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EN
The author argues that Plantinga's Proper Function and Evolutionary arguments fail against liberal naturalism defined in a broad sense as the view that 'here aren't any supernatural beings'. The former argument can be interpreted in at least three ways: deductively, inductively and theistically. None of these, however, is successful. The latter argument suffers from several deficiencies of which two major ones are: (1) The unlikelihood of the reliability of our cognitive faculties, given (liberal) naturalism and (varieties of) evolutionism, is not shown. (2) Agnosticism with respect to the likelihood of our cognitive reliability is insufficient to establish the self-defeating character of naturalistic evolutionism, unless it is also shown that the belief in this reliability lacks an independent warrant. The last condition has been neglected by Plantinga.
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Współczesne postaci ontologii. Od Hegla do Quine’a

38%
Filo-Sofija
|
2012
|
vol. 12
|
issue 1(16)
9-38
PL
The article presents some prominent figures of modern ontology from Hegel to nowadays. It takes into account the diverse forms of ontology in three distinct trends of philosophy: Hegelianism, phenomenology and analytical philosophy. Each of these trends has its own subject, aim and method of ontology. The subject of Hegel’s ontology is understood as something originally undefined, being on the border of nonentity. When presented this way, the subject presupposes a dialectic method of ontology, which the German philosopher defines as “the consciousness of the form of the inner self-movement of the content of logic.” It is based on reflection, which, according to Hegel, is both a tool and medium to knowledge, though in his Phenomenology of spirit he identifies it as being by itself. Thus understood ontology is to be found both in the works of Hegel’s students and his critics (S. Kierkegaard, M. Heidegger, J.-P. Sartre). In Husserl’s phenomenology it is not reflection but eidetic intuition (Wesensschau) that is the main method of ontology, and its subject is not just being, but the essence – a correlate to the eidetic intuition. To Husserl’s phenomenological presumptions referred, among others, N. Hartman and R. Ingarden, who understood ontology as eidetic analysis of ideas. Though Heidegger saw the problem differently: the goal of ontology is defining the meaning of Being (Sinn vom Sein), its method is phenomenological. In none of the approaches was the subject of ontology understood in a classic way as Being, but rather as a certain form of its representation, as the content of consciousness (ideas), or as a certain sense for a definite subject. A different approach to ontology is observable within analytic philosophy, which involved lots of different personalities and different traditions, such as the new positivism, scholastics (J.M. Bocheński, E. Nieznański), Leibnizian rationalism (A. Plantinga), empiricism and pragmatism (W.O. Quine, P. Strawson). Remarkable achievements in ontology belong to some Polish logicians, representatives of the Polish school of analytic philosophy, such as S. Leśniewski and T. Kotarbiński. Leśniewski was the founder of formal ontology – logical calculus of names, while Kotarbiński discovered nominalistic and materialistic ontology – reism (from Latin: res ‘thing’) based on Leśniewski’s ontology. The main thesis of reism was the claim that “every object is a body.”
3
38%
Filo-Sofija
|
2011
|
vol. 11
|
issue 4(15)
919-938
EN
There are three chief aims of the paper. First, it presents in short the beginning of the analytic philosophy of religion, its development, issues, and methods. Second, it puts forward a hypothesis that in the last five decades analytic philosophy of religion has been dominated by the epistemological paradigm, i.e. in most cases, any problem in question has been studied as part of the general problem of rationality of religious belief. That situation is changing slowly towards achieving more balance between the issues of epistemology of religion and those concerned with philosophical theology. Third, the paper provides criteria for the classification of the different ways to understand the rationality of religious belief: the rationalistic and evidentialist approach, the natural theology approach, the Wittgensteinian fideism and Reformed epistemology approaches. A brief description of each of those four positions in epistemology of religion is included.
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