out some inconsistencies in Znaniecki's understanding of science, arguing that his sociology of knowledge did not free itself from a philosophical dimension, as Znaniecki thought it had done, and remains only a provisional construction. For, despite his efforts, his conception has stumbled upon significant limitations of the sociological method in explanation of the growth of knowledge, which Znaniecki attempted to overcome by encroaching upon the areas of epistemology, logics, and psychology of knowledge.
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Rationality of Science?

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The problem of rationality of science has been explored by many philosophical and methodological schools in the 20th century. In 'The Rationality of Science. Problems, Conceptions and Arguments' Monika Walczak examines two models of rationality: Classical Concepts of the Rationality of Science (CCRS) and Non-classical Concepts of the Rationality of Science (NCRS). According to the adherents of CCRS (e.g. logical empiricism and the Lvov - Warsaw School), rationality of science is characterized by: demarcationism, the idea of scientific theories as deductive structure, scientific realism, objectivism, reconstructionistic strategy, epistemological fundamentalism, the maximalistic idea of logical consistency and universalistic understanding of this criteria. For the adherents of NCRS, in contrast to CCRS, rationality of science is characterized by: anti-demarcationism, pluralistic vision of the bearers of scientific rationality, scientific antirealism, anti-objectivism, descriptionistic strategy, epistemological anti-fundamentalism, the minimalistic idea of logical consistency and pluralistic understanding of the criteria of rationality. Rationality of Science. Problems, Conception and Arguments is clear, informed, stimulating discussion that will be interesting to a wide range of philosophers, methodologist, scientist and others concerned with the status of rationality of science.
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The author attempts at analyzing the question of subjectivity in the context of broadly defined epistemology and methodology of humanities and science. Employing theories of I. Wallerstein and B. Latour, the athor discusses transformations in understanding and interpreting the concept of the subject.
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The paper analyses the semantic theories of empirical sciences, mainly their newest, structuralist version from the philosophical perspective. It is proved that structuralism interprets in various ways its fundamental categories: of model, of empirical theory, and of satisfaction relation. Some of the interpretations are inconsistent with the initial basis, that is, with the logical model theory. In constructing the conception of empirical theory, structuralists transgresses in a special way the logical model theory.
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This paper tries to reconstruct the way Bruno Latour thinks of science, by concentrating mainly on his book Pandora's Hope, which is applicable for this intention, because of the multiplicity of its topics. Latour wants to overcome the dichotomy of constructivism and naturalism. This ambition will be demonstrated on some of his key concepts. The idea of circulating reference is meant to be the replacement of the subject-object dichotomy. He also has a peculiar answer to the question whether the objects of science are fabricated or real. Latour's approach also makes it possible to judge scientific research programmes. The traditional dichotomy of extemalism and intemalism in the sociology of science is replaced by Latour by the concept of the circulatory system of science. Latour's theory owes much to his anthropological perspective on science.
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An excellent book recently published by Michał Heller 'is devoted to the struggle with the most difficult questions one may put to the universe' (p. 237) . It brings to the layperson a presentation of the main cosmological hypotheses discussed nowadays at the scientific forum and focuses on the difficulties addressed in these proposals. At the same time Heller presents in this work his philosophical-cum-theological views on other issues, particularly on the question of the existence of God and of the relation of God to the empirical reality. Moreover, he encompasses in his purview some methodological questions concerning empirical cognition. The authoress concentrates on the philosophical-cum-theological contents of the book and criticizes some of Heller's views by contrasting them with the atheistic standpoint.
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